

UN Vision Project on Global Public Policy Networks


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**SECURITY, STABILITY, DEVELOPMENT AND
COOPERATION IN AFRICA:
A REGIONAL EXPRESSION OF A GLOBAL POLICY
NETWORK IN FORMATION**

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Case Study for the UN Vision Project on Global Public Policy Networks



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I. GLOBALISM TO REGIONALISM TO LOCALISM: PROBLEMS AND RESPONSES

Helsinki in the Cold War and its Post-Cold War Extension

At the height of the post-Stalinian Cold War, the states of the First and Second Worlds met in Helsinki to negotiate an important set of principles, norms, rules and procedures to cover aspects of their bipolar confrontation. This 1975 regime or global public policy network (GPPN) was built on a basic trade-off between two elements of crucial importance to the two sides: For the Soviets, it contained a recognition of post-World War II boundaries in Eastern Europe, whereas for the West, it contained human rights principles for which the parties were to be held accountable. A decade and a half later, the first item was emptied of much of its importance, as the states within the recognized boundaries threw off the Soviet yoke and the Soviet Union itself fell apart into new units along formerly internal boundaries. The second element, however, was of even greater importance than when it was introduced, since it proved to be a major cause of the collapse of the Soviet side and remained to blossom into a broader GPPN with a new organization to provide a global policy network for East-West relations.

The 1975 Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) became an Organization (OSCE) at its 1994 Conference in Madrid. While it was established to govern global relations, its scope was limited to their regional expression in Europe broadly defined, “from the Atlantic to the Urals,” in General deGaulle’s phrase. Its concerns were contained in three “baskets” relating to security in Europe, to economic, scientific and technological, and environmental cooperation, and to humanitarian and other cooperation. While the European security basket fell within the scope of interstate relations handled by governments and their foreign ministries, the contents of the other two baskets spilled over onto the local level in many of the 35 participating countries. Meetings of private as well as official experts discussed such topics as democracy and elections, human rights, people-to-people diplomacy, conflict management, environmental issues, media performance, scientific issues, culture, and economic cooperation.

US Congressional Interest

Following the signature of the Helsinki, a US congressional delegation visited the Soviet Union and met with “dissidents, refusniks, and representatives of religious communities;” impressed with their bravery, the congress(wo)men created a bipartisan joint Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe to monitor and publicize the course of the Helsinki principles. The Commission has been instrumental in mobilizing congressional support for related measures, developing a network of interested officials and private sources, monitored and publicized the work of the C/OSCE through hearings, delegations, research and publications.

One of the most important aspects of the Commission’s work has been to serve as a facilitating channel between official government activities and the broader public, so that the effect of the principles and the work of the Organization could be reflected on the local level. This channel has operated in both directions. The Commission brings the OSCE-related concerns of private groups and citizens to the attention of officials in the US and other member countries, and to facilitate the access and participation of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to OSCE meetings and activities. It also monitors domestic American compliance with Helsinki principles and decisions, facilitating such compliance by disseminating those principles through groups and conferences and encouraging the conforming activities of private sector organizations.

Another activity of the Commission has been to examine the applicability of the Helsinki process and principles to other regions than Europe. Hearings focussing on one or more regions have involved officials and scholars from the US and the regions discussed, seeking to explore the dimensions and conditions of adoptability in the Middle East, Latin America, the Pacific, and Africa. While these discussions have not had any direct results, they have been useful in varying degrees in stimulating consideration of home-grown Helsinkis abroad.

Regional Imitations

The success of the CSCE-OSCE activity in the European sphere inspired other regions to talk about adaptations of Helsinki to their own conditions and OSCE members to

consider extending their model to other regions. Scholars and officials have joined in examining the applicability of the European experience to the Middle East, Latin America, Asia, Africa and Southern Africa. While OSCE staff have been little involved in this debate, national representatives to OSCE meetings have taken part; more importantly, the “Helsinki idea” has intrigued and inspired government figures, including legislators, and academics to examine the relevance of the essentially European GPPN to their own regions. Both the idea and the experience of Helsinki norms, institutions and practices have been examined in the light of conditions obtaining elsewhere. The debate came from two angles: the similarity of inaugurating conditions, and the relevance of the Helsinki principles to the region.

The two regions where Cold War conditions presumably leading to an impending reconciliation were replicated elsewhere were the Middle East and Southern Africa. The possibility of a conference on Security and Cooperation in the Middle East (CSCME) was discussed in conferences and writings in Europe and the United States, and also in the region. While the basic trade-off of territory for security was established since 1967 in UNSC/R242 and applied in the post-October War negotiations of 1973-75 (disengagements), 1979 (Camp David and Washington Treaty), and post-1989 (Madrid and Oslo), no progress has been made in establishing a security regime or broader principles for other issues in for the region.

Similarly, the erasure of the battle line between apartheid South Africa and the Front Line States by the opening up of the South African socio-political system to all its citizens between 1990 and 1994 created conditions which paralleled the breakup of the bipolar system in Europe. A proposal for a Conference on Cooperation and Security in Southern Africa (CCSSA) was made in 1992 but not retained. When South Africa joined the existing regional organization, the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC), sporadic attempts were made to establish principles that could constitute a GPPN for regional cooperation, but they still remain incomplete.

The Organization of American States, the oldest of the regional organizations, already embodies principles of its own governing interstate relations and from time to time has added additional principles relating to local conditions. While these remain disparate enough to fall short of a comprehensive GPPN, they form a longstanding basis for policy.

It is in Africa that the most striking developments have taken place, although these still remain incomplete. African events have frequently paralleled similar events on a global scale, while drawing from their own sources and situations. While the collapse of the Soviet system is often cited as the source for the second wave of democratization in Africa in the early 1990s, it is rather from extraordinary events in Africa itself--notably, the overthrow of the apartheid system without revolutionary violence--that African democratization drew its inspiration. Similarly, the African development of a regime of principles derived from its own as well as broader global sources.

