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India as a Humanitarian Donor in the 21st Century: The Seeds of a More Ambitious Role

Abstract. *This paper studies India as a humanitarian donor against the backdrop of the country’s recent emergence in the international aid architecture. Has India grown to match its global potential in the area of humanitarian action? This paper finds that the country’s humanitarian action lacks strategic direction and remains a subsection of its development cooperation. This may partly be explained by India’s undersized and fragmented foreign aid infrastructure. New Delhi’s strong verbal support for the multilateral humanitarian system has thus far not resulted in marked action. Lacking a global vision, India’s modest humanitarian contributions are strongly focused on its neighborhood and mostly denote in-kind relief materials (food, medicines). Other strategic goals, such as trade and New Delhi’s bid to become a permanent member of the UNSC, do not seem to play a significant role. All things being equal, current investments in human resources to overcome fragmentation and growing participation in global policy fora will only pay long-term dividends.*

Keywords: *India, United Nations, humanitarian, aid, emerging donor*

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1. Introduction

The Indian Finance Minister dismissed British aid to India as “peanuts” in the midst of the heated debate over Britain’s overseas expenditures last year.¹ This cheeky remark signposts that India’s transformation to a net donor, first announced in the 2003-2004 budget speech,² has drawn to an end. Prompted by growth and global aspirations,³ Indian ministries and agencies disbursed \$1 billion for overseas projects in 2007.⁴ In 2011, India ranked as the second largest emerging donor after China with an estimated \$1,5 billion overseas disbursements.⁵ In the meantime, foreign aid projects managed by the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) alone more than doubled, from \$300 million in 2007 to over \$700 million in 2012.⁶

Manifestly emerging as a donor country,⁷ India’s humanitarian contributions have nonetheless idled in the past 10 years. The country’s humanitarian budget, averaging at \$40 million, corresponds roughly to that of Luxembourg.⁸ As New Delhi actively bids for permanent membership in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), the limited resources it devotes to humanitarian action is striking. After all, the coordination and implementation of humanitarian aid is one of the fundamental responsibilities of the United Nations system.

Idle humanitarian contributions, on the other hand, are increasingly characterized by a shift from bilateral to multilateral, albeit dominantly earmarked financing. India provided over \$20 million through a United Nations appeal in response to the 2010 floods in Pakistan and has dispatched more than 100 thousand tons of high-energy biscuits to Afghanistan through the World Food Programme (WFP) to date.

Has India grown to match its global potential in the area of humanitarian action? Most research on India’s emergence as a donor has focused on development cooperation.⁹ Only a few studies, notably Price (2005) and Meier and Murthy (2011),¹⁰ analyzed India’s humanitarian assistance in detail. In answering the above question, this paper (i) examines the setup and recent changes in India’s foreign aid infrastructure; (ii) analyzes the country’s integration in the global humanitarian system; and (iii) gives a detailed account of India’s humanitarian portfolio in the last ten years based on data acquired from a 2012 Right to Information claim.

2. India's foreign aid infrastructure

The same institutional arrangement services India's overseas development and humanitarian portfolio. The Ministry of External Relations (MEA), the lead decision making outfit in India's foreign aid infrastructure however uses specific terminology, such as "disaster relief", "flood relief", "cash assistance", "food assistance", "medical relief" and "humanitarian assistance" to distinguish humanitarian action from development cooperation.¹¹

Projects worth more than \$18 million (1 billion Indian rupees) require the approval of the cabinet.¹² In all cases, however, the geographically specialized political divisions of the MEA are the drivers of India's foreign aid portfolio – alongside with a whole range of bilateral and multilateral tasks. These divisions are headed by joint secretaries (heads of desks), who hold substantial power within the Ministry's bureaucracy due to generally weak policy planning.¹³ The largest, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Maldives (BSM) Division staffs nine diplomats, wherein "one person handle[d] aid to Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Maldives and Burma" in 2011.¹⁴

In early 2012, five years after its first official announcement,¹⁵ the Development Partnership Administration (DPA) was established within the Ministry to oversee India's foreign aid portfolio and thus carve out a more strategic direction for India's ever-growing but hitherto chiefly ad-hoc foreign assistance. Establishing the DPA hence addresses the comparative shortcomings of India's overseas projects, particularly vis-à-vis China,¹⁶ with slow implementation and the misuse of funds across political divisions.¹⁷

