Brazil as a norm entrepreneur: the “Responsibility While Protecting” initiative

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The initiative

On 21 September 2011, Brazil’s president Dilma Rousseff declared in a speech to the UN General Assembly: “Much is said about the responsibility to protect; yet we hear little about responsibility in protecting. These are concepts that we must develop together”. In the following months, the Brazilian government took the concept development into its own hands. A group of young diplomats in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs swiftly drafted a concept paper titled “Responsibility While Protecting: Elements for the Development and Promotion of a Concept”. On 9 November 2011, Brazilian UN Ambassador Maria Luiza Ribeiro Viotti presented the concept to the Security Council. Through this initiative, Brazil broke new ground. For the first time, the country brought forward a proposal on developing a critical global norm touching on the very bedrock of global order. The fact that Brazil chose the contested debate on the “Responsibility to Protect” (R2P) for this initiative underlines the ambitions of foreign minister Antonio de Aguiar Patriota for Brazil to be a global player. In doing so, Brazil engaged as a “norm entrepreneur”, a role that the established powers see as their chasse gardée.

The “Responsibility While Protecting” (RWP) initiative builds on the R2P concept, which member states adopted at the UN World Summit in 2005. R2P covers four trigger threats: genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. In 2008, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon and his first special representative for R2P, Edward C. Luck, developed the “pillar approach” to better conceptualize the different dimensions of R2P. The first pillar stresses that states have the primary responsibility to protect populations within its borders. The second pillar refers to the international community’s duty to assist states to build their capacity to protect their populations. The third pillar covers the responsibility of the international community to take “timely and decisive action” to prevent and stop genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity if a state fails to protect its population.

In the concept note presented to the Security Council, Brazil explicitly supports the Responsibility to Protect:

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Violence against civilian populations must be repudiated wherever it takes place. The 1990s left us with a bitter reminder of the tragic human and political cost of the international community’s failure to act in a timely manner to prevent violence on the scale of that observed in Rwanda. There may be situations in which the international community might contemplate military action to prevent humanitarian catastrophes.\(^6\)

Brazil qualifies the support for R2P by pointing to problems with implementation:

To counter this perception, Brazil suggests complementing R2P via the principles of the proposed RWP:

- All three pillars of the R2P “must follow a strict line of political subordination and chronological sequencing” (para. 6);

- All peaceful means have to be exhausted; a “comprehensive and judicious analysis of the possible consequences of military action” (para. 7) must precede the consideration of the use of force;

- The use of force can only be authorized by the Security Council according to Chapter VII of the Charter, or (and this is noteworthy) “in exceptional circumstances, by the General Assembly, in line with its resolution 377 (V)” (para. 11 c);\(^7\)

- The authorization of the use of force must “be limited in its legal, operational and temporal elements”, and the enforcement must remain true to “the letter and the spirit” of the explicit mandate (para. 11 d);

- To ensure proper monitoring and assessment of the interpretation and implementation of the Responsibility While Protecting, “enhanced Security Council procedures are needed” (para. 11 h). The Security Council is also obliged to “ensure the accountability of those to whom authority is granted to resort to force” (para. 11 i).

Other participants in the R2P debate had previously advanced similar principles. What was new was that Brazil packaged them under the RWP label. This is an important development for two reasons: first, its author (a key rising power that is Brazil) and second, the timing (right after the Libya controversy).