II. ORIGIN AND PURPOSES OF THE CONFERENCE FOR SECURITY, STABILITY, DEVELOPMENT, AND COOPERATION IN AFRICA (CSSDCA)

Contextual Problem

Two lines of evolution crossed at the end of the 1980s to provide the context for the creation of an African Helsinki-like response--the breakdown of world order and the increasing marginalization of Africa. From the outside, the end of the Cold War has meant the collapse of a system of world order that has shaped perceptions, restrained as well as focused conflict, and maintained state order for the half century since World War II. While the defeat and disappearance of one of the parties in the bipolar confrontation left international relations without any clear shape and purpose, it also eliminated the remaining superpower's concern for many regions and issues of the world, lifted restraints on previously submerged conflicts, and removed supports for governments held in power by more foreign than domestic backing.

Specifically in regard to Africa, the major tenets of African political systems were removed in the Cold War victory: the centralized party-state was undermined by competitive notions of democracy and loyal opposition, the centralized economy with its wasteful parastatals was subject to austerity and competition through imposed structural adjustment, and the ideological approval of African socialism was shattered by notions of accountability, political and economic competition and free enterprise, and privatization. Some of these developments worked against their stated purpose, only to provide further causes of grief for Africa: privatization was applied by warlords and rulers to state revenues, competition was used by rebel movements to contest legitimate governments, and the end of Cold War patronage left governments and rebels alike to fend for themselves on the informal arms market.

From the inside, the increasing marginalization of Africa under these conditions was gradually becoming more and more apparently to African leaders. The fact that "most of the hopes and aspirations which had provided the spur for our independence had not been realized", coupled with the "tendency to always find ready-made scapegoats for our problems," constituted sobering realizations. "By emphasizing the external threat to sovereignty, the OAU contributed to the perseverance of intrastate conflict." African states had received independence as a result of their pressures for self-determination; yet, the passage of power from foreign

to national rulers had been only half accomplished, since the nationalist rulers seized but then held power in the name of the people but without any further recourse to the nation as a source of authorization and accountability. Africans were ruled by other Africans, not by themselves.

At the same time, Africa's position in the global system was gradually slipping in importance, not only in regard to political justifications but also economically. The development myth and dream had vanished, per capita national product dropped by a third, food production fell by 20% over the 1970s and 1980s, external debt equaled more than three times total exports and more than three-quarters of GNP, and Africa's share of the world national product dropped from nearly 2% to slightly over 1%, while holding more than 9% of the world's population.

African Responses

There were many African responses to this multi-leveled problem. At the highest level, the OAU, baffled at its inability to handle the recurrent politico-military security problems of the continent, turned in the 1980s to take on economic challenges, despite the founding agreement that left economic matters to the UN Economic Commission for Africa (ECA). In 1980, an extraordinary summit formulated the Lagos Plan of Action, a self-reliance program for economic revival. When it proved unrealistic, a new Priority Program for Economic Recovery was launched in 1985 in conjunction with the UN, aimed at reinserting rather than removing African economies from global interactions. This was followed by more specific declarations: the Common Position on External Debt (1987), the Khartoum Declaration on Human Centered Development (1988), the Mauritius Declaration on Education (1989), and the African Charter for Popular Participation in Development (1990)--all contributed general principles to the struggle for development. However, by the beginning of the 1990s, security problems had again thrust their demands on the OAU and it turned back to its collective security functions.

In security matters, the target changed just as the continent re-focused its attention. Instead of requiring collective security responses to interstate conflict between OAU members, Africa entered an era of state collapse under the combined breakdown of governmental functions and the rise of domestic rebellions. The

outbreak at the end of 1989 of the second internal revolt in Liberia after Sgt. Samuel Doe was fraudulently elected in 1985 called for a collective security response that was picked up by the regional organization, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) rather than the OAU. The collapse of the Siad Bare regime in Somalia at the same time escaped African attentions completely and fell to the US and the UN to handle, badly. The discriminatory regime of Juvenal Habyarimana in Rwanda was challenged in 1990 and then locked in a stalemate with the Rwandan Patriotic Front in the name of the excluded Tutsi minority.

On the domestic level, Africa in the early 1990s became the site for one of the most extraordinary political developments in the postwar era, the Sovereign National Conference (known by its French-ordered acronym CNS because it occurred almost exclusively in French-speaking countries). In twelve countries, beginning with Benin in 1990, self-constituted representatives of civil society took sovereignty away from the autocratic single-party ruler, put it into their own hands, and rewrote the constitution, opened up the political system and held new elections for a more accountable government. Other, non-French-speaking states imitated the movement in their own ways. These nonviolent revolutionary reforms represented a comprehensive effort by African bodies politic to meet some of the current problems at a very basic level, but they did not always stick and in half the cases were reversed by entrenched autocrats better versed in politics than their opponents.

Kampala Initiative: Negotiations to Create the New Regime

The problem plus the insufficiency of the responses continued to impress some leading statesmen. In 1989, after some years of retirement and some additional years of private discussions and public speeches, former Nigerian president Gen. Olusegun Obasanjo launched the African Leadership Forum (ALF) as a vehicle for his efforts to confront the African crises. The ALF served as the organizer of a number of conferences in various locations and some development seminars at the General's farm at Ota in southwest Nigeria; these meetings involved officials but also private citizens, academics, and local leaders. One such conference, in Paris in April 1990, drew the conclusion that Africa would remain in its multi-leveled crisis until a composite and comprehensive solution producing stable conditions for development

were found from within. A broad conference to examine such solutions was recommended, and for the following six months, the director of the ALF, Felix Moshe, toured the continent contacting leading African personalities in states and regional organizations about the feasibility of the project.