The Development Partnership Administration is composed of three divisions: "DPA-I deals with project appraisal and lines of credit; DPA II deals with capacity building schemes, disaster relief, Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation Programme and DPA III deals with project implementation."¹⁸

With 16 diplomats, DPA is the largest political unit within the MEA by far and is led, similar to the Pakistan, Afghanistan & Iran (PAI) division, by an additional secretary (higher in ranks than joint secretaries).¹⁹ So, if size and leadership can be any indication, the Development Partnership Administration is likely to assume an important role within the MEA. Importantly, it will nurse a quasi-permanent cadre of staff with specialized knowledge in development cooperation and humanitarian action to overcome the lack of institutional knowledge within the Ministry.²⁰

Akin to its foreign policy, India's lack of "strategic culture" thwarts its global humanitarian engagement.²¹ Most evidence suggests that decision making has not and will not be transferred from geographic divisions to the DPA. A joint secretary stated in 2012, for example, that "[DPA] will only implement the policies given by the political wing of the MEA, the Minister, the Foreign Secretary, the Secretaries and the territorial divisions."²² Further exacerbating this fragmentation, India still lacks a formal humanitarian (and development) policy, so internal turf battles are likely to hamper the coherent, strategic allocation of funds in the foreseeable future.²³

The establishment of the DPA is in line with the larger aim of strengthening the Indian Foreign Service.²⁴ While the MEA's yearly budget corresponds roughly to that of Brazil,²⁵ there are about

twice as many Brazilian and even more Chinese diplomats than Indians.²⁶ Out of the 815 Indian diplomats in 2011-2012, 542 were staffed in the 162 Indian missions and posts abroad.²⁷ Allegedly, the US embassy in New Delhi alone hosts more than 600 diplomats.²⁸

Strengthening the MEA serves to improve Indian capacity to address global challenges and hence further raise the country's profile in developing and crisis-hit countries.²⁹ The country's UNSC bid is but one of such initiatives to benefit from improved interstate relations. Clearly considered a high-priority issue, the MEA's general and foreign aid budget was expanded for the financial year 2013-2014,³⁰ despite budget cuts across the board over growing fiscal deficit.³¹

The MEA is not the only relevant actor in India's humanitarian infrastructure. The National Crisis Management Committee (NCMC), an inter-ministerial coordination forum steering the country's internationally renowned domestic disaster response,³² has also reacted to crises abroad. And while the Ministry of External Affairs is not a member, the Ministry of Defence sent the military to provide humanitarian aid in Sri Lanka and the Maldives in coordination with the NCMC. In a similar vein, the National Disaster Management Authority (within the Ministry of Home Affairs) dispatched its National Disaster Response Force to Japan, following the earthquake in 2011.³³




Chart 1: Humanitarian infrastructure in India (Source: GPPi)

3. Verbal support for the humanitarian system

The manifest “bilateralization” of humanitarian aid in the past two decades has been undermining the ability of implementing agencies to provide impartial and independent aid free from the interests of donor governments.³⁴ Core contributions to multilateral agencies, by contrast, boost agency-level deliberation over humanitarian action and silent speculations over subordinating needs-based humanitarian action to geopolitical or other considerations.³⁵

Troubled by this dynamic, New Delhi expressed its concerns with the “use of bilateral agencies and international NGOs for delivering humanitarian assistance [and claimed] that multilateral mechanisms are the appropriate channel” in 2001.³⁶ In 2010, albeit with a focus on development cooperation, the Indian Minister of External Affairs reiterated this concern and called for the “manifold increase [in] needs-based activities, especially ‘core’ untied funding.”³⁷

New Delhi supports the reformed humanitarian system,³⁸ and “believes that the United Nations must coordinate international humanitarian assistance [and] that the UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) are key mechanisms for strengthening this capacity.”³⁹ In 2011, the Prime Minister even called on the United Nations to “lead efforts in the area of food security.”⁴⁰

In spite of these declarations, New Delhi has not been at the forefront of core multilateral contributions. On the contrary, most of its humanitarian aid is bilateral or earmarked. Other than symbolic contributions to UNHCR, India has only provided voluntary core funding to the CERF, UN Women and the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). In the last ten years, these contributions constituted less than 2% of India’s humanitarian allocations (*see Table 2 below*).⁴¹

