The starkest examples of forced displacement and blocked return perpetrated by local forces related to the Shi’a Turkmen PMF forces in Tuz and Kirkuk governorate. As the larger Shi’a PMF groups (with Badr in charge, but accompanied by a range of other PMF factions) entered Tuz to halt or reverse ISIL’s course in 2014, they mobilized what effectively became local franchises or affiliates from among the Shi’a Turkmen population in Tuz. After the Shi’a PMF began more limited operations in Kirkuk in early 2015, they used the same strategy, again among the Shi’a Turkmen population. The larger PMF forces invested more training and resources in these Shi’a Turkmen affiliates than they did for most other local forces, perhaps in part because the larger Shi’a PMF forces had a more limited presence in Kirkuk and had agreed to withdraw from Tuz after its liberation (in both cases this was due to agreements with the KRG; see the description of control in the Tuz and Kirkuk case studies). Priming strong, locally rooted Shi’a forces was a way for these larger PMF units to keep a foothold of control in both areas. The shared sectarian outlook of these national and local forces was likely also a contributing factor.
At the time of GPPi’s research, Shi’a Turkmen forces held significant territory in Tuz and a smaller corridor of territory in Kirkuk, both relatively autonomously. They still reported to and consulted with their larger parent PMF forces, but the latter were less directly engaged in directing day-to-day activities. In both of these areas, the degree of local versus Shi’a PMF engagement shifted following Baghdad’s re-assertion of control over Kurdish-held territories in October 2017; however, Shi’a Turkmen PMF were still a strong force in Kirkuk and Tuz after this territorial shift, with an even wider area of operations and remit. For example, at the time of GPPi’s research in Tuz, local Shi’a Turkmen PMF maintained control of half of the district capital, Tuz Khurmatu city, and much of the southern half of the district, while the KRG retained control in the other half. When Kurdish forces were forced to leave in October 2017, PMF forces (not just local, but also the leading PMF forces described in the previous section) were free to carry out operations throughout the district.
Because local Shi’a Turkmen forces were in control and managing operations in these areas up until 2017, many of the numerous issues of forced displacement, blocked return and abuse of IDPs during this period can be attributed to these local forces. It is likely that the larger parent PMF forces, such as Badr or AAH, were tacitly aware of such abuses and thus are also to blame; however, in many cases, local actors appeared to be the ones motivating and driving these violations. Shi’a Turkmen PMF groups perpetrated numerous abuses and retaliatory acts against and destroyed much of the property and restricted the return of non-Shi’a Turkmen groups. Abuses by Shi’a Turkmen PMF (from petty harassment to mass arrests and targeted killings of community leaders) effectively emptied the formerly mixed neighborhoods of Tuz Khurmatu city of their Sunni Turkmen and Sunni Arab populations. At the time of research, locals from these neighborhoods estimated that only 5 – 10 percent of the original Sunni Arab population and 10 percent of the Sunni Turkmen population remained. Reports of Shi’a Turkmen attacks on Sunni Arab and Sunni Turkmen communities were fewer in areas outside of Tuz Khurmatu because there were few non-Shi’a Turkmen left. While nearly all families from Amerli’s three Turkmen Shi’a villages returned to their homes shortly after ISIL’s ouster, no Arabs or Sunni Turkmen (an estimated 15,000 families or more) had returned to areas controlled by the PMF. In their absence, Shi’a Turkmen PMF engaged in significant destruction of homes and property in non-Shi’a Turkmen communities. According to Human Rights Watch, the patterns of property destruction suggested an effort to permanently change the population dynamics.12 Locals whom GPPi interviewed tended to agree with these findings and argued that the property destruction in PMF-controlled Tuz was motivated by sectarian politics and an attempt to reshape who controlled certain areas within Tuz.