In the following six months, between November 1990 and May 1991, four preparatory conferences were held to shape the ideas behind the conference and to cultivate support. The first two meetings, in Addis Ababa, worked on both the procedures and the contents of the effort. Obasanjo brought the general secretaries of the Addis organizations, the OAU and ECA, to join in convening some thirty politicians and scholars, and spoke of a triad of security, pluralism, and economic cooperation, each encompassing a number of basic principles. A steering committee comprising about half of the conference participants met again in February 1991 and restructured the principles into four goals: security, stability, development and cooperation. Helsinki was evoked at both meetings, but the steering committee decided to term the categories calabashes rather than baskets; as Obasanjo explained, calabashes are not only African but, unlike baskets, they do not leak. The committee envisaged a final document signed by African states, who would then adopt its principles through national legislation.

Preparations also emphasized contacts with relevant sectors of support, both abroad and domestically. A third meeting, in Cologne in March, brought the leaders of the ALF movement in contact with officials in the Helsinki movement. It recognized that the European movement started as a private initiative that took time to develop, that the African movement needed to rest on its own roots, and that “Africa may need to make use of, or supplement, its existing organization, the OAU.” The fourth meeting sought to develop those roots by bringing together African NGOs in April in Ota, where they recommended inclusion of NGOs in all aspects of the evolving process.

The principal conference on the CSSDCA, convened in Kampala on 19-20 May 1991 by the ALF, ECA, and OAU, brought together 500 participants, including five heads of state, three former heads of state, and diplomats, scholars, businessmen, and representatives of student and women’s organizations. Diplomatic gloves were off, people spoke frankly, and not all supported the general idea. After initial speeches, participants broke up into working groups on each calabash and emerged with new

drafts, which were then adopted with good consensus and enthusiasm by those assembled. A summary of the principles is attached.

The evolution of the Kampala principles has been variously characterized as a movement, a process, a regime, and a GPPN. While the focus of this analysis is on the procedures of setting up and running a global public policy network, a few words of summary on the substance of the Kampala principles is in order. The last item, cooperation, is the culmination of the previous three, and as such identifies the pertinent levels of collaboration to be developed--among African states by continent, by region, and bilaterally, within the developing world of the South, and between North and South. Thus Kampala was to lead to a Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa, where the Document would be debated, revised as necessary, and adopted, as it would also be adopted by the OAU. The network would entail a permanent secretariat and perhaps other consultative and financial structures.

In its principles, the key to security is the responsible exercise of sovereignty, in the absence of which cooperation among neighbors is required to deal with internal problems and conflicts. Measures are required to assure the security of both states and people, creating a security community among African states where war is no longer envisageable as a tool of national policy and where the basic necessities of life are assured to their citizens. Stability calls for the rule of law, accountable democratic procedures, the free participation of the citizenry in governance, and the full protection of human rights. Development calls for an open, competitive economy to assure the satisfaction of basic human needs and the full growth of the African human potential. A number of specific agencies and proposals were also included to implement these principles.

State Consideration and OAU Selective Adoption

Although the GPPN exists as a process in motion, the Kampala Document has not yet been adopted as an African regime. The OAU took several looks at the document, selected from it some small pieces, and tabled the rest sine die. No state has included its principles as such in its national legislation, although many of the tenets were already present or subsequently added to constitutions, declarations,

speeches, and writings. Most devastatingly, Obasanjo's home state, Nigeria, under its worst tyrant, Gen. Sani Abacha, turned against the author of the Document, sentenced him for conspiracy and put him under house arrest in debilitating health conditions in 1995, at the time when he was planning to revive the CSSDCA campaign. The business as usual of African conflicts, authoritarianism, underdevelopment, and selective cooperation continues, as does Africa's marginalization in a globalizing world.

The reaction of the OAU and its membership was cool and selective, since their interests were being challenged by the proposed regime. Already at the Addis preparatory meeting in November 1990, the OASU secretary general challenged the foreign, Helsinki nature of the document and recalled that Africa already had a security regime in the OAU, despite its frequently-noted insufficiencies. The OAU Council of Ministers, meeting in Abuja under the presidency of Gen. Ibrahim Babangida two weeks after Kampala, deferred consideration of the document to a later Council session, to the Secretariat, and to member states, and therefore did not submit it to the immediately following Summit. Subsequent submissions to the Council in Abuja in February 1992, and in Dakar in July 1992 and February 1993 resulted in successive deferrals, and slow death.

There is no doubt that CSSDCA would have had some relationship to the OAU, either parallel in competition, superior to monitor, internal to alter, or in replacement. It therefore was an inevitable threat to the Organization as constituted. It is likely that there was also a personal rivalry of sorts between Obasanjo and Salim Ahmed Salim, the OAU Secretary General, as there was between Generals Obasanjo and Babangida.

However, the OAU at the time of the development of the CSSDCA movement was also in the process of developing its own program of conflict management, and that that process gained from the ideas exposed at per-Kampala meetings. The eventual Mechanism for the Prevention, Management and Resolution of Conflicts, which comprised a new department in the secretariat, a Security Council-like body capable of action between summits, and an ad hoc institution of special representative of the secretary general (SRSG), was adopted at the Dakar summit in July 1993 and immediately put to use. Imitation was the best form of opposition to CSSDCA.

Opposition also came more broadly from member states. Some of the heads of state in attendance at Kampala, notably Sudan's Omar Hassan Ahmed al-Bashir and Zambia's Kenneth Kaunda, found the source of Africa's problems abroad and in the past and the need for a new regime absent. In the OAU Councils of Ministers, Libya was also vocally opposed.

Besides the active "derailers," there were other states who played other roles in the OAU discussions. A larger group were simply "brakers," seeking to slow the process of considering the Kampala propositions because of their own vulnerability to its provisions, particularly on democracy, sovereignty, free enterprise, and cooperation. Probably the leading braker was Nigeria itself, the OAU host and presidency in 1992, whose head of state, Gen Ibrahim Babangida, viewed Obasanjo as a critic and ultimate threat. Most of the rest of the states were "Riders," uninspired by the document and waiting to go along with the majority. No favorable majority ever formed, and relevant governments came to forget about the initiative.