A loud advocate of state sovereignty,⁴² India has religiously warned against extending UNHCR’s mandate to include the protection of internally displaced persons.⁴³ It has also called for the “more meaningful inter-governmental oversight” of the UN’s humanitarian programs.⁴⁴ A fitting way to do so is joining OCHA’s Donor Support Group, a club of donors providing a modest \$0,5 million core contribution to OCHA. India signaled its intention to join in 2006,⁴⁵ but unlike other emerging donors, such as Russia or the United Arab Emirates, it remains an outsider.⁴⁶

India’s inattention to multilateral humanitarian institutions is all the more surprising given its aspiration to become a permanent member in the Security Council of the United Nations. Humanitarian action, similar to development cooperation, projects soft power in crisis-hit countries and thereby garners support for Indian initiatives in the UN and beyond.⁴⁷

Most recently, however, India has received OCHA’s head, Under-Secretary-General and Emergency Relief Coordinator Valerie Amos for dialogue that “boosted cooperation on the working level” between the parties.⁴⁸ The Indian ambassador to the UN now partakes in the Dialogue on Humanitarian Partnerships, a high-level policy dialogue between traditional and emerging humanitarian donors in New York.⁴⁹ New Delhi has even pondered joining the Good Humanitarian Donorship Initiative, an informal donor forum promoting good practice.⁵⁰

4. The volume and distribution of India’s humanitarian aid 2001-2012

India does not fully report its humanitarian contributions to UN OCHA’s Financial Tracking System; hence, a hitherto unpublished dataset – with information from a 2012 Right to Information claim, MEA annual reports, the Food Aid Information System, Indian embassy websites and other open sources – is used in the following sections.⁵¹

The volume of Indian humanitarian aid has not increased substantially in the past eight years. The country’s yearly contributions correspond roughly to Luxembourg’s humanitarian budget and fall significantly short of Gulf donors’ or Turkey’s (over \$100 million)⁵² and that of Northern donors, such as Sweden or the United Kingdom (over \$700 million).⁵³




Table 1: India’s overall humanitarian contributions by year, in current US dollars (Source: Compiled by the author)

India’s humanitarian portfolio displays clear regional patterns. So-called neighboring countries, such as Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Pakistan and Sri Lanka received over two-thirds of all assistance over the past 10 years (see Table 2 below).

Afghanistan, the largest beneficiary stands out with a school feeding program worth almost \$125 million. In the context of this program, India, the second largest wheat producer in the world, transformed over one million tons of wheat into high-energy biscuits for distribution by the World Food Programme in Afghanistan. Transportation has been a “considerable logistical exercise”⁵⁴ as Pakistan would not always allow transiting aid shipments to Afghanistan;⁵⁵ hence, Indian manufactured biscuits would be shipped through Iran. Surprisingly, it did not occur to India, the fifth largest bilateral donor for Afghan development and loud advocate of linking relief, recovery and development,⁵⁶ to find a more sustainable solution for its humanitarian program. Instead, in 2012, Canada sponsored the establishment of a factory in Kabul to produce high-energy biscuits locally.⁵⁷

Indian assistance to its neighbors has been predominantly in-kind: medical teams, medicines, wheat and construction material for shelters. This applies to almost all humanitarian aid to Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, the Maldives, Nepal and Bangladesh. Seemingly an outlier, in early 2005, Bangladesh received \$21,5 million of cash assistance, but a memorandum of understanding was signed between the two countries to constrain the procurement of relief items to India.⁵⁸ Pakistan accepted in-kind assistance from India after the 2005 Kashmir earthquake,

whereas \$15,5 million-worth relief supplies were transported through the Line of Control. Following the 2010 and 2011 floods, however, the government of Pakistan refused direct Indian assistance, therefore New Delhi turned into the largest contributor to the UN OCHA-administered Pakistan Emergency Response Fund (\$20 million).⁵⁹

The remaining one-third of Indian humanitarian assistance is evenly shared between different geographic regions: the Middle East and North Africa, Southeast and East Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, the Americas, the Commonwealth of Independent Countries. Indian trade and foreign policy initiatives, such as Focus Africa, Focus CIS⁶⁰ or Look East⁶¹ were not supported by humanitarian projects to the fullest extent; rather, India's humanitarian presence in these regions has stayed constant over the years.