**The development of the Brazilian position**

The RWP initiative is a major departure in Brazilian foreign policy in two respects. First, it is one of the rare cases where Brazil has forcefully advanced a new concept related to a contested key aspect of the global order – the understanding of sovereignty. While Brazil has forcefully voiced its aspiration for a permanent seat on the Security Council over the past years, it has rarely advanced concrete diplomatic initiatives to underline its constructive potential on the Security Council. It has mostly contented itself with the fact that it is the only really plausible candidate from Latin America. Second, until 2011 Brazil had mostly pursued a skeptical if not outright negative course vis-à-vis the concept of a R2P.\(^8\) The RWP concept, however, marks a clear departure from this position because it acknowledges the responsibility to intervene, in certain circumstances militarily.
For most of the 20th century, Brazil’s foreign policy was characterized by a non-interventionist reflex. While in the 19th century Brazil engaged in its own interventions in the neighborhood and initially defended the Monroe Doctrine as protection against European powers, Brazil became weary of US interventionism in Latin America. This also translated into a strong anti-colonial stance as well as Brazilian solidarity with the positions of the Group of 77. Until 2004, the strict opposition to the use of force precluded Brazil’s participation in UN peace operations with a chapter VII mandate. This explains Brazil’s negative early reactions to R2P. Then Foreign Minister Celso Amorim referred to R2P as nothing more than “the droit d’ingérence in new clothes”. Many in Brazil’s foreign policy elite were suspicious of the agenda behind the talk about “failed states” and “non-governed spaces”. Might this language be nothing more than a front for large powers to intervene into other countries selectively, not to protect universal human rights but to pursue economic and geopolitical interests?

In recent years, this negative stance has given way to a policy of constructive engagement with R2P. Two factors have facilitated this shift: Brazil’s developing identity as a “rising power” and its self-image as a democratic country committed to human rights. Brazil’s foreign policy elites have realized that the automatic support of positions among the Group of 77 cannot be the bedrock of its foreign policy if Brazil intends to live up to the responsibilities of a rising power. At the same time, Brazil (unlike China or Russia) is a full-fledged democracy. This fact is increasingly important for Brazilian foreign policy in the sense that respect and support for human rights has led many to question unconditional support for sovereignty. The notion of “sovereignty as responsibility” (a duty to protect citizens) is gaining currency also due to the stronger role of Brazilian civil society organizations in the field of human rights. This has been reflected in official positions. Already in 2004, on the occasion of the Brazilian participation at the UN mission in Haiti in accordance with Chapter VII, President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva declared that Brazil is following an approach that is “oriented by the principle of non-intervention, but also by an attitude of ‘non-indifference’”. When Lula’s successor Dilma Rousseff took office in 2010, she announced in one of her first interviews that, with regards to foreign affairs, the Brazilian voting on questions related to human rights issues in the UN Human Rights Council would change. She vowed not to abstain if, for example, the issue at hand deals with the stoning of women. This “non-indifference” in the case of grave human rights violations prompted Brazil to engage in the global conversation on “sovereignty as responsibility”. “Brazil wants to make, as well as follow, international norms”. Both aspects crystallized in the context of the discussion on the Libya mandate, which forms the backdrop for the RWP initiative.

**The Libya controversy**

The year 2011 was a decisive year for the development of the Responsibility to Protect on the global stage. The UN Security Council mandates that authorized interventions in Libya and Côte d’Ivoire both explicitly referenced R2P. The Security Council did so in a unique constellation: In 2011 all BRICS members (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) were represented on the Security Council. In addition to China and Russia as permanent members, Brazil, India and South Africa all held a rotating seat. And none of the BRICS voted against Resolution 1973, which authorized a coalition of the willing with NATO members at the core to use “all necessary” measures to protect civilians under threat in Benghazi. Brazil abstained
in the vote alongside China, Russia, Germany and India. Despite the concerns raised by Brazil in the debate on the resolution, Brazil’s abstention came across as moderately supportive of the resolution. However, in the following months the concerns voiced by Brazil turned into manifest anger at the way NATO countries such as France, the UK and the US interpreted Resolution 1973. Instead of stopping after successfully preventing the troops of Ghaddafi from attacking Benghazi civilians, NATO countries flew countless sorties against Libyan troops – all in the name of “protecting civilians”, a term incessantly invoked by NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen. In the eyes of critics such as Brazil, by acting as the “rebel air force” NATO reinterpreted the purpose of Resolution 1973 and turned it from a mission to protect civilians into a mission for regime change in Libya. Brazil was not alone. NATO actions have “given R2P a bad name”, India’s UN Ambassador Hardeep Singh Puri asserted. The arrogance with which representatives of the NATO countries leading the Libya mission brushed aside criticism in the Security Council particularly drew the ire of Brazil, India and South Africa. France and others outright rejected demands for accountability with respect to how they implemented Resolution 1973. At the same time, Brazilian representatives shied away from adopting the radical language of Russian representatives, who spoke about a “Western crusade” and an “oil war” in Libya.