Contrary to the entrenched official reactions, the post-Kampala period and then the incarceration period were not a period of inaction on the NGO level, however. The ALF continued to discuss the Kampala principles at conferences on related subjects in September 1991 and March 1992. Further publications disseminated the Document. It also received the attention of Africanists and their publications. During the incarceration period, interim leadership of the ALF, assumed by Dr Francis Deng, former foreign minister of Sudan under a different regime, kept working at the project through a series of publications supported by the Carnegie Corporation. A secretariat continued to function in Accra, and in New York, Hans d'Orville organized a succession of publications with numerous testimonials in support of the incarcerated general. Toward the end of the period, a new strategy was being planned, which would enlist academics and political figures in key African countries, working through regional research organizations, to bypass the continental level and press for adoption of the Kampala principles by (sub)regional organizations, which could then put pressure on the OAU. While the period was undoubtedly one of dormancy for the process, it was also one where attention by specialists was maintained and the movement was kept alive, even if in closet.

However, perhaps more significantly, many of the principles are being pursued by elements of civil society in the individual countries. Human rights organizations

grew, sometimes even under governmental auspices. Plural--hence opposition--political parties continued to develop, often under difficult circumstances but at least more than in the previous decades; aid offered primarily through the children of NED (National Endowment for Democracy) in the United States helped parties learn the ropes of organization and elections, and when they did foreign and foreign-trained domestic election observers monitored the results. (In the Nigerian election of 1999, observers from the National Democratic Institute/Carter Center, International Republican Institute, OAU, Commonwealth, European Union, among others, monitored the proceedings). Combined domestic and international pressure for democratization brought contested elections in Kenya, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Liberia, Tunisia, Sierra Leone, Uganda, and Burundi, beyond the CNS states, where, arguably, there otherwise would have been none. Together, this does not eliminate the need for a comprehensive set of principles, nor does it even outweigh the worse examples of their breach. But it does indicate that the spirit of Kampala moved on on its own, at the grassroots level.

Resurrection

It has been remarked that the events in Nigeria in 1998-99 gave fourfold proof that God exists: In June 1998, Abacha suddenly died, struck down in full (and sole) candidacy for president by a heart attack. He was immediately replaced by Gen. Abdulkssalami Abubakar, an integritous military figure with no ambition except to return the country to civilian rule. A month later, Chief Moshood Abiola, a weak but symbolic figure elected president in 1993 in an annulled election to a now-expired term, also died suddenly of a heart attack. The leading candidate was Obasanjo himself, who emerged from prison and retirement to win election in February 1999 to the position he relinquished twenty years before.

The new Nigerian government has made the revival of the Kampala process a major point of its foreign policy. On one hand, this attention promises a resurrection of the movement and gives it major impetus from the official attentions of Africa's largest and one of its mmost important states. On the other hand, the movement is transformed from a broad-based public initiative to a foreign policy plank (even if the most important) among many of one state (even if the most important) among many.

The challenge of the time is to maintain both the concentrated support of the moment and the broad base of the former time, in combination to provide a dynamic multileveled movement for a new global policy network.

President Obasanjo's first major foreign policy appearance came in July 1999, only two months after his inauguration, when he reintroduced the CSSDCA as a major focus of his government at the OAU summit at Algiers. The same message was repeated in his speech before the General Assembly of the United Nations in September. In between, he convened a small group of foreign ministry officials from Nigeria, Senegal, Tanzania, Egypt, Mozambique, South Africa, and the ALF, OAU, and ECA to discuss reanimation of the CSSDCA process. The renewed process requires a new strategy at all levels.

III. REGIONAL AND LOCAL ACTORS AND THEIR ROLES

Initiating State: Nigeria

The strategy of 1991 for the building of the Kampala GPPN, as developed by the ALF and pursued through the 1990-91 meetings, was to strike an alliance between state leadership and NGOs. This strategy was dictated in part by the European precedent and in part by necessity, since the idea arose primarily in the mind of a sensitized former political figure and needed to be translated into state action. Kampala itself was described as the voice of Africa, bringing together the many sectors of civil society that its principles sought to protect and enhance. The strategy failed because Africa's many voices were not effective in reaching their own governments, which was the very situation that Kampala decried and sought to correct. The process did not get started because the local level was not effectively and sustainably galvanized and mobilized to reach the governmental level.

The strategy of the interim, largely by default, was to mobilize expert and civil opinion to keep the idea alive. Rejected by African states and by the African regional organization, and then deprived of its animating figure, the idea needed above all to keep its head above water, in hopes of better days. During this period, the ALF and friends, working primarily through meetings at the Brookings Institution, searched about for a new modus operandi, not daring to expect (despite all hope) the return of its leader: Abacha seemed to be in better health under better conditions than Obasanjo.

The strategy of 1999 overcomes disadvantages of the beginning of the decade by now being firmly in the hands of a single, powerful state. But it needs to overcome other disadvantages by providing mechanisms of articulation between the various levels above and below the state--national to local, regional and continental. On the "upper" levels, the idea has been to work on (sub)regional organizations before turning to the OAU again. On the "lower" levels, the interim strategy of using national and regional think-tanks, "Councils on Foreign Relations," and business groups to generate interest and pressure is relevant to the revival period.

(Sub)Regional Organizations

Faced with blockage on the level of the OAU and leaving that bastion to the charges of Nigeria, the movement focuses on a more manageable level of international organization, the various (sub)regional groupings. The various state groupings in West, Southern, East, Central/Equatorial and the Horn of Africa which have been created since the mid-1970s in response to ECA pressure to overcome colonial divisions to regional cooperation were all initially economic in nature and then gradually took on additional security functions, recognizing in practice the interdependent nature of these functions, as emphasized in the Kampala document. This interdependence growing out of the real experience of the organization makes them a ready vehicle for the adoption of principles and mechanisms of the Kampala GPPN, which then can be combined at the continental level as part of the CSSDCA process.