A shift can only be observed with regard to Latin America and the Caribbean. From 2001 to 2008, India spent altogether less than \$1,5 million on humanitarian assistance in this region. From 2009, its assistance rose to roughly \$2 million per year, not counting one-time \$5 million cash donations to Chile and Haiti in 2010.⁶² This rise in humanitarian donations was accompanied by the establishment of embassies in New Delhi and respective Latin American capitals. The Latin American region also stands out for being the only region receiving predominantly cash assistance; this might be due to its geographic distance from India.⁶³

In the Middle East, India's support for Palestinian statehood was reinforced by continued humanitarian commitments bilaterally as well as through UNRWA.⁶⁴ Iraq was a regular recipient of Indian high-energy biscuits and India sponsored UN OCHA's coordination in Libya and neighboring countries with \$1 million. Most recently, India pledged \$2,5 million to cover the United Nations' \$1,5 billion-worth appeal for Syria.⁶⁵

The most regular recipient of Indian humanitarian aid aside from neighboring countries is probably the DPRK with quasi-yearly, 2 thousand tons rice shipments. In Southeast Asia, the Indian army delivered significant in-kind assistance to Indonesia, following the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami and the 2006 Java earthquake.

Indian assistance to Sub-Saharan Africa has been rather steady, averaging at roughly \$2 million per year and distributed among 28 countries. Sudan, the biggest single recipient in the region received a one-time 10 thousand tons donation of wheat in the financial year 2004-2005 to "help [the] people in Darfur."⁶⁶

As already suggested by the examples above, the most common method to deliver in-kind humanitarian aid is through the Indian military (e.g. after the 2004 tsunami) or the World Food Programme, most prominently in Afghanistan, Iraq and North Korea (DPRK). Cash assistance is deposited on the affected government's account or distributed by Indian embassies in form of vouchers.⁶⁷

Only on occasion does India provide humanitarian aid through private actors. The Rama Krishna charity, the ICRC and Caritas distributed Indian aid in Sri Lanka in 2005, 2008 and 2010 respectively.⁶⁸ The Indian Red Cross has delivered aid to Iran.⁶⁹

In two instances, Indian States financed humanitarian action in consultation with the central government: Tamil Nadu donated for the ICRC's work in Sri Lanka in 2008-2009 and Kerala to Pakistan in 2010.⁷⁰ In addition, private pharmaceutical companies provided medicines after natural disasters, notably, in Moldova and the Ukraine.

<i>I. Tied funding 2001-2012 (bilateral or earmarked)</i>	<i>Cash</i>	<i>In-kind</i>	<i>Regional total</i>	<i>Share of grand total</i>
Neighbors	21,6%	78,4%	313.412.000	68,5%
Afghanistan	0	127.007.000	127.007.000	
Bangladesh	31.591.000	53.454.000	85.045.000	
Sri Lanka	25.000	42.020.000	42.045.000	
Pakistan	26.230.000	15.500.000	41.730.000	
Bhutan	7.392.000	0	7.392.000	
Nepal	1.637.000	4.527.000	6.164.000	
Maldives	0	3.079.000	3.079.000	
Myanmar	950.000	0	950.000	
Sub-Sharan Africa*	27,6%	72,4%	21.175.000	4,6%
Sudan	0	3.340.000	3.340.000	
Uganda	1.700.000	700.000	2.400.000	
Djibuti	0	2.000.000	2.000.000	
Ethiopia	0	1.540.000	1.540.000	
Latin-America*	86,3%	13,7%	21.070.000	4,6%
Haiti	5.726.000	50.000	5.776.000	
Chile	5.000.000	0	5.000.000	
Cuba	2.000.000	0	2.000.000	
Colombia	1.000.000	1.000.000	2.000.000	
MENA*	12,6%	87,4%	20.719.000	4,5%
Iraq	0	8.203.000	8.203.000	
Palestine	0	3.192.000	3.192.000	
Lebanon	0	2.300.000	2.300.000	
Yemen	0	2.187.000	2.187.000	
Libya	1.000.000	737.000	1.737.000	
Southeast and East Asia*	16,2%	83,8%	16.388.000	3,6%
China	0	5.000.000	5.000.000	
Indonesia	0	5.000.000	5.000.000	
DPRK	1.000.000	3.116.000	4.116.000	
CIS*	37,3%	62,7%	14.235.000	3,1%
Mongolia	0	7.053.000	7.053.000	
Tajikistan	5.200.000	0	5.200.000	
Europe and North America*	90,0%	10,0%	5.555.000	1,2%
United States	5.000.000	500.000	5.500.000	
<i>II. Untied core funding 2001-2012</i>	100,0%	0,0%	7.713.000	1,7%
CERF	3.500.000	-	3.500.000	
UNRWA	3.096.000	-	3.096.000	
UN Women	1.020.000	-	1.020.000	
UNHCR	97.000	-	97.000	
Grand TOTAL (I+II)	26,8%	73,2%	457.830.000	100,0%

* countries receiving over \$1,5 million are listed. Regional totals are inclusive of all donations

Table 2: India's cash and in-kind humanitarian contributions 2001-2012 by recipient (Source: Compiled by the author)

5. Conclusion

Despite India's weighty emergence in the international aid architecture, the country remains a lightweight player in humanitarian action. New Delhi's humanitarian budget has not followed the manifold expansion of its development cooperation programs, but idled to be wafted away by fragmented decision making and the lack of clear policies.