In the wake of the Libya debate, Brazil was irritated by NATO’s actions and concerned about the deep rift that emerged regarding the interpretation and implementation of the R2P. As one Brazilian diplomat put it, “In the end, everybody loses if we have such a polarized debate”. Brazil saw itself in a position to constructively contribute to bridging the divide while also improving its own global standing. One would have thought that the West would have appreciated this effort to advance the debate on R2P. However, that was not the case. In the first months after the presentation of the RWP concept, Brazil mainly received critical feedback from Western capitals.

Skeptics in the West

There were three main drivers for skepticism in Washington, Berlin, Paris and London.

1 Conceptual differences

The criticisms voiced by German UN Ambassador Peter Wittig in the informal debate on the RWP concept with Brazilian Foreign Minister Patriota in February 2012 is representative of the conceptual objections from Western capitals. Wittig noted that the Brazilian approach lacked “a precisely defined concept of its own”. In addition, he criticized the “prescription of a strict chronological sequencing, the mandatory exhaustion of all peaceful means, and the introduction of ‘exceptional circumstances’ as an additional qualifying trigger” for the use of force. In the eyes of the German UN ambassador, RWP therefore “limits the scope for timely, decisive and tailor-made solutions to situations of extreme gravity”. Then UN special representative for R2P, Edward C. Luck, expressed similar points at the same debate. He also criticized the strict sequencing requirement and warned against building up prohibitively high hurdles for swift action: “Let us not raise the political costs of doing the right thing at the right time. That would be truly irresponsible.” Not without a paternalistic tinge, Luck added: “I know that is not what you are seeking Mr. Minister. Your goal, as ours, is to help the Responsibility to Protect reach its full potential.”
One does not have to read between the lines of Luck’s remarks to realize that he at best regards Brazil’s RWP proposal as an amateurish initiative that lacks an appreciation for the side effects. It is striking that Western representatives do not publicly acknowledge the potential of the RWP initiative to bridge the gap between the West and the proponents of an absolutist notion of sovereignty in Russia and China.

2 Perception of RWP as a tit-for-tat response to Libya and the Brazilian stance on Syria

The second reason for the negative reaction among Western capitals is the fact that many in the West saw Brazil’s initiative mainly as a tit-for-tat response to Libya. Brazil’s voting behavior in the Security Council on the Syria question amplified this perception. Syria was the main debate in the Security Council when Brazil advanced the Responsibility While Protecting concept. After Europe put forward a resolution on 4 October 2011 that would have condemned “grave and systematic human rights violations” in Syria, Brazil chose to abstain in a move that was seen as closely aligned with Russia and China. Indeed, Russia heavily lobbied Brazil to support its position on Syria. In addition, much of the Syrian community within Brazil was pro-Assad at the time and leaned on the Rousseff government to reject any condemnation of the Syrian government. In her explanation of the vote, the Brazilian UN Ambassador argued that:

Brazil stands in solidarity with the aspirations expressed by the populations in many Arab countries for greater political participation, economic opportunities, freedom and dignity. (...) Brazil has unequivocally condemned human rights violations, wherever they occur.22

Yet Brazil chose to not support the European initiative for condemning human rights violations (and threatening sanctions that exclude military action). Brazil gave the following reason:

Because of Syria’s centrality to stability in the region, it is all the more important that this Council be able to act with caution and preferably with a single voice. We are convinced that more time would have allowed for differences to be bridged and for legitimate concerns to be accommodated. We regret that this was not the case.23

The US and European countries saw this as an implausible front for what they perceived as a coordinated BRICS stance against the resolution. They argued that Russia in particular was staunchly backing Syrian president Assad’s regime. This support, the West argued, continued to give Assad’s regime cover for continuing with gross human rights violations. And they argued that it was reprehensible for democratic countries such as Brazil to, in effect, support such a position by abstention. The German UN ambassador publicly vented his anger:

The draft condemned human rights violations, demanded an end to the violence and called for an inclusive, Syrian-led political process. If adopted, the resolution would have contained nothing more than a symbolic threat of sanctions – explicitly restricted to Art. 41 of the UN Charter, thus explicitly non-military in nature. (...) Surprisingly, the large democracies of the South that are currently members of the Council – Brazil, India and South Africa – did not support the European draft, but preferred to abstain in a move closely coordinated with Moscow and Beijing.24
US UN Ambassador Susan Rice had already criticized the behavior of the IBSA countries (India, Brazil and South Africa) in early September 2011:

It’s been a very interesting opportunity to see how they respond to the issues of the day, how they relate to us and others, how they do or don’t act consistently with their own democratic institutions and stated values. Let me just say, we’ve learned a lot and, frankly, not all of it encouraging.25

3 Western conceptions about global norm evolution

The third reason for the negative reaction of the US and Europe to the Brazilian proposal goes deeper and has to do with how the Euro-Atlantic established powers see the process of global norm evolution. Political elites and academics alike mostly argue that norm entrepreneurship is (and as some would even add should be) the domain of the West. There is little room for agency of non-Western actors in the stages of the “norm cycle”. Advocacy for a norm, so the argument goes, originates in the West (from governments or NGOs). A norm is then codified in an international forum at the initiative of Western powers. After that, “global norm diffusion” and the implementation of the norm follows. During this process, the content of the norm remains unchanged. Non-Western countries can only decide whether they want to implement or reject the norm. A “boomerang effect”, in which local NGO activists cooperate with transnational civil society networks, helps with the diffusion of the norm.26 In these models, there is little space for non-Western norm entrepreneurs who seek to shape a particular norm. These models overlook that in many cases (take non-proliferation and disarmament), norm evolution in the 20th century did not follow this simplistic model. Voices from outside the Euro-Atlantic powers forcefully raised their points and influenced the evolution of the respective norms. Upon closer inspection, the process of norm creation and diffusion does not look as neat as the models suggest for much of the 20th century. But that did not register in the Western political imagination, which – especially after the fall of the Berlin Wall – got all too comfortable seeing itself as the sole dominant and relevant player in the politics of global norms. Therefore the West was unprepared for the non-linear, open-ended politics of norm contestation and evolution in which non-Western powers also play important roles. But it is exactly this process that is taking place in the case of R2P (as it is in a number of other areas, such as internet governance). Precisely because R2P is a rather vague political norm (compared to the criteria of hard law), there is significant room and need for interpreting the norm and further developing it – and it is exactly here where the Brazilian initiative makes an important political contribution.27

Not just Western politicians but also academic research needs to quickly catch up with this reality. The term “emerging norm”, which is popular with regard to R2P, rather serves to obscure this dynamic of open-ended norm evolution.28

Academic research should further explore the new dynamics of global norm evolution where the West cannot expect to be alone in shaping critical norms. Once both researchers and politicians have come to terms with this reality, this will make it easier to constructively engage with initiatives such as Brazil’s Responsibility While Protecting.