In addition to (sub)regional organizations of cooperation, other organizations are being solicited to include the Kampala Document in their focus of activity and to endorse the CSSDCA process, often from outside Africa as an encouragement to processes within the continent. A prominent example is the World Bank affiliate for economic development and political stability in the continent, Global Coalition for Africa (GCA), which is the subject of a current effort by private individuals associated with the interim period strategy to include an endorsement and promotion of the Kampala Document as a focus of its agenda. The National Summit for Africa movement which constitutes a grassroots constituency for African policy in the

United, endorsed the CSSDCA in its Statement of Principles and held a special session on the Kampala process at its national convention in Washington on 19 February 2000.

While not yet having adopted the Kampala principles as such, some (sub)regional organizations have already included Kampala-like declarations and mechanisms in their structures. In December 1999, the Economic Community of West Africa States (ECOWAS), rich from its experience in Sierra Leone (terminated in October) and Sierra Leone (still in place awaiting UN replacement), adopted a defense agreement reflecting the security calabash of CSSDCA. Earlier efforts in other regions also showed similar partial reflections: The Declaration of Principles on Sudan negotiated by the Inter-Governmental Agency on Development (IGAD) in the Horn of Africa in 1994 included principles of stability; the Organ on Politics and Security established in 1996 in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) included security principles; and the effort of Laurent Kabila to convene a regional meeting on Security, Development and Cooperation in May 1998 to commemorate the anniversary of his takeover of power (to which, in the event, no one came) was a similar effort in central Africa.

However, these efforts have neither been integral adoptions of the Kampala principles nor have they been based on anything deeper than state foreign policy actions. The effect and the cause are related. Still missing has been the installation of an effective base in national and regional organizations and groups in local society, as foreseen in the Brookings plans.

Civil Society

Plans articulated for the current step foresee the mobilization of local groups as the first building blocks of a process that moves from the local through the state to the (sub)regional to the continental level. Implementation is still in progress; examples can be given of various stages.

In South Africa, ACCORD (the African Center for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes) is probably the leading home-grown institution for the practice and training of peacemaking in its own country and, more broadly, its region. Indeed, it was on a home stop-over on his way to ACCORD's African Conference on

Peacemaking and Conflict Resolution in March 1995 that Obasanjo was arrested. ACCORD disseminates Kampala principles through education and practice, and works alongside SADC in many of its activities.

In Senegal, CODESRIA (the Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa) is the broadest pan-African institution of research cooperation, working through thematic research networks that cut across linguistic and regional boundaries. Its quarterly, *Africa Development*, is the longest-standing Africa-based journal. At its research planning conference in September 1998 at the University of Witwatersrand, CSSDCA was prominently highlighted as Africa's own set of principles and mechanisms for conflict management.

In Benin with branches throughout West and Equatorial Africa, GERDDES (the Study and Research Group on Democracy and Economic and Social Development in Africa) is an organization for the promotion of principles from the stability and development calabashes. National branches of Amnesty International and of the International Human Rights League in various African countries also promote Kampala principles.

Elsewhere, the focus is on using local business groups and chambers of commerce to endorse the CSSDCA principles. More broadly, such groups are also invited to join with local academics, human rights activists and other civic leaders to form "Councils on Foreign Relations" in the major cities of the continent. At present, such councils do not exist anywhere in Africa except on an ad hoc basis; the closest institution are foreign relations research academies such as the Nigerian Institute for International Affairs (NIIA), which has discussed CSSDCA in its publications. Full plans for the development of such councils are not yet worked out. It is most probably that results could only be achieved with outside assistance and encouragement, such as might be provided by cooperation between NED and the US Council of Foreign Relations (CFR).

IV. STRUCTURE AND PROCESS

A Network in Formation

Thus, the CSSDCA GPPN involves both a process and principles, the process constituting the network, and the principles and compliance with them the policy. As such, it is incomplete to talk of any one element alone, the most encompassing term being regime or two terms of policy network. However, either of these terms might imply a static-ness that is inaccurate. Not only is CSSDCA (to use one word, if inaccurately) a GPPN in formation, but GPPNs themselves are always in formation, or, more properly, in negotiation, as their members continually try to offer themselves an alternative to defection or compliance. Ikle terms this third possibility the characteristic of negotiation: one can say yes, no, or let's continue talking. Hirschman terms it the alternative of voice as opposed to simply exit or loyalty.

The continuing negotiation aspect has been lost on some critics of the specific CSSDCA GPPN. Derailers and brakiers have missed the provisions of the Kampala Document which, emphasizing that "The CSSDCA is a process," foresaw a period of negotiations of up to two years for the formulation of a politically binding document, which, after adoption by the states and the OAU, would be subject to periodic review conferences. Thus part of the process is the continual reformulation and review of the basic obligations and of states' compliance with them.

The structure of the network behind this process in the current period is led by the ALF working with the Nigerian government with a grant from the Carnegie Corporation and led by a secretariat moved from Accra to Abeokuta, under a Nigerian secretary, Ayodele Aderinwale. This motor agent is most directly charged with leading the negotiation and adoption of the CSSDCA principles on three rising levels--state, (sub)regional organization, and OAU. All levels are under campaign at the same time; the neatness of a state to region to continent progression is not necessarily the best or most realistic strategy, any more than do military campaigns run in a straight line.

The downward thrust of the process, without which the upward campaign would be rootless, as in the past, is much more pluralistic and less easily organized. Targets of opportunity are seized as they appear: the GCA's search for a new focus at the beginning of the millennium, the statement of goals by the US National Summit on Africa, the project of CODESRIA to identify a new research strategy, the possibility

of developing cooperation between NED and CFR--all constitute openings which fit into the CSSDCA strategy. Significantly, this part of the process escapes the control and direction of the ALF, the NGO equivalent of the Nigerian government. Opportunities to propagate CSSDCA ideas are often seized by individuals who are part of the movement--non-Africans as well as Africans--since they are hard to orchestrate by a central conductor who is not present when the openings appear. At best the ALF serves as a clearing house and information center.