The creation of the Development Partnership Administration will not address these strategic shortcomings. Decisions on humanitarian contributions are likely to be retained by understaffed geographic divisions within the Ministry of External Affairs; hence, geopolitical interests will continue to funnel assistance to neighboring countries. The lack of a global vision will continue to downgrade India's humanitarian action into a secondary and rather spontaneous role.

On the other hand, DPA is prone to improve the quality of India's overseas projects and thus enhance New Delhi's soft power projection in developing and crisis-hit countries. Continued emphasis on bilateral and earmarked humanitarian aid also holds the potential to engage with affected governments and garner support for Indian interests. In this reading, the very fact that humanitarian action remains a subsection of development cooperation is synergizing.

Humanitarian action is designed, however, to support affected people in an impartial way, according to their needs wherever they be. If India, which has legitimately raised its voice against the "bilateralization" of Western aid, means to subscribe to these ideals, engaging in policy dialogue and restructuring its current humanitarian portfolio is instrumental.

India has the potential to match its global aspirations in humanitarian action. The country's reputed domestic disaster response and generous development budget would allow for a more significant humanitarian engagement. Stepping up as a humanitarian donor would also increase New Delhi's oversight of multilateral agencies.

Current investments in human resources and participation in international policy fora are but the seeds for India's adoption of a better fitting, global role in humanitarian action. Failing to concert decision making and increase its puny humanitarian budget, India is missing out on becoming a relevant player to shape the future of the humanitarian system.

Notes

¹ Gilligan, A. (2012, 4 February). "India tells Britain: We don't want your aid." The Telegraph Retrieved 13 March, 2013, from <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/india/9061844/India-tells-Britain-We-dont-want-your-aid.html>. On 9 November 2012, the UK's Department for International Development announced that it would terminate all grants to India with immediate effect. Ongoing programs will be phased out by the end of 2015. DFID. (2012, 9 November). "India. Country programme update - 9 November 2012." Department for International Development Retrieved 14 March, 2013, from <http://www.dfid.gov.uk/where-we-work/asia-south/india/>.

² Singh, J. (2003). 2003-2004 Budget Speech of the Minister of Finance and Company Affairs on 28 February 2003, Ministry of Finance, Government of India.

³ Fuchs, A. and K. C. Vadlamannati (2013). "The Needy Donor: An Empirical Analysis of India's Aid Motives." World Development.

⁴ Chidambaram, P. (2007). "Budget 2007-2008, Speech of P. Chidambaram, Minister of Finance, February 28, 2007."

⁵ Mullen, R. D. and S. Ganguly. (2012, 8 May). "The Rise of India's Soft Power - It's not just Bollywood and yoga anymore." Foreign Policy Retrieved 30 November, 2012, from http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/05/08/the_rise_of_indian_soft_power.

⁶ Fuchs, A. and K. C. Vadlamannati (2013). "The Needy Donor: An Empirical Analysis of India's Aid Motives." World Development, Roche, E. (2013, 21 February). "India may reduce overseas development assistance." Live Mint & The Wall Street Journal Retrieved 7 March, 2013, from <http://www.livemint.com/Specials/ZZny0NRkgnEL4Nve3tAhuN/India-may-reduce-overseas-development-assistance.html>.

⁷ India refuses this terminology in principle, but applies it in practice. See, for example, the speech of Ministry of External Affairs Additional Secretary P. S. Raghavan (Raghavan, P. S. (2013). Round-Table. Mapping Experiences around International Development Cooperation. New Challenges and Opportunities, New Delhi, Observer Research

Foundation.). Similarly, the term development partnership is preferred over development or foreign assistance to distinguish it from "North-South economic cooperation patterns". Taneja, K. (2012, 1 July). "India sets up global aid agency. Development Partnership Administration has a corpus of \$15 billion." The Sunday Guardian Retrieved 14 March, 2013, from <http://www.sunday-guardian.com/news/india-sets-up-global-aid-agency>. Donor and recipient are not exclusive categories in humanitarian assistance, given that most donor countries receive humanitarian assistance on occasion. This was the case with the US in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina in 2005.

