

Built on shaky ground: the Comprehensive Approach in practice

by Philipp Rotmann¹

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Research Paper
ISSN 2076 - 0949
(Res. Div. NATO Def. Coll., Print)
ISSN 2076 - 0957
(Res. Div. NATO Def. Coll., Online)

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Imprimerie Deltamedia Roma
Via Iberia 19/a 00183 Roma
www.deltamediaigroup.it

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Despite its reputation as a catchphrase of little consequence, NATO's Comprehensive Approach (CA) is a necessary response to practical coordination challenges and capability gaps that affect all of the Alliance's operations. While the need for "comprehensiveness" is therefore well founded, the record of its implementation in key missions, such as the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, is not encouraging. In reality, despite many ministerial declarations to the contrary, military and civilian efforts remain fragmented and incomplete. The problem runs deeper than a mere failure in implementation: the fragmentation of national governments, conflicts between organizational and professional cultures, different approaches to violence and unresolved political-strategic disagreements among contributing nations all deepen or maintain existing divisions. In examining these issues, the present paper takes a closer look at the choices that each individual official, agency, ministry and government faces in whether to invest in a Comprehensive Approach or to satisfy their many other political and institutional imperatives. Ultimately, the promise of a formal top-down campaign introducing the CA is therefore very limited. Instead, new ways of pragmatic collaboration below the strategic level need to be encouraged. Most examples are drawn from Afghanistan, the alliance's most demanding mission that permeates both its other operations and largely shapes its institutional evolution

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THE COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH: ORIGINS AND PAST PERFORMANCE

*Experience in Afghanistan and Kosovo demonstrates that today's challenges require a comprehensive approach by the international community involving a wide spectrum of civil and military instruments.*²

While often criticized as vague, the declared rationale for NATO to strive for a Comprehensive Approach (CA) to operations is also right on target. Given the political disagreements and the practical complexity behind it, its language could hardly be more precise. In fact, there are many academic papers whose authors did not have to negotiate their language among 28 governments; few of them achieved greater clarity. The same is true for the concept of Integrated Missions at the United Nations and a host of similar undertakings at the national and international levels.³

WHY DOES NATO NEED A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH?

Born out of the short-lived and sometimes counterproductive effects of earlier limited military interventions to “manage” crises around the world, post-Cold War interventions by the United Nations, the European Union and NATO have become increasingly ambitious. In addition to dozens of national militaries, police, diplomats, development agencies and aid organizations now play critical roles for the success of these campaigns. With more actors, coordination has become exponentially harder.

At the same time, the costs of coordination failures have grown, as well: in several cases in Bosnia and Kosovo, command-and-control conflicts between military and police units contributed directly to the escalation of public unrest and ultimately, casualties both among protestors and NATO/UN forces. In Afghanistan, the lack of civilian capacity to help stabilize “cleared” areas and assist local governments in providing better services directly undermines the sustainability of tactical military successes.

As a result, the need for a “comprehensive approach” is undisputed. Without abandoning the entire paradigm of global security governance and dealing with weak and failing states, there are

no good old days to go back to: stabilization and contested statebuilding require a carefully synchronized application of different forms of power from organized violence to effective governance, relief and development assistance.

Earlier in 2010, ISAF's Operation Moshtarak to retake and hold the Southern Afghan town of Marjah served as a stark reminder of the challenges involved in this type of mission. Each “line of effect” critically depends on the others to succeed in its planned objectives more or less on schedule – a tall order in a war zone. Failure to meet this ambitious level of coordination and comprehensiveness wastes scarce resources, duplicates some efforts and opens critical gaps in others, and puts the lives of soldiers and civilians at risk, local and international alike. If shrewd opponents are given contradictory signals or adverse incentives to exploit divisions within the international community or among military and civilian actors, the mere lack of coordination jeopardizes the entire mission.

There are two kinds of shortfalls that the Comprehensive Approach seeks to address: coordination challenges between existing capabilities, and genuine capability gaps. Both require different solutions. For coordination challenges, pragmatic and creative officials in the field have found informal and ad-hoc ways of working together long before the Riga Summit or the Comprehensive Approach. There are, however, two important weaknesses to self-organized bottom-up coordination. For one, it depends chiefly on the particular senior officials and their ability and willingness to work together. Given the many other considerations in terms of nationality, seniority and bureaucratic or service pedigree that are required regarding alliance appointments, it is often impossible to build an effective team at the personal level. For the other, the tremendous growth of military interventions, peace operations and the civilian aid industry has led to a proportional growth in the actors and activities that need to be coordinated. In a telling example, the former commander of Joint Force Command Brunssum, General Egon Ramms, recently estimated the number of civilian organizations working on reconstruction in Afghanistan at 1,700.⁴ At this level of complexity, the alliance needs institutional solutions to meet the coordination challenge.

