Attitudes toward Locally-Drawn Forces
A central aim of this research project is to assess whether communities feel more secure and comfortable with forces drawn from nearby areas and how this local solution to local security problems affects overall security and stability. If any case study exists of the strengths and drawbacks to this local solution, it is Hajj Ali. In other communities, local Sunni forces tended to be small in number and played a limited support role for the Iraqi forces in control, which in the case of Qayyara were primarily the Federal Police. Hajj Ali was an exception to this pattern. The head of the local tribal PMF, Sheikh Nazam, commanded a significant local force: over 600 officially registered, and more unofficially affiliated fighters, compared to an average of 100 for most Sunni TMF. Moreover, he used it to exert almost total control, with reportedly very little Federal Police intervention. Most residents in Hajj Ali appeared to support this level of autonomy, but to the extreme detriment of the minority who did not support Sheikh Nazam. For the residents of Hajj Ali, the Sheikh’s tribal fighters were not only the sole force around. Having a father or son accepted into the force was also a rare source of livelihood. In interviews, residents were enthusiastic about the Sheikh’s efforts for the community (as they tended to frame it) and the participation of locals in the villages’ security. However, this unanimity was disturbed by the fact that any minority voices were likely expelled, or worse. There have been reports of the local tribal force abusing, harassing, or deporting (to IDP camps) community residents suspected of supporting ISIL and opposing Sheikh Nazam. Such forced displacements are likely one of the more extreme treatments of so-called “ISIL families” in the Qayyara area (see sidebar).
Most other areas of Qayyara did not experience such a strong pattern of local control. The rest of the region saw fewer tribal forces that were clearly subservient to the Federal Police. However, residents in other areas of Qayyara did express some form of preference for “local forces,” even if in a minor support role. Although all interviewed said they had no experience with the Shi’a PMF (again, who are largely absent in Qayyara), many suggested they would favor local tribal fighters over these forces from outside Qayyara if given the choice. One local council member said he had seen the destruction and abuses the Shi’a PMF perpetrated in Sunni areas like Ramadi and Falluja on television, and for that reason he preferred the local Sunni forces: “At least the local [tribal] Hashd are our sons. We can draw a line with respect to them. We can control them if something happens. But if [the Shi’a] Hashd ash-Shaabi were here, there would be nothing we could do to control them.” He also noted that the Shi’a PMF are too powerful a military force to be controlled. Another IDP, interviewed in one of the camps, was from an area known as an ISIL stronghold and said he feared that if the Shi’a PMF were in control, they would take revenge on families who stayed behind under ISIL.
While such comments suggest that residents preferred local militia forces to fighters from outside their governorate and/or sectarian communities, the prevailing view was that it would be best for Iraqi forces to ensure the rule of law. Residents and officials alike suggested that, overall, they would prefer official Iraqi forces (i.e., local police, the Federal Police, and Iraqi military) to the continuing presence of popularly-mobilized, semi-irregular security forces. Most pointed to the need to mobilize additional forces quickly in a time of crisis but expressed that the Hashd (Sunni or Shi’a) should not remain over the long-term. Several officials said that the number of tribal forces should be kept low and that they should be demobilized in the future because they tend to be disorganized and untrained, with weak command and control. One official noted that the incidents of violence and criminality by tribal forces would have been harder to address and contain if their numbers had been larger. Most of the reports of criminality involved petty theft, but there have also been incidents of fighting between different tribal forces and of tribal forces taking the law into their own hands and settling scores.
Community members too, almost uniformly (outside Hajj Ali), expressed a preference for regular law and order implemented by uniformed police or the ISF. For example, one man from a village near Qayyara city explained, “I prefer the Federal Police and the Iraqi Army because they are more organized and have the ability to control our area.” He also noted that he suspected the tribal forces of being corrupt or having ulterior motives. Another IDP from as-Shura village, who still lived in the camps, similarly suggested that the local tribal forces were not large enough to protect the population if they returned. “I prefer the Federal Police and the Iraqi Army to be in our areas because they know how to control them, and it is their duty to do so,” he said.