⁸ For India's humanitarian contributions, see below; for Luxemburg, see UN OCHA Financial Tracking Service. (2013). from <http://fts.unocha.org/>.

⁹ See for example Agrawal, S. (2007). Emerging Donors in International Development Assistance: The India Case. Ottawa, International Development Research Centre, McCormick, D. (2008). "China & India as Africa's New Donors: The Impact of Aid on Development." Review of African Political Economy 35(115), Woods, N. (2008). "Whose Aid? Whose Influence? China, emerging donors and the silent revolution in development assistance." International Affairs 84(6), Bijoy, C. R. (2009). India: Transiting to a Global Donor. South-South Cooperation: A Challenge to the Aid System?. A. J. Tujan. Quezon City, Reality of Aid, Chaturvedi, S. (2012). "India's development partnership: key policy shifts and institutional evolution." Cambridge Review of International Affairs 25(4): 557-577, Fuchs, A. and K. C. Vadlamannati (2013). "The Needy Donor: An Empirical Analysis of India's Aid Motives." World Development.

¹⁰ Price, G. (2005). Diversity in Donorship: The Changing Landscape of Official Humanitarian Aid. India's Official Aid Program. HPG Background Paper. London, ODI, Meier, C. and C. S. R. Murthy (2011). India's Growing Involvement in Humanitarian Assistance. GPPi Research Paper. GPPi, Global Public Policy Institute.

¹¹ Humanitarian aid is categorized under Non-Planned Grants in the Union Budget. "Technical & Economic Cooperation with Other Countries" lists bilateral aid allocations to developing countries (including humanitarian aid), as well as a specific line for Aid for Disaster Relief. Other ministries design their foreign aid allocations, such as regular contributions to UNICEF (Ministry of Health and

Family Welfare) and WFP (Ministry of Agriculture), in consultation with the MEA. Price, G. (2005). *Diversity in Donorship: The Changing Landscape of Official Humanitarian Aid. India's Official Aid Program.* HPG Background Paper. London, ODI.

¹² Ibid, Bagchi, I. (2009, 20 November 2012). "Tharoor plans to revive MEA policy planning." Times of India, from <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Tharoor-plans-to-revive-MEAs-policy-planning/articleshow/5035735.cms>

¹³ Bagchi, I. (2009, 20 November 2012). "Tharoor plans to revive MEA policy planning." Times of India, from <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Tharoor-plans-to-revive-MEAs-policy-planning/articleshow/5035735.cms>, Meier, C. and C. S. R. Murthy (2011). *India's Growing Involvement in Humanitarian Assistance.* GPPi Research Paper. GPPi, Global Public Policy Institute, Katoch, A. (2012). Interview. Berlin/New Delhi, 1 November, 2012.. The ranks within the MEA in increasing seniority are: under secretary, deputy secretary, director, joint secretary, additional secretary and secretary. Ministry of External Affairs. (2013). Retrieved 7 March, 2013, from <http://www.mea.gov.in/>.

¹⁴ Patel, N. (2011, 26 July). "India to create central foreign aid agency." The Guardian Retrieved 7 March, 2013, from <http://www.guardian.co.uk/global-development/2011/jul/26/india-foreign-aid-agency>, Ministry of External Affairs. (2013). Retrieved 7 March, 2013, from <http://www.mea.gov.in/>.. The largest divisions are: Consular, Passport, Visa (CPV) with 17, DPA with 16, Administration and External Publicity (XP) each with 11, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Maldives (BSM) with nine and Pakistan, Afghanistan & Iran (PAI) with eight staff members.

¹⁵ Chidambaram, P. (2007). "Budget 2007-2008, Speech of P. Chidambaram, Minister of Finance, February 28, 2007."

¹⁶ Sato, J., H. Shiga, et al. (2011). "'Emerging Donors' from a Recipient Perspective: An Institutional Analysis of Foreign Aid in Cambodia." World Development **39**(12): 2091-2104, Roche, E. (2012, 1 July). "India goes from aid beneficiary to donor." Live Mint & The Wall Street Journal Retrieved 7 March, 2013, from <http://www.livemint.com/Politics/BToxm8wd11xe45wSBbkqGO/India-goes-from-aid-beneficiary-to-donor.html>.