The second kind of shortfall is about genuine capability gaps for

² NATO, “Riga Summit Declaration. Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Riga on 29 November 2006,” (Riga: North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 2006), para. 10.

³ On the issues behind the Riga Summit formulation and subsequent conceptual work, see Brooke Smith-Windsor, “Hasten Slowly: NATO's Effects Based and Comprehensive Approach to Operations. Making sense of the past and future prospects,” in Research Paper No. 38, ed. NATO Defence College Research Division, Rome (Rome: NATO Defence College, 2008). On the UN's struggle with “mission integration,” see Susanna P. Campbell and Anja T. Kaspersen, “The UN's Reforms: Confronting Integration Barriers,” *International Peacekeeping* 15, no. 4 (2008). (including physical infrastructures) which these systems control. This definition is mine, but is based on elements of other definitions.

⁴ Public remarks at a conference in Minden, Germany, 11 September 2010, reported by Stephan Löwenstein, “Minden und Hindukusch,” <http://faz-community.faz.net/blogs/sicherheit/archive/2010/09/11/minden-und-hindukusch.aspx> [13 September 2010].



key tasks that are not part of the traditional military toolkit. A prime example is the case of police forces to fill the immediate post-war security vacuum: given the right pre-deployment training and force structure, military forces have generally been able to cover the basic requirement for deterrence, interdiction, even searches and arrests in the short term. Civilian police officers can train and advise their local counterparts in investigative techniques and forensics. But few countries have been able to supply the kind of robust gendarmerie that the instability and residual violence of a post-war transition usually requires.⁵

HOW DOES THE COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH FARE IN PRACTICE?

Four years after Riga, NATO members can point to a host of “comprehensive” activities from partnership agreements with the EU and UN through common mission-specific forums such as the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB) in Afghanistan to the nationally implemented Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). Despite significant progress in some areas, however, few of these institutional tools have lived up to the operational requirements that sparked their creation in the first place. Several examples from Afghanistan illustrate this point.

PRTs are one of the most successful examples in practice, partly because the concept always allowed for the adaptation to the domestic political needs of each contributing country and the different operational environments across Afghanistan.⁶ PRTs combine a military unit with diplomatic and development assets at the regional level. A recent study on U.S. PRTs in Afghanistan concludes: “While other agencies remain needed for long-term economic and political development, the PRTs are best suited to conduct reconstruction in ways that create stability in the short term.”⁷ Ultimately, PRTs turned out to be a useful innovation for a particular set of conditions – too violent for traditional civilian development assistance, but stable enough for a civilian development presence to work according to the corresponding contracting and accounting rules of their home governments.

When stabilization gave way to counterinsurgency, however, PRTs quickly turned into fortresses from which a few civilians tried to

remote-control a handful of reconstruction projects through local contractors, or reverted into military units with large bags of cash and civilian advisers. In the short term, these approaches might get a road built but often not in ways that contribute to stability and security in the medium or long term. Neither is the solution to work without the military. In actively contested territory, protecting the population requires a military presence at the district level or even below. So far, only very few NATO forces have been able to establish and support such a presence. Initial hopes that the civilian components of PRTs could rapidly set up reconstruction projects hot on the heels of a military clearance operation have not materialized so far.

Cases of ineffective coordination abound in every field, from governance through police and judicial development, anti-corruption and counter-narcotics up to the place where civil-military and inter-allied efforts should ideally be fused: the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB) of ambassadors and heads of international organizations in Kabul, and for truly strategic questions the North Atlantic Council in Brussels. Barely any of the key turning points of the Afghan mission emerged from any of these bodies, or any other truly multilateral, cross-sectoral (i.e., comprehensive) forum. Fundamental decisions about troop contributions and the definition of “caveats” (where or how a particular nation’s troops could not be deployed by the ISAF commander) take place nationally, in many cases in way that is entirely disconnected from defining the strategic objective. If strategy is the “art of choice that binds means with objectives,”⁸ to break that link between means and objectives from the outset must have severe repercussions for any mission. For ISAF, this began with the “mother of all caveats” that Washington registered in 2002 by not supporting an international deployment across the entire country. When Germany decided to drop its unsuccessful lead role in policebuilding into the lap of the European Union, it was of no concern if and how rapidly the EU would be able to set up an effective police mission in a new environment that was significantly less permissive than the Balkans. And when the U.S. government decided to review its Afghan strategy after President Obama took office, it supplied the first truly comprehensive analysis but neither General Stanley McChrystal’s recommendations nor