Unfortunately, because the West did not show a sufficient degree of foresightedness, in early 2012, Brazil found itself rebuffed by almost all sides. Not only did the West react negatively for the most part. A number of key Western countries were so angered by the initiative that they exerted significant political pressure on the Rousseff gov-
ernment. Both China and Russia were also skeptical since Brazil’s RWP contains an endorsement of the need to intervene in grave cases. All the while, fellow rising powers India and South Africa had little to say on the RWP initiative.29

Tentative convergence and uncertain prospects

During the late spring and summer 2012, many Western countries gradually dropped their opposition to the RWP concept in favor of a more constructive engagement. This was partly due to the belated realization that RWP had the potential to bridge the ever growing divide in the global debate on the Responsibility to Protect. Germany for one started to engage with the concept. Deputy Foreign Minister Emily Haber remarked in June 2012: “Within the EU, we actively became the spokesperson for those who had intention to go along with the initiative both critically and constructively but not to reject it”.30 Among those continuing to favor rejection was France.

A number of moves on the Brazilian side helped the rapprochement of countries such as Germany. First, Brazil disassociated itself from the demand of a “rigid sequencing” of the three pillars. Brazilian UN Ambassador Maria Luisa Viotti stressed that the sequencing of the three pillars had to be “logical, not chronological”.31 To this end, Brazil corrected a flaw in the original concept note because it in effect runs counter to what should be one of the lessons of Libya. The implementation of the Libya mandate (Resolution 1973) demonstrates that the sequencing between the measures under the different pillars need not and should not be strictly chronological. After the success of pillar 3 measures (protecting Benghazi from the assault of the Ghaddafi forces), one should have shifted back to political negotiations. Abandoning the strict sequencing language is a reflection of the fact that Brazil has consistently argued that the original concept was not carved in stone but a means to get a global discussion going.

Second, Brazil’s changing stance on Syria facilitated the more positive reaction in the West during the summer of 2012. On 3 August, Brazil voted in favor of the General Assembly Resolution 66/253 B (which clearly condemns the violence in Syria) – and this despite the fact that it was advanced by Saudi-Arabia, a not too credible player in the Syria conflict. In an explanation for Brazil’s support for the resolution, the Brazilian Deputy UN Ambassador struggled to portray it as consistent with the county’s October 2011 stance in the Security Council:

Our decision also reflects our belief that the UN General Assembly could not remain silent as violence escalates in Syria and the ensuing human suffering increases. The position we took today – which is coherent with Brazil’s policy with regard to the Syrian crisis since its beginning – should also be seen as a message to all parties to renounce the use of force, since there is no military solution to the conflict.32

At the same time, Brazil overtly reprimanded the Assad government:

The primary responsibility for ending violence, upholding the law, both domestic and international, and respecting human rights lies with the Government of Syria, as we have stated time and again. It must fully and immediately meet this grave and urgent responsibility.33

Brazil herewith distinguished itself from the states that voted against the resolution in the General Assembly – that is, those states that Hu-
man Rights Watch director Kenneth Roth called the “Dirty Dozen”, which includes China and Russia. Brazil’s position indicated to Western countries that there is not a united BRICS front on the Syria and R2P question.

Meanwhile, India and South Africa signaled stronger interest in the RWP concept and seemed open to suggestions that the IBSA countries get together to further promote and develop the concept. This coincided with the UN Secretary according ample space to the discussion of the Brazilian RWP concept in his report on the R2P in July 2012 (it was the last report drafted by R2P special representative Edward Luck before his mandate expired). The discussion of the concept in this report is more positive than in the first remarks by Edward Luck in February 2012.

So the stars seemed finally aligned for Brazil to further flesh out the concept and find allies during the opening of the 67th UN General Assembly in September 2012, exactly a year after the RWP first saw the light of day. But this did not happen. Already by early September, in the General Assembly informal debate on the Secretary General’s R2P report, Brazil was surprisingly generic in its statement. Brazil’s UN Ambassador merely stated that:

Further discussion based on the principles, parameters and criteria proposed by the ‘responsibility while protecting’ may offer a good basis for sharpening our understanding of the exercise of collective security in full respect of the Charter. Such a discussion should look to the future, rather than to the past. Brazil stands ready to contribute to this debate.