¹⁷ Jacob, J. (2011, 17 July). "India setting up foreign aid agency." Hindustan Times Retrieved 7 March, 2013, from <http://www.hindustantimes.com/News-Feed/India/India-setting-up-foreign-aid-agency/Article1-722089.aspx>.. This comparative disadvantage has cost India support from the G77 (notably the AU) in its bid to reform the Security Council. Cooper, A. F. and T. Fues (2007). "Do the Asian Drivers Pull their Diplomatic Weight? China, India, and the United Nations." World Development **36**(2): 293-307.

¹⁸ Ministry of External Affairs. (2013). "Development Partnership Administration." Retrieved 7 March, 2013, from <http://www.mea.gov.in/development-partnership-administration.htm>.

¹⁹ The three DPA divisions are led by joint secretaries. Roche, E. (2012, 1 July). "India goes from aid beneficiary to donor." Live Mint & The Wall Street Journal Retrieved 7 March, 2013, from <http://www.livemint.com/Politics/BToxm8wd11xe45wSBbkqGO/India-goes-from-aid-beneficiary-to-donor.html>, Ministry of External Affairs. (2013). Retrieved 7 March, 2013, from <http://www.mea.gov.in/>.

²⁰ The MEA has not been able to recruit the best candidates within India as other Ministries, such as the Indian Administrative Service and the Indian Revenue Service offer more prestige and financial opportunity. Bajpai, K. (2012, 13 October). "Foreign policy on a shoestring." The Times of India Retrieved 7 March, 2013, from http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2012-10-13/edit-page/34414274_1_ifs-foreign-policy-bigger-service, Tharoor, S. (2012, 24 August). "Our diplomatic deficit." The Indian Express Retrieved 7 March, 2013, from <http://www.indianexpress.com/news/our-diplomatic-deficit/992257/0>.

²¹ The Economist. (2013, 30 March). "India as a great power. Know your own strength." The Economist Retrieved 30 March, 2013, from <http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21574458-india-poised-become-one-four-largest-military-powers-world-end>.

²² Taneja, K. (2012, 1 July). "India sets up global aid agency. Development Partnership Administration has a corpus of \$15 billion. ." The Sunday Guardian Retrieved 14 March, 2013, from <http://www.sunday-guardian.com/news/india-sets-up-global-aid-agency..> Mullen claims that "development policy decisions remain with the MEA's respective country divisions." (Mullen, R. D. (2013, 4 March). "Holding back on soft power." The Indian Express Retrieved 14 March,

2013, from <http://www.indianexpress.com/news/holding-back-on-soft-power/1082532/0>.) Katoch also suggest that geographic divisions are still responsible for humanitarian allocations. (Katoch, A. (2012). Interview. Berlin/New Delhi, 1 November, 2012.) and data from the RTI request (Ministry of External Affairs India (2012). "Right to Information Request. Submitted in August 2012.")

²³ Mitra, D. (2010, 6 August). "India drops plan for external aid agency." iGovernment Retrieved 20 March, 2013, from <http://igovernment.in/site/india-drops-plan-external-aid-agency-37739>, Katoch, A. (2012). Interview. Berlin/New Delhi, 1 November, 2012.

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²⁹ Markey, D. (2009). "Developing India's Foreign Policy "Software". " Asia Policy 8: 73–96.

³⁰ Mullen, R. D. (2013, 4 March). "Holding back on soft power." The Indian Express Retrieved 14 March, 2013, from <http://www.indianexpress.com/news/holding-back-on-soft-power/1082532/0>.. See also Economist, T. (2011). Official development assistance. Aid 2.0. The Economist..

³¹ Roche, E. (2013, 21 February). "India may reduce overseas development assistance." Live Mint & The Wall Street Journal Retrieved 7 March, 2013, from <http://www.livemint.com/Specials/ZZny0NRkgnEL4Nve3tAhuN/India-may-reduce-overseas-development-assistance.html>.