⁶ Unlike in Afghanistan, where U.S. PRTs were put under ISAF command as part of ISAF expansion in 2004-2006, U.S. PRTs in Iraq were never part of a NATO operation but operated largely according to the same national model. See Carter Malkasian and Gerald Meyerle, “Provincial Reconstruction Teams: How Do We Know They Work?” (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2009).⁷ Richard A. Clarke and Robert Knake, *Cyber War: The Next Threat to National Security and What to Do about It*, New York, HarperCollins, 2010, 233.

⁷ *Ibid.*, ix

⁸ Eliot A. Cohen, Obama’s COIN toss. In Afghanistan, we have a plan – but that’s not the same as a strategy. *Washington Post*, 2009-12-06.



the resulting inter-agency Civil-Military Campaign Plan reflected the limited capacity of America's own civilian assets, let alone those of its allies.⁹

Ultimately, most of what works across agency or national boundaries, such as the PRT concept, predates the Comprehensive Approach and operates on the tactical level. In terms of operational and strategic effects, NATO's efforts and those of its member states in key theaters are as fragmented as they were before the Comprehensive Approach was ever put on paper.

OBSTACLES FOR EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION

None of these challenges is unique to NATO, nor are individual officials or politicians to blame. Every government and international organization that tried to develop institutional solutions for the coordination challenge in stabilization, counterinsurgency and post-conflict peacebuilding has faced a number of fundamental obstacles. The most important of these obstacles are (1) the institutional and political fragmentation of mandates at the national level, (2) conflicts between organizational and professional cultures, (3) differences about dealing with violence and (4) unresolved political-strategic disagreements among contributing nations.

National-level fragmentation

From NATO's International Staff and its military headquarters to ministries and parliamentary committees of foreign affairs, defense and development in member state capitals, all the major players needed for a truly Comprehensive Approach face bureaucratic and political incentives that largely favor parochial interests over investing in common solutions. This effect originates in national capitals, where each ministry or government agency tends to defend its core mission, structure and organizational culture from being changed or watered down in the name of coordination or interoperability.¹⁰ The effects travel from the inter-agency level of Washington, London or Berlin through the international, inter-organizational (EU-NATO) maze of Brussels and further intermediate headquarters to the ambassadors and military commanders in Kabul or Pristina. The closer it gets to reality in the field, the more the willingness for pragmatic action trumps parochial bureaucratic interests. However, this works only for those kinds of decisions that are made by officials on the ground. Whenever decisions are

controlled by higher headquarters and national capitals – in many countries a political, even legal requirement – they automatically become subject to the bureaucratic-political interests of the players there.

None of this is intended to blame officials or politicians in national capitals. Famously set out in 1972 by Graham Allison and Morton Halperin, the effects of “bureaucratic politics” are as commonplace in modern governments as inter-agency meetings and budgetary conflicts.¹¹ The critical issue is that of organizational identity – what is the core mission of an army, of a foreign service, of an aid agency in each country?

For a truly comprehensive approach to emerge, each part of each government needs to transform, not just the military. For many NATO armies, the shift from homeland defense and a conventional defense doctrine built around tank battles to expeditionary warfare, stabilization and institution-building remains far from complete two decades after the end of the Cold War. That is despite the fact that conventional threats have all but disappeared, and many forces have long been subject to strong budgetary pressures to change.

For foreign ministries and development agencies, the new mission of expeditionary stabilization or institution-building poses a much greater transformation challenge, particularly under conditions of residual violence. For diplomatic or aid organizations, contested statebuilding or even counterinsurgency is much further from their traditional core mission. In the long run, it cannot be expected to be more than a sideshow to the continuing core business of “conventional” diplomacy and development assistance. In addition, for aid professionals even more than diplomats, the deep political controversies about the wisdom to undertake these kinds of interventions in the first place are based in the midst of their professional peer groups.