After the withdrawal of Kurdish forces from half of Tuz in October 2017, there was an outbreak of violence and clashes, particularly in the city of Tuz Khurmatu. This prompted a new round of displacement of Kurdish civilians, with estimates of up to 30,000 displaced, and further instances of retaliatory violence and property damage in their wake. These events took place after the period of GPPi research and represent another set of displacement issues or factors in that there were more actors involved than purely local or even national PMF units. Political uncertainty and reversal of control was likely as much of an issue as the presence or conduct of LHSFs. Nonetheless, Shi’a Turkmen PMF reportedly participated in retaliatory violence and their past behavior and treatment of civilians from outside the Shi’a Turkmen community likely contributed to the decision of many Kurdish residents to flee the area after they learned that these forces would be taking full control.
Although Shi’a Turkmen PMF controlled a smaller area in Kirkuk than they did in Tuz, similar patterns manifested in the zones of PMF control. The areas around Bashir in Kirkuk had traditionally been Shi’a Turkmen villages, surrounded by predominantly Sunni Arab villages. As of fall 2017, one-third of the Shi’a Turkmen families who had been displaced had returned, as opposed to a complete lack of Arab returns.13 A local official said that Turkmen PMF (in cooperation with Peshmerga and local police) actively stopped Arab IDPs at checkpoints, blocking them from returning. In 2018, Human Rights Watch reported continued forced displacement of Sunni communities in Kirkuk and destruction of their property by PMF fighters (in cooperation with Iraqi forces, who assumed control in late 2017).
Among the different local forces examined in GPPi’s research, the Shi’a Turkmen PMF exhibited the most abusive behavior toward other groups, creating the most concerning displacement and return patterns in their areas of operation. This is in part because they were stronger, enjoyed greater autonomy, and controlled a wider area than most other local forces, giving them the opportunity to exercise their agenda virtually unchecked. The connection with the larger Shi’a PMF groups likely helped, too. While the research findings strongly suggest that this severe exclusion and intimidation of non-Shi’a Turkmen communities in Tuz was largely initiated and driven by the local Shi’a Turkmen forces, it is likely that these abuses were known and possibly encouraged by their larger PMF parent forces. At a minimum, they did little to discourage or stop them, and the protection of these very powerful groups enabled the local PMF forces to do as they pleased.
Similar patterns of PMF protection and unchecked abuses by local forces manifested on a smaller scale (given the smaller scope of territorial control) in the Ninewa Plains (near Mosul) in 2017. A PMF-backed Shabak force controlled many of the key checkpoints in the southern Ninewa Plains, particularly around the entrance to Mosul. These Shabak forces had a thuggish reputation and their position of control appeared to be a factor deterring other groups from returning (levels of property destruction; lack of education, livelihood opportunities, or services; and comfortable resettlement elsewhere also influenced many IDPs’ decision not to return). Shabak communities rapidly returned to their home communities in the Ninewa Plains and even expanded into neighboring villages and cities, while most of the Kaldo-Assyrian or Christian and Sunni Arab communities that had previously dominated villages or cities in this area stayed away. The small, largely Christian city of Qaraqosh (one of the areas of GPPi research) saw virtually no return. Although this was partially due to other factors,14 these tensions between the Christian and Shabak communities (p. 16 – 8) were a significant driver, as was mistrust of the Shabak militias, who overwhelmed the local Christian forces in both numbers and capacity. Other organizations have reported similar tensions between Shabak or other Shi’a PMF forces and LHSFs mobilized from the Sunni tribal or Kaldo-Assyrian communities in other areas of the Ninewa Plains (see for example this Sanad profile of the nearby Tal Kayf area, p. 22 – 23).
All of the above-mentioned examples of abuse or discrimination committed by local forces have occurred in areas where local ethnic or sectarian rivalries bear heightened significance due to the diversity in these areas as well as long-standing inter-group tensions and the connection with broader political contests for control. However, local forces used their position of power to retaliate against rivals even where such larger communal splits and political fault lines were absent. In areas that were predominantly Sunni Arab, the divisions often manifested along tribal divisions or lines of local political rivalries. In Tikrit, for example, the extensive looting and property damage that took place during the initial displacement was said to have contributed significantly to residents’ flight from the city. As noted in the section above, IOM’s study on obstacles to return suggests that this property damage (which 57% of the IDPs from Tikrit attributed to ‘militias’ in the area) strengthened their reluctance to return (p. 27, 62). This initial looting and violence was publicly blamed on larger Shi’a PMF forces. However, GPPi’s research suggests that much of the violence was initiated and perpetrated (and, on some accounts, even led by) local Sunni PMF groups, who sought revenge against tribal rivals that had sided with ISIL. This is not to suggest that the Shi’a PMF did not also play a role in producing these significant displacement and return issues, but simply to underline that, in terms of causality, local actors and local motivations were sometimes as much to blame as the outsiders.