In substance, the process of extending a policy network into comprehensive implementation involves both depth and breadth--depth in the precision and enforcement of the principles, breadth in the extension of adoption and compliance to the whole universe of potential adherents, in this case, Africa (presumably North as well as Sub-Saharan). The principles themselves represent something softer--if broader--than policy. As in any GPPN, they are policy guidelines or soft law, if anything can be softer than international law itself. The plan calls for the adoption of the Kampala principles as part of national legislation, but many of them are moral injunctions or general guidelines for more specific binding measures. Thus, again as in any GPPN, compliance is an approximate thing. This means that there is more constraint in the monitoring and reporting than there is in the simple adoption of the principles.

The extension of the GPPN to its full extent has both a depth and breadth dimension of its own. Adoption has not been and is not instantaneously unanimous, and so coalitions of adherents have to organize within (sub)regional organizations as well as the OAU (just as coalitions of supporters have organized within the legislatures and executive councils of each state). Before the ultimate unanimity, outliers have to be isolated, and opposing coalitions confronted, either for further negotiations or for (legislative) combat. The process is necessarily sloppy. Furthermore, the process of capturing the continent by its (sub)regional components may lead to a lesser but no less sloppy confrontation of more or less differing versions when the (sub)regions meet at the OAU, a confrontation that will not only lead to further negotiations but which is open to capture and exploitation by the remaining derailers and brakkers (and riders) making common cause in opposition.

This is where the local level and civil society again becomes important, providing the depth dimension to membership. Only as a coalition of governments

and NGOs can the process retain and expend its character as a movement. Only through cooperation between governments and NGOs can the principles of CSSDCA receive full implementation and monitoring by both consumers and producers of their values. Creation of a legislative commission in each country to facilitate that coalition and cooperation once the principles are adopted, along the lines of the US Congressional Commission, would be useful.

Unresolved Questions in Formation

This is not a self-implementing process, and yet, as noted, it is not one subject to centralized direction. To note its contradictions is merely to note that the world is not square, or perfect, or even logical by any single system of logic (and not all the operative systems have been discovered yet, even if we firmly believe they will, some day).

One question is the tension between the Nigerian and the universal aspect of the process and network. This tension is not unresolvable, but it requires other states to join rapidly in the leadership of the movement.

A second is the need to keep engagement active at all levels, or more precisely to keep local NGO and national state engagement in balance. Slight or momentary imbalance on one level or the other can serve as a goad to the lagging level to catch up, but serious imbalance on either level can change the nature of the process, skew the movement, and twist the policy network out of shape.

Third, relations with the OAU and the (sub)regional organizations insert a new level into the official process that was not there in the early 1990s and continue to pose unresolved questions of structure. Kampala was not the Conference on SSDCA; it merely called for that conference, and when the CSSDCA does occur it will have to define its relationship with the OAU very clearly and helpfully, or else there will be organizational war. The Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) and the Arab Summits have effectively overshadowed the League of Arab States (LAS), making up for but not compensating its weakness. The OAU is similarly weak but still authoritative, able to do some things that CSSDCA, even institutionalized, cannot do. One is reminded of Kwame Nkrumah's own conflict in sponsoring the African

Peoples Solidarity Organization (APSO) and the Conference of Independent African States (CIAS), prototype of the OAU. CSSDCA is not APSO but the tension with OAU is only increased thereby.

Fourth, as in any international law, let alone soft norms, the CSSDCA policy network is faced with the challenge of building accountability and compliance in the absence of enforcement. Where CSSDCA does include enforcement-like measures, in its doctrine of sovereignty as responsibility and in the calabash on security, it is bound (by that very nature) to meet opposition, both military and principled. In such a way are GPPNs strengthened, but in such a way are they also destroyed on occasion, depending on how the battle goes.

Finally, the periodic adjustment negotiations continue to pose questions about the nature and direction of the GPPN. As with any GPPN, its process nature can lead to a reformulation of the principles, or even their divergence from the original orientation. Again, the need for a solid base in civil society is evident.

V. LESSONS ON NETWORKING ON THE JOB

Although (and because) CSSDCA is a GPPN in formation, some lessons appear particularly clearly from the ongoing experience.

1. The role of inspiring personal leadership is crucial. Gen. Obasanjo put to work the dynamism and experience that he had accumulated in his first presidency and harnessed his energy in the service of civil society. When he was arrested, the movement flagged, but--perhaps not as obviously--personal commitment was again involved: private individuals associated with the Brookings group kept at the job, all the more inspired by the condition of the jailed leader.

2. The CSSDCA experience began in civil society, as an NGO in formation, and its subsequent course underscores the tremendous importance of a rooting in civil society. Attendance in Kampala was non-governmental in large part, efforts to keep the process in the interim period were entirely non-governmental, and the success of the GPPN in the third period depends entirely on its ability to find firm and diverse engagement on the NGO level.

3. Ultimately, official government engagement in the CSSDCA movement is the goal of the process. Paradoxically, the adoption of CSSDCA by a single government as a spearhead of its foreign policy has its advantages and disadvantages: Kampala gains a strong advocate, but at the same time becomes one among many Nigerian foreign policy planks and one among many African states' foreign policies. It finds competition from other policies within Nigeria and from other states within Africa. Efforts elsewhere to support the movement can be seen--and delegitimized--as backing another state's foreign policy. Indeed, it might well be preferable to move the ALF secretariat outside of Nigeria, so that Nigeria could be seen to support a pan-African movement based elsewhere.