As a result, when a parliamentary committee on foreign affairs or the budget is asked to balance its priorities with regard to the foreign affairs budget, it tends to privilege the established ways and means of diplomacy between the great powers over the special needs and niche concerns of a few remote places which will sooner or later disappear from the political agenda. The same is true inside the bureaucracy, from the career paths of senior officials to the pressure from staff unions: the surest way to the top is through Washington, Brussels and Beijing, not Kabul or Pristina.

⁹ “United States Government, Civil-Military Campaign Plan Afghanistan.” Unclassified, June 2009; Stanley A. McChrystal, “Commander’s Initial Assessment,” (Kabul: United States Forces-Afghanistan, International Security Assistance Force, 2009).

¹⁰ Morton H. Halperin and Priscilla Clapp, *Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2006), 27.

¹¹ Graham T. Allison and Morton H. Halperin, “Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm and Some Policy Implications,” *World Politics* 24, Supplement(1972).



These are the posts most diplomats joined for, and in faithfully representing the interests of their members, staff unions tend to fight the transformation of diplomacy tooth and nail. In the waning days of the Bush administration, Condoleezza Rice's announcement to make deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan mandatory among foreign service officers and the resulting firestorm is a case in point. Quieter versions of the same basic controversy are being played out in many other capitals as well.

These effects make the fundamental rules of any bureaucracy largely immutable in the short term. Development budgets continue to follow the long-winded procedures designed for multi-year assistance frameworks with Sri Lanka, Uganda or Guatemala, regardless of a brief window of opportunity to help the Afghan government build trust in its capacity to deliver to the people of Marjah or Herat. Military cash handouts come much faster and without much, if any, red tape or receipts but often fuel corruption and ultimately, as a recent long-term study of aid and security found, "in many cases aid is contributing to conflict and instability."¹² From contracting rules to policies governing staff mobility, regulations that make sense in the context of peacetime accountability requirements are ill-suited to a conflict zone.

Organizational and professional cultures

While these structural cleavages are real and have real consequences, over time they have also been overlaid by clashing organizational and professional cultures. Depending on their distance to the military, aid agencies are labeled "green" (working closely with national/NATO forces), "blue" (UN) and "red" (the Red Cross and a few other ultra-independent NGOs). There are principled rifts between the humanitarians' adherence to neutrality between the state and its violent competitors on the one hand, and the imperative of local (state) ownership held by development agencies on the other. Institutions infused by a crisis management mindset operate differently to those striving for sustainability, and field-driven organizations work differently to those controlled from far-away capitals. Each of these shifting and often incongruent boundaries carries at least as much cultural significance as it reflects material priorities and constraints.

These cultural rifts amplified concerns about the independence of humanitarian aid in areas of active conflict to encompass all sorts of development actors and NGOs that felt they needed a safe distance from the military without having the requisite experience and local networks that allows the traditional humanitarian agencies

such as the Red Cross to operate in a war zone. At the same time, the reactions of many in the military to such seemingly irrational behavior belied the mirror image of their own biases. Too often, for example, even governmental aid agencies have been excluded by the military from basic security assessments for excessive fear of leaks to the Taliban. It is characteristic for the impact of clashing organizational cultures that both sides are usually right in these conflicts: there is a lack of awareness for operational security and intelligence concerns among the aid community, and if agencies expect (rightly) to benefit from the information gathered by their own military colleagues, they need to improve their own practice in this regard. But there is also a culture of excessive secrecy among the military as well as the diplomatic community, where all kinds of openly available information are classified by default.

These cultural rifts hamper not just operational attempts at comprehensiveness such as PRTs but also compound the effect of the political conflicts that constrain EU-NATO cooperation, for example. The effects of a few governments' objections on information-sharing would be much less detrimental in practice if not every routine media analysis or situation report was considered CONFIDENTIAL.

The 'semi-permissive environment,' or the problem of violence

Violence is another key obstacle for implementing the Comprehensive Approach. Because strategic decision-makers assigned missions to NATO forces that are impossible to complete with military means alone, the Comprehensive Approach exists to draw on civilian capabilities to support these overarching political-military strategies. The civilian providers of these assets, whether humanitarian or development-focused and governmental or non-governmental, have either had little previous experience with intensely violent environments or had developed their own approach of navigating such environments that was partly incompatible with the military one.