³² India's domestic aid expenditures highly exceed its overseas allocations: India committed \$6,2 billion to disaster response from 2007 to 2011 (IRIN. (2011, 20 July). "AID POLICY: Record donor aid, record costs." IRIN Retrieved 7 March, 2013, from <http://www.irinnews.org/Report/93279/AID-POLICY-Record-donor-aid-record-costs>.) The main driver and secretariat of the NCMC is the Ministry of Home Affairs (Ministry of Home Affairs. (2012). "National Crisis Management Committee (NCMC)." Retrieved 15 March, 2013, from <http://www.ndmindia.nic.in/management/ncmc.html>.) India's own disaster management has attracted appraisal from foreign governments. The UK's Department for International Development, for instance, claims that "India has cadre of experienced disaster managers in government, following disasters in Orissa, Gujarat and Tamil Nadu" (Lord "Paddy" Ashdown (2011). Humanitarian Emergency Response Review, The Humanitarian Emergency Response Review.) Even when India refused foreign assistance in response to the 2004 tsunami, it was praised (alongside other affected countries) for its "impressive" capacity to provide immediate relief within its borders while also extending significant assistance abroad (Bhaskar, C. U. (2005, 8 January). "Tsunami Reveals Indian Military's Humanitarian Response Capability." Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA) Retrieved 7 March, 2013, from http://www.idsa.in/idsastrategiccomments/TsunamiRevealsIndianMilitarysHumanitarianResponseCapability_CUBhaskar_080105, Telford, J. and J. Cosgrave (2006). Joint Evaluation of the International Response to the Indian Ocean Tsunami: Synthesis Report, Tsunami Evaluation Coalition.) For a more critical

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³³ Due to shared decision making, however, the response force arrived belatedly and could not play a relevant role in disaster response. Katoch, A. (2012). Interview. Berlin/New Delhi, 1 November, 2012.

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³⁷ Krishna, S. M. (2010). Statement by Mr. S. M. Krishna, External Affairs Minister, at the General Debate of the 65th Session of the United Nations General Assembly on September 29, 2010. New York.

³⁸ Ahamed, E. (2008). Statement by Mr. E. Ahamed, Minister of State for External Affairs, at the High-Level Conference on the Central Emergency Response Fund at the 63rd Session of the United Nations General Assembly on December 04, 2008. New York.

³⁹ Government of India (2013). India & UN. Humanitarian Issues. . New York, Permanent Mission of India to the United Nations.

⁴⁰ Singh, M. (2011). Statement by H.E. Dr. Manmohan Singh, Prime Minister of India at the General Debate of the 66th Session of the United Nations General Assembly on September 24, 2011. New York.

⁴¹ Indian support for pooled funds is greater: \$20 million for the Pakistani Emergency Response Fund in 2010 and \$1 million for OCHA's coordination work in Libya and neighboring countries in 2011-2012.

⁴² Meier, C. and C. S. R. Murthy (2011). India's Growing Involvement in Humanitarian Assistance.

GPPi Research Paper. GPPi, Global Public Policy Institute.

⁴³ Ministry of External Affairs (2001-2012). Annual Reports. New Delhi, MEA, Permanent Mission of India (2011). 50th Meeting of the Standing Committee of UNHCR: Statement by India. Geneva, Permanent Mission of India, Government of India (2012). 63rd Session of the Executive Committee of the UNHCR. Statement by India (1-5 October, 2012).. While not a signatory to the refugee regime, India is member of UNHCR's Executive Committee.

⁴⁴ US Embassy Abu Dhabi. (2005, 25 May). "UAE Hosts UN International Humanitarian Assistance Donors Conference." Wikileaks Retrieved 14 March, 2013, from <http://www.cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=05ABUDHABI2358>.

⁴⁵ Consulate Istanbul (2006). International Conference Shows Turkey's Growing Humanitarian Role. Consulate Istanbul, Wikileaks.

⁴⁶ For a possible explanation, see Horváth (Horváth, A. (2013, 11 February). "Piggy banks and unequal partners: Non-Western powers in humanitarian action." AlertNet AidWatch Retrieved 14 March, 2013, from <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/blogs/alertnet-aidwatch/piggy-banks-and-unequal-partners-non-western-powers-in-humanitarian-action/>).

⁴⁷ Weiss, T. G. (2013). Humanitarian Business. Cambridge, UK, Polity Press.

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<http://fts.unocha.org/>; Indian embassy websites; online news. Methods: Indian rupees are converted to dollars at January rates each year; the value of in-kind donations is estimated by the World Bank's Global Economic Monitor (GEM) Commodities indices.

⁵² Data from the Global Public Policy Institute's previous research on emerging humanitarian donors. See: <http://www.gppi.net/?id=1819>

⁵³ UN OCHA Financial Tracking Service. (2013). from <http://fts.unocha.org/>.

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⁶⁷ Ibid.

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