Similar examples of local, inter-tribal disputes interacting with LHSF-driven displacement manifested in other Sunni tribal areas, such as in Qayyara in Ninewa. However, many of these appeared connected with the “ISIL families” issue, and so will be further analyzed in the subsequent section.
Collective Punishment, Collective Blame: “ISIL Families” and Broader Government and Community Culpability
One of the most significant migration issues surrounded the forced displacement and blocked return of so-called ISIL families. It was an issue that many LHSFs contributed to, but often in partnership with or at the behest of a wider circle of government and community actors. The overall high level of resentment and hostility toward ISIL fueled a sort of collective punishment approach targeting anyone associated with ISIL members. This included not only those who had perhaps only cooperated with ISIL under duress, but also the wives, children and extended relations of those deemed to be ISIL members, which were commonly referred to as “ISIL families.” Severe abuse and discrimination against ISIL families strongly contributed to displacement and blocked return dynamics across all areas of GPPi’s research for this study.
Allegations of abuse and mistreatment against ISIL families manifested broadly across North and Central Iraq, including in Anbar, Babel, Diyala, Salah ad-Din, Ninewa, and Kirkuk governorates. Many men with any kind of ISIL association were detained or disappeared, and their wives, children or other family members faced severe harassment, discrimination, and sometimes even direct assault. For example, in Qayyara, a predominantly Sunni Arab subdistrict south of Mosul, those whom GPPi interviewed for this research reported that other members of the community threw grenades into the yards or at the homes of those they deemed to be “ISIL families.” Other homes of ISIL families in the area were burned or damaged (p. 36).
Such abuses were frequently carried out by members of LHSFs, but also by many other actors in the community. In fact LHSFs and Iraqi or Kurdish security forces as well as local officials often worked in tandem. For example, while Iraqi security forces carried out many detentions of alleged ISIL associates on their own, 15 they also often cooperated with PMF forces on these detentions (PMF units like Badr have had a long history of close cooperation with Iraqi forces, in particular a sort of “revolving door” between Badr members and members of the Federal Police; see examples here and here). During GPPi’s research in Qayyara, residents reported that some of those detained from their homes (presumably because of their ISIL affiliation) were detained by Shi’a PMF groups who worked closely with the Federal Police.16 Local security officers interviewed confirmed that, in cases where it was too sensitive for them to directly detain someone they or the community suspected of being an ISIL associate (presumably because there was insufficient evidence), they could ask nearby PMF forces to do so. The PMF Commission denies that its forces engaged in detention and Iraqi officials do not recognize that PMF units are allowed to detain individuals. However, reports of such tacit cooperation recurred throughout GPPi’s research areas, and are also supported by other organizations’ research and documentation.17
Such abuses, harassment and intimidation caused families or individuals who would be a likely target to remove themselves from communities or deterred them from returning. More directly, ISIL families were sometimes forcibly displaced to IDP camps, and their homes or property were destroyed in their absence to deter them from returning. This happened across the liberated areas. One interview with a local community advocate engaged in trying to negotiate the return of such families provides a sense of the scope: he said that, as of summer 2018, there were an estimated 96 “isolation camps” — the term used to describe the places in IDP camps where ISIL families were held.18
Once removed to IDP camps, ISIL families were typically kept separate from other IDPs and prevented from leaving. In some cases, they were not allowed to have access to mobile phones or legal support, placing them in what were effectively detention-like conditions, according to Human Rights Watch. Amnesty International reported that many of the ISIL families in these positions, which were usually headed by women, were denied the same aid or health access granted to other IDPs in the camps (sometimes directly by the PMF operating in or securing the camp area). Some of the affected women were sexually exploited and assaulted.