As a consequence, two conflicts emerged about violence: whether to deal with violence, and how to deal with violence. "Whether to deal with violence" addresses the rift between the adherents of a crisis management and a sustainability approach. In their different ways, military forces and humanitarian agencies are set up to work in unstable, violent conditions. Soldiers and aid workers know the risks, and their budgets, control systems and decision-making processes are set up to deliver short-term fixes rather than tackling the underlying problems at the source, be they individuals in need

¹² Andrew Wilder, "A 'weapons system' based on wishful thinking," Boston Globe, 16 September 2009. See also the reports of the U.S. Special Inspector-General on Afghanistan Reconstruction at www.sigar.mil.



or violent conflicts. In contrast, development actors are set up to work in non-violent conditions, in close partnership with more or less stable governments to implement long-term solutions to improve economic and social welfare. Neither their human resources policies nor their procurement and accounting systems are designed to deliver projects on anybody's schedule apart from the donors' budget cycle, or to account for the challenges of contracting in a war zone. While they both "build things," development agencies are not a substitute for combat engineers, nor are they set up to run quick impact projects under unstable conditions.

The other conflict is largely between humanitarians and the military, about "how to deal with violence." While many humanitarian organizations had to painfully learn that their code of neutrality does not afford them protection from every combatant, the Taliban have also learned to appreciate the service provided to their supporters and fighters if they respect that neutrality. By now, different organizations have developed widely diverging attitudes toward working with combatant militaries, from maintaining principled neutrality (necessary and realistic for those, such as the Red Cross, that work even deep in the Taliban heartland and are sufficiently well known even among splinter groups) to open collaboration.

Ends, means, and priorities: unresolved questions of strategy and policy

Finally, there are unresolved political-strategic conflicts among NATO governments over ends, means and priorities, with regard to specific missions and broader issues, as well. While the language compromises found in the North Atlantic Council enable the alliance to conduct operations based on less than fully identical interests among its members, they do not solve these underlying strategic conflicts. From the relative weight of counterterrorism, stabilization and socio-economic development in the early years of the Afghanistan mission to the debates about the feasibility of counterinsurgency today, all major actors saw their positions shaped by domestic factors. As a result, there was little room for a robust multilateral policy process to address these questions.

Without such a process, each government found itself faced with strategic ends they generally shared but for which their individual willingness to pay and sacrifice varied widely, and with means they only partly endorsed but had no leverage to constrain. Unsurprisingly, allies ended up picking and choosing their own contributions with little or no regard to the overall strategic picture.

The history of German and U.S. attempts to develop the Afghan

police is a case in point. Largely left alone by its European partners, Berlin's starting point was to define the key questions of institution-building strategy on its own and based on the available inputs, i.e. what kind of and how many German police officers were available to deploy voluntarily within the framework of existing laws and regulations. A realistic appreciation of Afghan needs featured little: after the commitment had been made in Bonn, the bureaucracy could only try to make it work. When the U.S. government found the German approach to be useless in supplying an effective local police force to fight a resurgent Taliban, it put its own radically different police development program right next to the existing one. Neither of these two programs had anything to do with a common understanding of what kind of police the country actually needed, what the role of police should be in the Afghan context, even in terms of counterinsurgency, and if the resources that either donor nation was able to supply were the right ones for achieving the intended outcome.

None of this is limited to ISAF or Afghanistan: the question of Kosovo's statehood and recognition follows the same logic, as did – particularly in the early days – the legal constraints on the part of various European navies in dealing with captured pirates in the Indian Ocean.

WAYS FORWARD: TOWARD MORE EFFECTIVE COORDINATION

Given the extent of adverse incentives pulling key actors at every level away from investing in a Comprehensive Approach, a classic top-down campaign to build an institutional framework for comprehensive civil-military operations under the NATO roof holds only limited promise. Few conceivable missions will find such a far-reaching domestic consensus at the national level, particularly in political systems without the centralized authority over foreign affairs that sets the American and French presidents or the British prime minister apart from many of their colleagues. Without such a strong political consensus, regardless of the level of pressure from Brussels, national leaders will have little chance to implement an effective whole-of-government approach at the national level: institutional fragmentation is here to stay. Similarly, we can safely expect differential commitments and muddled compromises on key aspects of mission strategy to remain a common, even necessary feature of alliance operations. In that context, formal institutional progress toward comprehensiveness can only be slow and incremental.

At the level of individual missions, the role of personalities and networks will remain central to the practical reality of operational decision-making. The need for compromise among states, the lack



of detailed information about conditions on the ground and the fluidity of events will always create ambiguity in strategic direction. These ambiguities translate into political space for individual initiative (or lack thereof) on the part of senior officials on the ground. Beyond selecting the right people for senior appointments, institutional and political incentives need to support pragmatic collaboration, at least in terms of coordinating the existing assets. By way of suggestion, there are three ways of effectively supporting this kind of flexible evolution of the Comprehensive Approach from the ground up.