But what this readiness to contribute exactly entailed was left unclear. There was nothing new or systematic in Brazil’s statement, and Brazil did not make any concerted diplomatic effort to broaden the RWP coalition. In her speech to the General Assembly on 25 September 2012, President Rousseff was not more specific either. To the contrary, instead of fleshing out RWP she chose to launch a call against bypassing the Security Council in decisions to use force:

The use of force without authorization by the Council is illegal, yet it is beginning to be regarded in some quarters as an acceptable option. This is by no means the case. The ease with which some resort to this kind of action results from the stalemates that paralyze the Council. Because of this, it must urgently be reformed. Brazil will always fight to ensure that decisions emanating from the UN prevail. Yet we want legitimate actions, founded on international legality. In this spirit, I have defended the need for a “responsibility while protecting” as a necessary complement to the “responsibility to protect”.

This statement is remarkable in that it revises some of the language in the RWP concept note that explicitly referred to “United for Peace” type of General Assembly resolutions “in exceptional circumstances”. Brazilian academic Matias Spektor, a leading voice in his country on the topic of R2P, condemned the speech as a missed opportunity: “Empty of ideas and poorly written, the speech provokes impatience, perplexity and dullness”. Precisely because the Brazilian president chose not to offer any new ideas on how to take the RWP forward, she came across as burying the concept. How can we explain the decision by Brazil to abandon its RWP initiative? Brazil’s top leadership clearly seems to have made a cost/benefit calculation that the initiative is no longer worth additional investment of Brazilian political capital. Its political top leadership saw the RWP is a loss-making enterprise. The politi-
cal payoffs seemed far off and uncertain but the political costs were real and immediate. The latter consisted of taking political fire from many sides for the initiative. Brazil seems to have been unprepared for the criticism and pushback after it launched the RWP concept. Matias Spektor notes in this context: “Brazil is not accustomed to taking part in heated debates that characterize the definition of rules on war and peace. But this is what is expected from an emerging country.”

Engaging in the business of norm entrepreneurship means taking risks and dealing with setbacks and criticisms – especially in a charged and contested political environment such as the debate on intervention and the use of force. That Brazil does not seem to muster the endurance necessary to push the concept forward further is as deplorable as much of the short-sighted Western criticisms of the initiative.

**Pulling the plug or restarting the initiative?**

The Responsibility While Protecting concept is one of the most promising initiatives to bridge the huge gaps in the global debate on the R2P. It was an important discussion starter – and just when the discussion should have started to tackle the serious open questions, Brazil seems to have pulled the plug. Some of these open questions include how exactly the monitoring and accountability mechanisms in the Security Council can be conceived. In addition, there is the urgent need to develop the discussion on the use of force according to the third R2P pillar in order to better understand “how force can and should be used to protect civilians, and what kinds of operational tensions, legal dilemmas, and normative challenges arise from its use”.

Ensuring the implementation of R2P and RWP (in the sense of “doing the right thing, in the right place, at the right time and for the right reasons” in the words of the latest SG report) requires “knowledge, understanding and careful reflection”. (The report does not dare use the term “intelligence” which is a sensitive term for many touchy UN member states.) Investing in the knowledge capacity of the “international community” (chiefly the UN) should be an urgent priority but is neglected or even undermined by member states. In this context, Brazil could have used the RWP discussion to move forward debates on, for instance, the UN using intelligence from drones to better assess situations. These are discussions that have so far been mired in predictable ideological controversy.