LHSFs were frequently and directly involved in such forced displacement. One of the most significant (documented) examples of this type of forced displacement happened in Shirqat, a district that was one of the last areas to be cleared and that many locals viewed as one of ISIL’s strongholds. In early 2017, because of ongoing security concerns and the suspicion of Shirqat residents, security forces — including notable engagement by both Shi’a PMF and local Sunni tribal PMF units — forced 110 to 125 so-called ISIL families to relocate to the Shahama IDP camp. Although the incident was so controversial that the political authorities immediately disavowed any responsibility, research suggests that both the Salah ad-Din governorate council and the local council in Shirqat authorized this forced displacement. As such, the illegal forced displacement and de facto detention of these families was executed by LHSF groups, but on the orders of Iraqi authorities.
In other areas, communities and tribal hierarchies took the lead. In Qayyara, a tribal sheikh told GPPi that a meeting of tribal elders, which local government officials also attended, had determined that ISIL families should be expelled and forced into IDP camps. Another elder said that the mothers, wives and other relatives of alleged ISIL supporters or collaborators had already been sent to live in the Jeddah IDP camp in Qayyara city. In these cases, while the presence of Sunni tribal PMF groups19 and their availability to enforce the displacement may have contributed pressure, the driving force behind it was the community’s will. Similar reports of informal pressure, backed by local authorities and LHSFs, recurred and continued throughout Sunni tribal communities in Ninewa, Salah ad-Din and Kirkuk.
Once displaced, ISIL families as well as other IDPs without connections to them were blocked from returning. Before IDPs were allowed to return to their homes in liberated areas, they had to be screened or ‘vetted’ for possible ISIL affiliation. The lack of transparency in this process and the ad hoc nature of its implementation meant that such vetting was frequently used to prevent ISIL families from returning even if they did not pose a security threat that should to justify their exclusion.20 In some cases, there were also direct governmental or tribal edicts that forbade ISIL families from returning to particular localities. For example, Amnesty International (p. 35 – 36) reported several accounts of the Shirqat local or tribal authorities (accounts differed on this) passing a law or edict banning that wives of so-called ISIL families from returning until they remarried.
LHSFs tended not to be directly engaged in producing such edicts (although Amnesty found one example of a supposedly PMF-instituted return ban in Hamam Alil, south of Mosul; see p. 36). However, they were strongly engaged in enforcing these bans or discriminatory vetting practices through their control of checkpoints. For example, in IOM’s study of obstacles to return, stoppages at checkpoints were identified as the second most common instrument for blocking IDPs’ return. Moreover, ‘militias’ and the Asayish (the KRG internal security forces) were the actors that were reported to be most frequently involved in stopping IDPs from returning (p. 14).
The broad discrimination enabled by the poorly managed vetting process and the general stigma against ISIL families was also problematic because it facilitated some of the other politically, sectarian or ethnically motivated discrimination or abuses described in the preceding sections. As the previous section has suggested, in many cases, abuse or blocked return was connected to other political agendas or motivations of control. As such, the “ISIL association” moniker (as a valid reason to reject individuals or families) helped legitimize and enable discriminatory return policies writ large, and thus contributed to overall politicization of displacement issues.
Divided Authority and System Effects
A last point to consider is how the larger phenomenon of LHSF mobilization affected the management of migration issues. Three clear trend lines stood out in terms of these systemic effects: (1) The effects of a multiplicity of actors on the rule of law and perceptions of insecurity; (2) how multiple actors and unclear mandates inhibited an effective administration of migration; and (3) how the presence and/or reputation of LHSFs complicated humanitarian actors’ work.
