References
1 This paper builds primarily on 40 key informant interviews conducted in February-March 2017 by the author and two local researchers, Ammar Ahmmed and Mohamed Faiq, in Tuz Khurmatu city, Brawchili town, and Khidr Wali town with political representatives (9), local security actors (8), civil society representatives (7), and people displaced from areas to which the team had no access (16), including Amerli, Hulaywa, Suleiman Bek, and Yengice.
2 Andrew Whitley, Genocide in Iraq: The Anfal Campaign against the Kurds (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1993), https://www.hrw.org/reports/1993/iraqanfal.
3 Human Rights Watch, Endless Torment: The 1991 Uprising in Iraq and Its Aftermath (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1992), www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/1992/Iraq926.htm. The same year, Nawjul sub-district was separated from Tuz and placed under the administration of Diyala governorate’s Kifri district, which is viewed by locals as a measure to further divide Kurds and Turkmens.
4 Sean Kane, Iraq’s Dispute Territories: A View of the Political Horizon and Implications for U.S. Policy (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2011), https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/resources/PW69.pdf.
5 For all of these estimates on demographics, there are no detailed statistics available. Key informant interviews suggested highly variable estimates. Informants also noted that there are no Shi’a Arabs or Shi’a Kurds living in the district.
6 Based on the Salah ad-Din Provincial Council’s decision in January 2016, Amerli sub-district became a district of its own effective January 2017, spurring debates over whether the new district would be considered in the eventual referendum under Constitution Art. 140. For practical reasons, we consider Amerli as part of Tuz district in this paper.
7 For example, there was an exchange of fire after the Northern Tigris Joint Operations Command (which Prime Minister al-Maliki set up to secure the Disputed Territories) attempted to strip the Tuz PUK party headquarters of its weapons on 17 November, 2012, leading to a heated conflict between the KRG and Baghdad. The head of Northern Tigris Operations Command accused 600 Kurdish officers and soldiers of its 16th Brigade, stationed in Tuz a year later, of disobeying orders and siding with the Kurdish Regional Government during this conflict. MA, “Abd al-Amir al-Zaidi Refers 600 Kurdish Officers and Soldiers to Trial for Disobeying Orders,” Almada Press, June 12, 2013, https://www.almadapress.com/ar/NewsDetails.aspx?NewsID=13463.
8 Michael Knights, Saving Iraqi Turkmens is a Win-Win-Win (Washington, DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2014), http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/saving-iraqi-turkmens-is-a-win-win-win.
9 For example, on 25 June, 2013, two suicide bombers attacked a sit-in organized by Turkmens to protest the lack of security in the district, leaving 22 people dead, including a leader of the Turkmen Front and a senior government official. “Iraq 2013: A Year of Change,” Russia Today, 2013, https://iraq2013.rt.com/en.html.
10 The siege of Amerli town was taken so seriously that Hezbollah Brigades even helicoptered in 50 of their best fighters. Babak Dehghanpisheh, “Special Report: The Fighters of Iraq Who Answer to Iran,” Reuters, November 12, 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-militias-specialreport-idUSKCN0IW0ZA20141112.
11 The involvement of the United States Air Force was rejected by all consulted informants in Tuz, despite the claims made by Foreign Policy and Human Rights Watch. Susannah George, “Breaking Badr,” Foreign Policy, November 6, 2014, foreignpolicy.com/2014/11/06/breaking-badr/; Human Rights Watch, After Liberation Came Destruction: Iraqi Militias and the Aftermath of Amerli (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2015), https://www.hrw.org/report/2015/03/18/after-liberation-came-destruction/iraqi-militias-and-aftermath-amerli.
12 President of the Sunni Waqf in Sammarra, Report on Suleiman Bek and Amerli, October 1, 2016.
13 Despite the district’s needs, local government representatives claimed that it has not received any financial support from the KRG or the central government since 2014 and that infrastructure projects approved before 2014 – such as the expansion of the Tuz General Hospital to accommodate 1,000 people and sewage works – were indefinitely stalled. The UNDP’s Funding Facility for Stabilization has also not approved reconstruction projects in the district. United Nations Development Programme in Iraq, Funding Facility for Immediate Stabilization Progress Report Quarter III- 2016 (New York: United Nations Development Programme in Iraq, 2016), http://www.iq.undp.org/content/iraq/en/home/library/Stabilization/funding-facility-for-immediate-stabilization-progress-report-qua0.html.
14 Announcements of the Tigris Operations Command, Second Commando Regiment, “Update.” Facebook post. June 2, 2017. https://goo.gl/PdUQeX.
15 The role of the Khorasani Brigades in today’s Tuz is unclear. Key informants suggested they stayed as a launching pad for an eventual confrontation with Kurds in the Kirkuk area. The Khorasani Brigade was not available for comment.
16 As one PMF leader explained, “You will join the militia that liberated your neighborhood.”
17 Rashid Kareem Ahmed set up a new unit of 100 fighters in early 2017 in Tuz Khurmatu city (Brigade 16). 600 Sunni fighters in Brigade 52 have been active in Kirkuk’s Hawija area since 2015. For more information, see the discussion of Brigade 52 in the Kirkuk briefing profile.