4. The success of the GPPN on as broad an issue area as CSSDCA depends on the interaction of three groups of actors: targets, networkers, and target-networkers. Targets are states, who are the subject of the efforts at conversion by the movement and the process, to change (or pursue) their policies in accordance with the network principles. Networkers are the NGOs who develop intra-African (and international) ties of varying intensity to initiate and coordinate their work of pressure on governments; even though the focus of their work is essentially national, they benefit

from international contacts and their very existence is in some way the result of transnational instigation. Human rights organizations are a prominent example.

Between these two layers are some agents (targets) which themselves grow through international coordination and cooperation of their national activities. Many of these agencies and activities are cited explicitly in the Kampala Document: African Green Revolution and Renewable Energy research centers, the All-African Trade Union Council, harmonization of continental education standards, development of regional university centers of excellence, and joint infrastructural development such as riverine cooperation, coastal shipping operations and coordinated airline operations, among others. Each represents a GPPN of its own, a wheel in the whole CSSCA machinery.

4. Not all GPPNs are centralized coordinated congeries of interaction; some, equally valid, are acephalic, uncoordinable, larger than the sum of their parts but with each wheel held in place by its own teeth and not by a central axis. The motor element is complementary rather than common interests. Such operations have no gatekeeper or conductor; in CSSDCA, the ALF is almost at best only an observant bystander and notekeeper. The model of such GPPNs is not a firm or even a multinational corporation, but the market itself. Another model is the system, in which the interacting parts speed each other up or slow each other down, but in which the conscious agent is located in each of the parts, not in the middle of the system. GPPNs may be able to be sub-categorized into cephalic and acephalic networks (as anthropologists categorize tribes), but both are networks.

5. Every action generates an equal and opposite action. This physical principle is equally valid as a social principle in the evolution of international cooperation. An understand of GPPNs has to spend equal attention to the opposition aroused by the network process; it is not merely transaction costs that slow networking (and which they are designed to reduce) but specific calculations of counter-interests which animate the derailers, brakings and even riders. These need to be addressed specifically and early in the process, before their opposition crystallizes and coalesces into an opposing network. It was by design that invited attendance at Kampala included President Kaunda of Zambia and Gen Bashir of Sudan, leaders to be converted by the process (as yet unsuccessfully, as it turned out, but the attempt was made).

VI. OUTCOME AND FUTURE PROSPECTS

Challenges for Success

Norms are done, defended, and undone by the same process. Creating a GPPN requires the construction of a coalition in depth and breadth about a consensual body of rules, regulations, norms and expectations and then pushing it through to adoption. Never challenged and never tested, it becomes irrelevant, usually not worth its creation. So the policy network invites challengers, to show its muscle--or translated, to show its ability to overcome opposition and to show its applicability to new situations. Pushing the GPPN through the challenge gives it strength. Negotiating it around the challenge gives it flexibility; too great rigidity can make it crack. Bending it before the challenge can be the same thing as cracking, only more graceful. Thus CSSDCA will continue to fight the fight for adoption under the new name of implementation once adoption takes place.

Before adoption, the most likely outcome is the outcome of inertia which has obtained to date, the non-cooperative prisoners' dilemma situation where the safest course for most is defection. This is the course of the brakemen, organized by a few derailers. Unfortunately, the common solutions to the prisoners' dilemma game are not apposite here. The reiterated game which allows punishment for defection or which benefits from the constraints of reputation is not applicable until the agreement is signed. Reframing the issue or using a mediator as a vehicle of trust do not help in the absence of a sharp confrontation of issues or parties. Side payments or enlargement of the pie are inoperable given the wide spread of issues (and parties) involved. The only thing that matters when governments are asked to sign on to principles that condemn their current practices is the presence of a popular demand. Thus again reinforces the need for the development of local level mechanisms as part of the CSSDCA movement.

After adoption, the most likely challenge--more so than frontal confrontation--is the problem of the stag hunt game, the need to restrain single shooters who break the ranks of consensus for momentary advantage and then rejoin the consensus with pledges never to do it again. Compelling situations break all moral restraints, leaving the universal restraints pocked with exceptions. GPPNs can stand only a certain number of such exceptions without collapsing, and yet exceptions are what

international politics is made of. They cannot be eliminated; the only, if soft, test of success is that they be held to a minimum.

Criteria for Success

In this situation, probably the initial but greatest test of success is the fruition of the movement through the creation of enough mass and momentum on the linked local and national levels to result in the formal installation of the regime through members' and organizations' adoption. By its own admission, that would take two years after the initiation of the negotiation process, not yet formally begun.

Thereafter, the next criterion level of the goalposts would be noticeable changes in aggregate behavior. A good example is the success of the CNS movement in the first half of the 1990s. That success was diminished but not erased by its reversal in half the states where a CNS took place. There are many more provisions in the CSSDCA, making multiple judgments necessary.

As noted in the debate on the impact of norms in international politics, another version of the test would be identifiable cases of restraint, instances where a party's behavior changed dramatically compared to earlier patterns or where a party marched up to the Rubicon and turned back because crossing was no longer a conceivable option. South African cessation of support for UNITA in Angola or RENAMO in Mozambique, or Liberian cessation of support for the RUF in Sierra Leone, could be examples. Justified enforcement by the community of states or by popular pressure would also be a sign of success, annulling the sign of failure signaled by the infraction of the rules. Sovereign national conferences and collective peace keeping or -enforcing operations are such instances.

ANNEX: GUIDING PRINCIPLES OF CSSDCA

1) The principles of good neighborliness and peaceful resolution of conflict shall guide African governments individually and collectively.

2) African governments shall initiate, design and implement policies and strengthen institutions to adjudicate interstate disputes, resolve conflicts and attenuate the possibility of interstate and intrastate violence.

3) African government shall undertake appropriate measures to prevent or contained crises before they erupt into violent confrontation.