Rule of Law Effects
One consequence of the post-2014 security response and the mass mobilization and deputization of sub-state and local forces may have been that it exacerbated displacement issues and complicated return, recovery, and re-establishment of rule of law. Several of GPPi’s case study areas saw the presence of a multitude of LHSFs with obscure lines of authority and often weak command and control structures. In many cases, these groups were competing with each other, resulting in frequent armed clashes and other acts of retaliation or tit-for-tat violence. These multiple forces also were frequently stronger (having more men and more arms) than the local police or authorities, making it difficult to keep them in check. Many of these quickly mobilized and scantily vetted forces included criminals and former insurgents. All of these factors contributed to higher levels of criminality, impunity and overall insecurity, which undermined the rule of law environment. These negative rule of law effects were most prominent in urban areas like Mosul, Tikrit, or Tal Afar city. However, such effects were also present in other non-urban areas where multiple, competing LHSFs with loose discipline or control were present.
Information gathered through qualitative interviews suggests that this erosion of the rule of law environment and perceptions of insecurity had many negative consequences in the case study areas. Most relevant for this essay, they helped to deter IDPs from returning and resettling or, in some cases, provoked renewed displacement. Insecurity in the area of origin has consistently been one of the top reasons for not returning home given by IDPs (see examples of these findings here, here, and here). There are multiple factors driving those perceptions of insecurity, including active fighting in some areas. However, weak rule of law and increased criminality and lawlessness are certainly important contributing factors.
In addition to GPPi’s observations, other studies have found a strong correlation between the presence of multiple security actors and a lack of return of IDPs. IOM conducts a regular (monthly) survey to assess conditions of return across Iraq, and one of the data points or indicators it monitors is whether four or more security actors are operating in the area. Those involved in monitoring and collecting this data said that this observation of ‘four or more’ security actors present was one of the strongest indicators for return ‘hotspots,’ meaning areas where the conditions for return were poor and displacement was prolonged.21 A November 2018 report by IOM further contextualized this within a general discussion of security factors: “[r]esults from the Return Index indicate that a location with the presence of a multiplicity of security actors is significantly less likely to have returns than a location with a smaller number of actors — this holds particularly true within the districts of Khanaqin, Telafar, Muqdadiya, Khalis and Tooz Khormatu” (p. 17). Although not conclusive, GPPi’s and IOM’s data both suggest that there is a correlation between the proliferation of multiple security actors in an area and worse displacement and return effects.
Complex Migration Management
The presence of multiple subgroups and security actors in general also created negative migration trends by hampering the administration of return. In the same November 2018 report noted above, IOM suggested that one reason that the presence of multiple armed groups might correlate with a lack of return in the respective areas was by inhibiting the administration of return: “[m]ultiplicity oftentimes brings confusion as to who is in control of locations and which protocols residents need to follow, issues ultimately linked to safety perceptions and affecting the likelihood to return” (p. 17).
This was most apparent in the way that LHSF participation in the vetting system inhibited smooth or regular return. Before IDPs were allowed to return to their homes in Baghdad-controlled areas, they had to be screened or ‘vetted’ for a possible ISIL affiliation by submitting their personal documentation to the Operations Command Center in the governorate to which they wanted to return. These centers were a joint venture by the Directorate of Security Intelligence, the National Security Agency, Iraqi Special Forces, the Iraqi army, police, and armed groups. However, many of these security actors maintained their own databases of suspected ISIL affiliates and each family member had to receive clearance from all databases. Not only was this process lengthy,22 but the databases often contradicted each other and the process by which an individual might be blacklisted was unclear. LHSFs were yet another layer within this already complex system of vetting and return. Stronger PMF forces reportedly kept their own databases and lists, and could submit information to influence who was on the official lists of blocked individuals.
In addition to adding to the overall cacophony of overlapping vetting lists and databases, LHSFs made the application of vetting even more irregular at the point of return. Many LHSFs were in control of checkpoints, which is where the final decision on whether permission to return or to pass through a transit point en route to return would be permitted. Although in theory all LHSFs manning checkpoints would have had the same lists of who was authorized to return, and regular procedures for permitting return, in practice, the ways that these rules were implemented was as numerous as the LHSFs themselves. This was partly to do with multiple lists of vetted individuals as well as the fact that they were poorly updated. But it is also because many LHSF forces at checkpoints applied their own rules and scrutiny. The contradictory and only loosely regulated vetting process allowed ample opportunities for LHSFs to exploit their position of control to allow IDPs in or not, regardless of the formal paperwork.