First, decision-makers at the strategic level need to push the authority for operational decisions, including civilian ones such as the approval of short-term development projects, to the lowest possible level of decision-making. Over the past twenty years, because crisis interventions were new and politically sensitive, many governments have experienced an excessive centralization of operational and even tactical decision-making in national capitals. This is not a uniform development across NATO, however: in an ironic twist, just as the U.S. military re-emphasized the value of decentralized authority as part of its rediscovery of counterinsurgency doctrine, the Germans are progressively ignoring their own tradition of *Auftragstaktik*.¹³ This trend needs to be reversed. Within reasonably clear, if fragmented, strategic guidelines from Brussels and national capitals, no operational decision should be taken at a higher level than that of the theater commanders and their civilian counterparts in Kabul or Pristina – those that are physically present in country and able to coordinate face-to-face.

Second, NATO should elevate the existing procedures for civil-military institutional learning such as exercises and studies by the Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre in Lisbon from the tactical and operational level to the strategic level. However, to analyze core experiences such as the process of formulating and negotiating strategy, designing ad-hoc institutions and putting political compromises into practice require different tools than the ones used to analyze command arrangements at the battalion to brigade level or joint planning between NATO, EU and UN. Learning mechanisms that are not limited to technocratic tinkering but that also accept and incorporate the primacy of politics and deal appropriately with sensitive political concerns could be adapted, somewhat counter-intuitively, from UN peace operations. The

UN has long been subject to much greater pressure than NATO or EU to justify its budget and conduct. In that context, a reform effort started by Kofi Annan and Lakhdar Brahimi in 2000 (with the “Brahimi Report”) has yielded several effective learning tools that merit a closer look even for a much more richly endowed organization such as NATO.¹⁴

Third, any attempt to remedy the effects of institutional fragmentation at the national level can only be slow and incremental, and must originate in each country from domestic political actors and tailored to each country’s political characteristics. There is no facilitation mechanism for political-institutional change that is going to work for presidential and parliamentary systems alike, or for those with greater and lesser degrees of centralized authority over foreign policy: no size fits all. Nor is the case of Afghanistan always the best example to create momentum for institutional change in the kind of domestic political climate that may soon prefer to forget that mission once and for all. In its efforts to promote such homegrown institutional changes from Brussels, the NATO secretariat should set up and support cross-fertilization between member states. NATO itself could make a particularly instructive contribution and set an example of openness and critical self-reflection by scaling up its own after-action reviews and reviewing its own institutional performance at the operational and strategic level.

There is no silver bullet to make NATO’s Comprehensive Approach or its equivalents elsewhere work effectively, given the prevailing institutional conditions, particularly at the national level. As long as international interventions to manage violent conflict and support state-building remain a sideshow to most national institutions whose resources and expertise are needed for these interventions to succeed, there can only be incremental improvements. Yet as policy-makers in NATO capitals are increasingly disillusioned with wholesale political transformation and less ambitious approaches to conflict management appear set to re-emerge on the agenda, we may see different demands to coordination, as well. If building effective and legitimate security forces is one of these approaches, as U.S. Defense Secretary Gates argues,¹⁵ the range of institutions, expertise, timelines and even political priorities involved would be much smaller. This analysis suggests that the promise of a comprehensive approach may be correspondingly larger in such cases.

¹³ *Auftragstaktik* or *Führen mit Auftrag* refers to a military command style that leaves subordinate leaders wide leeway in implementing given objectives. It is widely considered a German invention. See Stephan Leisten Schneider, *Auftragstaktik im preußisch-deutschen Heer 1871 bis 1914* (Hamburg: Verlag E.S. Mittler & Sohn, 2002). On U.S. doctrine on command in counterinsurgency operations, see US Joint Staff, “Joint Publication 3-24 Counterinsurgency Operations,” (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2009).

¹⁴ Thorsten Benner, Stephan Mergenthaler, and Philipp Rotmann, *Learning to Build Peace? United Nations Peace Operations in Global Perspective* (Oxford:

¹⁵ Robert M. Gates, “Helping Others Defend Themselves: The Future of U.S. Security Assistance,” *Foreign Affairs*, May/June 2010. Oxford University Press, 2011 (forthcoming).



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