18 The League of the Righteous stands apart from the rest because its leader defines the group as a combat force [quwa dhariba], which does not hold territory. This group also differs in that only half of its fighters are locals, and the rest are from southern governorates and undertake special missions [muhammat khassa]; most of its local fighters have not been recruited recently because the group has been clandestinely active in the area since 2003. It is also the only consulted group that openly admitted to interrogating suspects (e.g., after a local policeman was killed in early 2017, the League of the Righteous arrested and interrogated three suspects and then handed them over to the local police, according to its commander). Outside of Tuz Khurmatu city, the League of the Righteous has a military base in Badr-controlled Suleiman Bek.
19 Emergency Room Statistics in 2016. Tuz General Hospital.
20 Human Rights Watch, Iraq: Ethnic Fighting Endangers Civilians: Kurds, Turkmen, Arabs Clash in Northern District (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2016), https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/01/13/iraq-ethnic-fighting-endangers-civilians.
21 “Dead and Wounded from the Security Forces, Including the Police Chief of Tuz, following an Attack by Daesh on Amerli,” Shafaaq, June 17, 2016, http://www.shafaaq.com/ar/Ar_NewsReader/9dde9ebb-6df8-4063-a8fd-e2732cb29f81.
22 “News of the Militias Continuing to Carry out Mass Executions in the Ameri Prison in Diyala,” Al-Quds al-Arabi, June 23, 2016, www.alquds.co.uk; Omar Awar, “Secretary General of the Council of Arab Tribes: 52 – The Number of Prisoners Executed by the Hashd Militia in the Prison of Ameri,” Bas News, June 19, 2016, www.basnews.com/index.php/ar/news/iraq/282494. Interviewed PMF commanders expressed concern over the judiciary system, claiming that ISIL detainees would often get out of prison in Tikrit and other Sunni Arab-majority locations in Salah ad-Din with the use of wastas [influential intermediaries] or simply paying off judges or prison wardens and guards. They did not confirm operating separate detention facilities, despite some allegations.
23 President of the Sunni Waqf in Sammarra, Report on Suleiman Bek and Amerli.
24 Human Rights Watch, After Liberation Came Destruction.
25 “Allawi: The Return of IDPs to Jurf al-Sakhr is in Iran’s hands,” al-Jazeera Arabic, May 4, 2017.
26 United States Department of State, Iraq 2016 Human Rights Report (Washington, DC: United States Department of State, 2017), https://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2016/nea/265498.htm.
27 Human Rights Watch, Iraq: Kirkuk Security Forces Expel Displaced Turkmen, Threats, Abuse against Sunni Families in Kirkuk (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2017), https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/05/07/iraq-kirkuk-security-forces-expel-displaced-turkmen.
28 Of the seven Kurdish seats in the district council, the PUK currently has four seats, the KDP two, and the Communist Party one.
29 The three villages are Kukis, Khasa Darli, and Yafa. President of the Sunni Waqf in Sammarra, Report on Suleiman Bek and Amerli.
30 “Brigade 52 (Badr) Arrests 3 Men Who Were Planning to Target Al-Azim Dam,” Al Ghadeer TV News, February 16, 2017, http://www.alghadeer.tv/news/detail/50565/.
31 “ISIL is Launching an Offensive on the Tuz Front,” Rudaw, April 3, 2015, http://www.rudaw.net/arabic/kurdistan/0403201511.
32 “Brigade 52 — Badr: More than 700 Square Kilometers Cleared in the Vicinity of Amerli and Northern Diyala,” Badr News, May 17, 2017, badrnews.net/home/single_news/61398.
33 Human Rights Watch, Iraq: Ethnic Fighting Endangers Civilians.
34 “Peshmerga Strengthens its Presence in Tuz Khurmatu with Two Battalions from Kurdistan,” Alghad Press, November 8, 2016.
35 Human Rights Watch, Iraq: Ethnic Fighting Endangers Civilians.
36 “The Start of a Meeting to Calm the Situation in Iraq’s Tuz District,” Al Quds Al Arabi, April 27, 2016, http://www.alquds.co.uk/?p=523223.
37 Tuz Khurmatu, “Arrival of the fighters of Imam Ali Combat Division to Tuz,” Facebook post. May 1, 2016. https://www.facebook.com/tuzkhurmatueli/posts/463047677228215.
38 According to a recent report, all 400 fighters of the Imam Ali Combat Division left Tuz on June 28, 2017. “Withdrawal of PMF from Tuz,” Al-Gharbiya News, June 28, 2017, https://www.algharbiyanews.com/?p=82210.
39 The Kurdish committee includes a PUK representative, the mayor, a member of the district council, a representative of the Sunni Endowment [waqf], and four other civil society representatives (religious and tribal leaders and lawyers). “Participants in the Mediation Committee,” Memo (soft copy), February 11, 2017, Tuz Khurmatu. The Turkmen committee includes the leaders of 10 PMF factions and five civil society representatives.
40 “The Turkmens are divided; some follow Turkey, and others follow Iran.” (Kareem Shukour Muhammad, PUK leader of the 16 Hamreen electoral district); “The Kurds do not pose a real threat to Turkmens as long as they are divided.” (Mohammed Mehdi al-Bayati, political representative of the Badr Organization).