As a whole, many humanitarian actors objected to the way that this vetting process placed security actors in control of managing return flows, to the often discriminatory standards and processes developed, and to the irregular way in which they were applied. However, the fact that poorly screened and controlled LHSFs could significantly influence and shape such processes made them even more problematic.
Challenges for Humanitarian Actors
The large presence of LHSFs also impacted displacement and return by making it harder for humanitarians to administer aid and returns. Humanitarian actors played a critical role in providing for the millions of IDPs and returnees, but their ability to do so depended on access and on cooperation with security actors in charge of local areas. This was hampered by the predominance of LHSFs in a number of ways. First, the sheer number of armed groups and unclear lines of authority made it difficult to establish the sort of working relationships necessary to develop humanitarian operations. Given the complexity and constantly fluctuating nature of the security sector (in part due to the plethora of actors), it was not always clear who was in charge, and how long their influence or control would last.
Second, many of the LHSFs in control of local areas had a poor reputation and a record of abuses. As such, humanitarian actors were often reluctant to work with them, either out of concern for staff safety, due to reservations that working with these actors would violate humanitarian principles of neutrality and ‘do no harm’, or that such cooperation might imperil future funding. As noted earlier, several of the most prominent PMF groups were either on US terrorist watch lists or had members or leaders who were (notably Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, who oversees overall PMF operations). By establishing a relationship with one of these armed groups — even if intended to facilitate humanitarian aid — humanitarian organizations risked violating material support to terrorism laws in the US, an important donor.
However, avoiding working with these actors – the major PMF forces in particular – posed a dilemma for humanitarians: these LHSFs controlled major swaths of territory and their permission or cooperation might be required in order to deliver aid or facilitate return to some areas. Not working with them would result in vulnerable populations receiving little or no support. A small number of humanitarian groups ultimately developed working ground relationships with PMF and those that did were able to provide assistance in areas where other NGOs or aid organizations were unable to work. These relationships, where established, could be productive – one aid worker interviewed for this research found the PMF organizations the interviewee had worked with to be extremely open to facilitating aid delivery, noting that they tended to respect the lines drawn by the organization in terms of maintaining their independence and neutrality. However, these types of partnerships were the exception rather than the rule, meaning that many vulnerable populations in PMF-controlled areas received insufficient assistance. In addition, those organizations that did work with PMF in this way kept their operations quiet, which inhibited broader cooperation and administration of aid.
Conclusion
Returning to the original prompt for this research and this essay: did the mass mobilization or deputization of so many LHSFs exacerbate displacement and impede return in Iraq? As a whole, the evidence suggests that it did, that LHSFs produced a number of negative consequences for displacement and return. Direct abuses, harassment or discrimination by LHSFs sparked fear in parts of the civilian population, spurring displacement or deterring return. LHSFs participated in the forcible displacement of civilians and blocked the return of IDPs in areas or checkpoints they controlled. The presence of so many competing security actors also impaired the overall climate for return and hampered the administration of migration policies and support. In short, the ways that LHSFs have negatively influenced displacement or return are as varied as the types of LHSFs themselves.