In interviews, community leaders favored demobilization or the recruitment of eligible tribal militias into the Iraqi forces in the future. One local council member and tribal elder, suggesting his preference for a local police force, said, “It’s better to dissolve tribal Hashd altogether…even though some are friends and relatives…They are tribal and follow a tribal system. They cannot apply orders. Some of these guys don’t even have a kindergarten education.” Another local mukhtar acknowledged the need for popular mobilization to deal with the crisis, but he worried about its long-term effects: “In the future, militarizing society is not the answer…It would be best if they were completely disbanded.” He noted, however, that while the demobilization of the Sunni PMF would probably be possible, it would be more challenging with the “Hashd al Janoub” or the PMF from the south (the Shi’a Hashd): “They sacrificed a lot, so it’s hard to tell them to lay down their weapons. The tribal PMU just held their ground – not a big sacrifice – so they could be let go with a scratch of the pen.”
Post-Liberation Challenges
At the time of research, roughly six months after the Coalition forces had regained control, the security situation was largely stable. A sense of normal life had returned in most of Qayyara, although the area faced significant challenges: infrastructure damage, lack of basic services, and the restoration of the regular rule of law. With Mosul still under active operations, many authorities that would normally operate from the region’s main city had relocated to Qayyara.
All the government offices, including the mayor’s office, the chief of police, and local representatives of Baghdad ministries, had set up temporary operations in homes that were presumed to belong to former ISIL members. However, many of these sites were inadequate. The strongest illustration of this problem is the local detention facility, which was located in a multi-house compound that was partially bombed by Coalition forces. It was being used as the local detention facility because ISIL had destroyed all other detention facilities. However, the compound was not designed to hold the number of detainees arrested in the wake of ISIL’s expulsion. The facility’s overcrowding and poor conditions were so severe that multiple interviewees flagged them as major and ongoing challenges, and local officials repeatedly asked officials in Baghdad for help in clearing or better housing the detainees. A Human Rights Watch visit to the detention facility found massive overcrowding, with 378 detainees crammed into a six-room house in one part of the facility.12
A temporary, floating bridge, which was replaced by a more permanent structure in June 2017, ensured access in and out of Qayyara. Moreover, while power, if irregular, had been restored in Qayyara city, many of the smaller, surrounding villages and communities had no water or electricity.13 This lack of services, together with destroyed homes in some of the communities, constituted the main deterrent for IDPs to return to their home villages. The 18 oil wells ISIL set ablaze, with another 16 damaged in fighting, were difficult to bring under control, and the fires were not all finally capped until early April 2017.14 During the period of research, thick black smoke hung in the air, and white sheep appeared black due to the accumulated pollution. IDP camps and health facilities reported numerous respiratory illnesses, which had been even more acute during the period when the sulfur facility was leaking noxious gas.
Nevertheless, overall return levels to Qayyara were high and increased as the area stabilized. IDPs interviewed in Qayyara camps – many of whom come from the surrounding areas – tended to cite the lack of electricity, water, and basic services in their areas as the main reason they had not yet returned. Some felt that security in the area had not been fully restored, noting that tribal forces were not able to secure all areas. However, this concern appeared to be a secondary, rather than primary, factor inhibiting return in most cases.15 As noted in the boxed text on reconciliation, many of the “ISIL families” who were threatened or forcibly displaced from their communities ended up in the Qayyara IDP camps; however, none of those interviewed openly acknowledged being the victims of such treatment.
At the time of research, the security situation appeared to be stable and improving. However, in early July 2017, ISIL forces reportedly retook the village Imam Gharbi, only seven kilometers outside Qayyara city. The village was quickly retaken, on July 20, 2017, by a joint operation from Ninewa and Salah ad-Din commands. Nonetheless, ISIL’s rapid retaking of a village far behind the frontlines and close to an urban center may suggest continued instability, even in seemingly secured places. If such threats persist, then the atmosphere of security crisis and shortfall, which originally led to the mobilization of militias like the tribal forces, is likely to endure. As a result, these forces may remain in place for an extended period of time.