However, given its reluctance to further push, the concept’s future hangs in the balance. Other countries such as Germany and the whole EU would be well advised to take up key elements of the concept and – in cooperation with the IBSA countries – revive the global debate with new ideas. This is all the more urgent in light of the international community’s disastrous performance in the case of Syria. And both the West and Brazil should draw some broader lessons for global norm evolution from the RWP saga: Western capitals (and NGOs) should get used to the fact that they no longer hold a monopoly on norm entrepreneurship, and this should result in an openness to engage constructively with proposals on key global norms emanating from outside the West. With the writing of geopolitical transition clearly on the wall, Western countries should recognize their almost automatic reflex to the Brazilian initiative and pause for introspection. For its part, Brazil will hopefully conduct an internal review and conclude that engaging in global norm entrepreneurship on balance is a business worth pursuing and investing in despite the inherent risks. The future of global governance depends on it.
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Endnotes

1 Speech given by President Dilma Rousseff during the general debate, opening the 66th UN General Assembly, 21 September 2011, http://www.un.int/brazil/speech/11d-Pr-Dilma-Roussef-opening-of-the-66th-germanal-assembly.html

2 She presented the paper in the context of the open debate on “protection of civilians in armed conflicts”, UN Doc. A/66/551-S/2011/701 v. 11 November 2011, called “concept paper” in the following.


4 UN-Doc. A/RES/60/1 v. 16 September 2005, para. 138 and 139.


6 Concept paper, l.c. (note 2), para. 8.

7 Resolution 377, also called “Uniting for Peace”-resolution, was brought in by the USA during the Korean War in 1950. It allowed the General Assembly to decide on military action without the permission by the Security Council. The Soviet Union had, at that point, blocked every engagement with the Korean War in the Security Council.

8 For further discussion, please see Matias Spektor, Humanitarian Interventionism Brazilian Style?, Americas Quarterly, Summer 2012, pp. 54–59 and Kai Michael Kenkel, Brazil and R2P: Does Taking Responsibility Mean Using Force?, Global Responsibility to Protect, 4, 41/2012, pp. 5–32.

9 Cited in Kenkel, l.c. (para. 8), p. 15.

10 Cf. Spektor l.c. (para. 8), p. 56.

11 Cited in Spektor, l.c. (para. 8), p. 57.


16 Cited in Thorsten Benner, NATO’s Libya Mission Could Cause Political Backlash, Deutsche Welle World, 8 September 2011.

17 Interviews with decision makers in the Security Council, August 2012.

18 Louis Charbonneau, Russia UN veto aimed at crushing West’s crusade, Reuters, 8 February 2012 http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/08/us-un-russia-idUSTRE81708B20120208

19 Personal conversation, August 2012.

20 Informal discussion on “Responsibility While Protecting” Hosted by the Permanent Mission of Brazil, New York, 21 February 2012, Remarks of Ambassador Dr. Peter Wittig, Permanent Representative of Germany to the UN, www.globalr2p.org/resources/RwP.php


23 Ibid.


30 Emily Haber, contribution to the symposium on the responsibility to protect, hosted by the parliamentary group of the German Green party (“Bündnis 90/Die Grünen”) on 8 June 2012, on panel topic 3: “The National Implementation of the Responsibility to Protect” (Berlin)


32 Explanation of Vote by H.E. Ambassador Regina Maria Cordeiro Dunlop, Deputy Permanent Representative of Brazil to the United Nations, 3 August 2012 http://www.un.int/brazil/speech/12d-dunlop-Prevention-Armed-Conflict.html

33 Ibid.

34 The other ten state he referred to were: Belarussia, Bolivia, Iran, Democratic Republic Korea, Cuba, Myanmar, Nicaragua, Simbabwe, Syria, and Venezuela.


36 http://www.un.int/brazil/speech/12d-mlrv-Responsibility%20to%20Protect.html

37 Ibid.


39 Matias Spektor, Silêncios, Folha de S.Paulo (Brazilian Newspaper), 3 October 20112.

40 Matias Spektor, A melhor barganha, Folha de S.Paulo, 22 August 2012.


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