However, for many of the problematic trends described above, LHSFs were not the sole culprits. In many cases, the abuses, rights violations, or discriminatory return policies perpetrated by LHSFs were instigated by or happened at the behest of larger community or political actors. Abuses committed by PMF forces in the wake of liberation as well as looting, acts of retaliation, extrajudicial or illegal detentions, or harassment of segments of the population were often carried out alongside Iraqi forces, suggesting tacit cooperation, if not direct complicity. Abuses and exclusionary strategies by local forces very frequently reflected larger ethnic, sectarian, or tribal splits within those communities, and were encouraged or abetted by other formal or informal actors in the community. Many of the worst instances of forced displacement or blocked return, such as those against purported ISIL families or against Sunni Arab communities, were in conformity with KRG, governorate or local Iraqi official policies. From this perspective, while LHSFs were certainly at the tip of the spear of discriminatory and violent displacement and return policies, their actions reflected a deeper and more problematic politicization of displacement. The displacement and (blocked) return of populations was instrumentalized by all sides — from national to local stakeholders, on the Baghdad and the KRG side, by state and sub-state actors and forces — and used as a strategy for political and territorial control. While this has been a long-standing issue in Iraq, and a tactic used consistently at different historical periods, it should be noted that this is not the case for all post-conflict or conflict environments, or at least not to the same degree.23
Nonetheless, although LHSFs were not the sole cause of problematic migration trends in Iraq, their presence appears to have exacerbated them. LHSFs did not invent discriminatory or exclusionary displacement policies, but their presence heightened the risk of this happening in many areas. Because LHSFs were often mobilized along existing fault lines, there was a greater likelihood of them using their dominance in certain areas to disadvantage or persecute other rival or hostile groups. In addition, local control by these often partisan security actors offered new opportunities for local, national and regional actors to exercise exclusionary strategies. Beyond these deliberate, exclusionary policies, the last section also highlighted a number of indirect or unintended consequences of the mass mobilization of so many substate actors. The presence of so many armed actors (by virtue of the mobilization of so many LHSFs) and convoluted lines of control weakened the rule of law and contributed to an environment not suited for return and recovery. The presence and actions of LHSFs made an already ad hoc and complex returns management system even more opaque and arbitrary, and hampered the work of humanitarian actors.
Lastly, the nature and character of LHSFs appears to have made a difference. Although there was variation from one type of force to another, LHSFs as a whole appeared to be more undisciplined and abusive, and civilians (including would-be returnees) did not trust them. There is certainly no shortage of criticism of Iraqi forces’ misconduct nor of that of Peshmerga fighters (some of which was described in the first section). However, in general, the different PMF forces — local and national — demonstrated less discipline and professionalism than state forces and tended to be more frequently associated with abusive behavior. As the Iraqi government and security forces resumed their control in different areas, return flows tended to increase — a pattern observed across all of GPPi’s research areas and also supported by other work tracking migration patterns in Iraq. GPPi’s interviews with those in liberated areas suggested that this was in part because civilians simply trusted and preferred Iraqi officials and security forces to LHSFs. Even those civilians or local authorities with relatives in different PMF forces tended to say that they preferred that the responsibility for security be in the hands of regular, state security forces. 24 These findings suggest a number of important recommendations or cautions going forward, both for the immediate situation in Iraq and more generally for future situations where LHSFs predominate:
LHSFs, Local Reconciliation, and Return. Going forward, addressing the influence of LHSFs appears to be crucial to ensuring the safe return of the two million Iraqis still displaced. Other organizations’ analyses of protracted displacement have identified a number of geographic hotspots — localities that, so far, have seen low return rates and in which the current conditions make an immediate and full return unlikely. Many of these return hotspots overlap with areas where GPPi also identified LHSF-driven displacement and return issues. This connection is a bit of a chicken-or-egg question — did LHSFs create the pernicious dynamics that make these areas ‘return’ hotspots? Or were LHSFs able to take control because these areas were already fragile or more prone to the type of conflict and social cleavages that might also deter return? While both cases could be made, LHSF competition and the related security problems are undoubtedly now a major factor in protracted displacement in these hotspots. IDPs stay away because they fear retaliation or abuse from these actors, or because they see them as a marker of continued insecurity, inter-communal tensions, and of likely future clashes.
Encouraging populations to return and stabilizing these areas will likely require some steps to get these LHSF tensions under control. Doing so is not so simple, however, precisely because of the intertwined nature of these issues. In many of these areas – for example, in Tal Afar, the Ninewa Plains, Sinjar, Tuz Khurmatu, or Kirkuk – the issues with LHSFs and the root causes of protracted displacement come back to the same long-standing ethnic, sectarian or political tensions in these areas. As a result, addressing issues surrounding LHSFs (both those related to displacement and more broadly) will require making progress on some of the underlying community and political tensions in these areas, as well as some potential progress along national fault lines. For example, in places like Tal Afar, local organizations have already been working to negotiate security guarantees among local actors to reassure civilians of safe return. However, given that the political and security issues in Tal Afar stem from both long-standing sectarian conflict and regional geopolitical competition between Turkey and Iran, local guarantees will only be successful with the full buy-in of these larger parties. Similarly, tensions in the Ninewa Plains area – which manifest both in LHSF competition and in disparities in different groups’ return – require both local trust-building among the different factions in these diverse, multi-ethnic and multi-sectarian communities, as well as some sense of larger resolution of the standoff between Baghdad and the KRG.
This type of local-to-national mediation, trust-building and reconciliation is already happening in many hotspot areas, much of it led by the National Reconciliation Committee and also facilitated by local organizations. However, so far many of these initiatives have happened on an ad hoc basis, have been under-resourced, and not well synced with larger recovery and stabilization programming. Given the importance of such local peacebuilding for addressing both return and LHSFs issues, initiatives such as these must be broadened and better resourced.
Vetting and De-Securitization of Return. A long-standing concern of humanitarians has been that the security vetting process vests predominant control of return in security actors rather than in civilian administrators. This process, together with the broad application of the ISIL families or ISIL affiliates monikers, have had the effect of securitizing IDP administration. The preference for a fully civilian-managed system of return was difficult to put into effect in the immediate aftermath of ISIL’s ouster because full civilian control and services had not yet been restored to many areas. However, as Iraq transitions to more of a stabilization and reconstruction mode, it is more realistic to de-securitize the management of displacement and return. A first step on that agenda of transitioning returnee management would be taking LHSFs out of the process. This involves not only removing LHSF input from vetting management lists and databases but imposing tighter scrutiny of allegations of blocked returns and detentions of IDPs by LHSFs along migration routes.
ISIL Families. Although much broader than the issue of LHSF control, there must be an end to the practice of segregating ISIL families in isolation camps. This issue is challenging because the security of these families is not guaranteed in their home communities. Even when permitted to return some women and children who have been branded as ISIL families express a desire to stay in the IDP camps because they do not trust guarantees for their safety in their home communities. Reintegration will likely be a continuing process for many years to come, and will require dedicated monitoring and protection resources at both a national and local level. Notwithstanding these challenges, the alternative of maintaining IDP camps as effective detention or holding sites is not a long-term solution. The status and funding of camps over the next one to five years is a major challenge that the international community can use as leverage to encourage action on the part of the Iraqi government to resolve these issues of blocked return.
Humanitarian Policies. The dilemmas that humanitarians face in cooperating with LHSFs to deliver aid is an ongoing challenge in Iraq, and one that is likely to arise in other contexts. Not only in Iraq, but broadly across the region, humanitarians are frequently placed in the difficult situation that they must work with LHSFs in order to deliver aid, but because of the irregular status of these actors and donor limitations on working with them, they must do so at their own risk and without the full humanitarian infrastructure at their disposal. The full legalization of the PMF and its increasing institutionalization within the Iraqi government makes it increasingly impossible to keep distance from these groups, but the continuing stigma has made it difficult for humanitarian organizations to develop appropriate policies that allow them to maintain their neutrality while still effectively delivering aid.
The issue of whether to recognize groups within the PMF as the de facto authorities or at least as significant influencers within an area begs a larger policy question of whether engagement or isolation is a better strategy in dealing with such groups. While Western donors are not likely to openly embrace the PMF groups soon, at least some of the groups within the PMF have demonstrated a greater interest in controlling unruly forces and supporting the Iraqi government. A strategy of engagement that recognizes and rewards these distinctions, or at least allows humanitarians to do so where they find LHSFs to be constructive partners, might ease some of the tensions surrounding LHSFs and displacement management.