4) A continental peace-keeping machinery shall be instituted for the preservation of peace in instances which potentially or actually threaten the security of African state(s) or the continent as a whole, and shall operate in cooperation with United Nations peace-keeping operations where necessary.

•4a) An authorizing body for mandating the establishment, extension and termination of peace-keeping operations; command and control structures; administration and logistic support for operations; finding systems; procedures for acquisition of troops; and, modalities for rapid deployment in reaction to situations of aggression against participating member States shall be established.

5) A treaty on mutual non-aggression and mutual defense in event of external aggression shall be negotiated among all African countries.

6) State boundaries shall be demarcated by bilateral commissions, and conditions of border permeability be established between neighbors.

7) Confidence building measures shall be developed between African countries to cover, *inter alia*, exchange of information on troop locations and movements; joint military training; joint military manoeuvres; joint naval patrols; and, joint studies and seminars on sub-regional, regional and continental security issues.

8) Military expenditures by member states shall be reduced through ceilings on manpower and limitations on military hardware.

8a) A collective understanding shall be developed of the type of military equipment justifiable for procurement or manufacture by African countries.

8b) A collective African effort should be undertaken for the selective manufacturing of desirable military equipment for Africa's defense.

9) An African Peace Council shall be formed of distinguished personalities and African elder statesmen under the OAU, and charged with the task of ensuring that peace and harmony reign in the continent and a state of intra-African and inter-African tranquility is created and maintained, and of effecting a measure of intervention in national security problems of participating member states and determining appropriate actions including reconciliation and mediation or recommendation of deployment of African peace-keeping operations or both.

10) Domestic conditions constituting a threat to personal and collective security and gross violations of basic human rights lie beyond the protection of sovereignty and are within the domain of action of all concerned African states.

11) Every individual citizen shall enjoy the security to live in peace with access to basic necessities of life while participating in the affairs of his/her society in freedom and enjoying all fundamental human rights.

12) The rights and freedoms of the citizens of members states shall be promoted and protected.

13) No citizen shall be subject to arbitrary arrest or detention without trial or subject to trail and other forms of human or cruel treatment. Provisions for *mandamus* and *habeas corpus* shall be made in national bills of rights. Legal aid services for those who cannot secure legal services for themselves shall be funded from public revenue. There shall be no detention without trial.

14) Every state shall have a constitution with a bill of rights promulgated after thorough national debate and adopted by an assembly of freely elected representatives of the people.

15) The charter and mandate of the African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights (ACHPR) shall be expanded to provide for an annual published assessment of the human rights record of each African country.

15a) An African Court of Justice on Human Rights within the framework of ACHPR shall be established to adjudicate between governments and people's rights. ACHPR should be funded separately by international organizations and other independent sources.

15b) Every participating state shall sign, ratify and implement African and other relevant international legal instruments in the field of human rights.

16) The individual's right to own property and to enjoy societies' socio-economic and cultural benefits shall be guaranteed by a constitution approved by a freely elected legislature.

17) Laws shall be legislated by an assembly of freely elected representatives and shall be vigorously enforced by African governments.

18) No one can be exempt from accounting for his/her conduct when a law is breached.

19) Active and genuine participation of the citizens of every country in the governance of public affairs shall be fostered.

19a) Decisions relating to governance of public affairs shall be freely discussed and choices assessed so that the public will be mindful of the risks and rewards associated with any action of government.

19b) There shall be no hindrance to alternative ideas, institutions and leaders competing for public support.

20) Citizens shall have the right to participate in free and fair elections in their countries through an election based on a secret ballot and universal adult suffrage, as stipulated by their national constitution.

20a) Every citizen of a participating member state shall have the right to stand for election of public office and participate in the affairs of the state.

21) Women shall be fully involved in decision-making processes at all levels and assured full access to all factors of production, with special attention to technical assistance and financial resources in the rural areas.

22) All laws that discriminate against women shall be abrogated, to be replaced by juridical instruments and mechanisms to guarantee and preserve the rights of women.

23) Political organizations shall be separate from the state and shall not be created on religious, ethnic, regional or racial basis and considerations and these should not be exploited by leaders.

24) The separation of religion from the State shall be protected, and religion shall remain a personal affair.

25) Governments shall ensure that in making appointments, due regard is given to equitable representation at the all levels.

26) Trade union rights shall be guaranteed in accordance with ILO conventions and recommendations.

27) There shall be periodic renewal of the mandate of political leaders. At the same time, the tenure of elected leaders in various branches of government shall be constitutionally limited to a given number of years.

28) The actions of the officers of the bench shall be unfettered by the legislative and executive branches of government, and their tenure shall be guaranteed and provided for in the national constitutions. Decisions relating to the removal of officers from the bench shall be exercised by a Judicial Commission. Independence of the judiciary shall be effected through an inviolate tenure of offices, and through stable emoluments guaranteed by an act of parliament.

29) Institutions that promote accountability in public service shall be established and given adequate protection through independent financing and guaranteed tenures. These institutions include boards of audit for public expenditure, code of conduct bureaus for public officials, and ombudsmen.

29a) The financing of organs of adjudication and accountability (courts, audit boards, code of conduct bureaus or ombudsman) shall be paid from consolidated revenue funds not subject to arbitrary interference by executive fiat.

29b) An independent Civil Service shall be established with guaranteed security of tenure, salary and pension with members nominated or professional grounds by an independent Civil Service Commission. Removal of a Civil Servant must be exercised solely by an independent Civil Service Commission.

30) Development shall be based on self-reliance and the internalization of self-sustaining growth, rapid continental production base and vertically in processing and marketing, integration, diversification horizontally in broadening the and popular participation and equal opportunity and access.

31) Meritocracy, and incentives and compensations for professionals and civil servants are necessary to curb the brain-drain, to promote the development of professionals to replace expatriate technicians, and to expand endogenous technical institutional capabilities, professional associations and national consultants.

31a) Policies shall be adopted to achieve the elimination of illiteracy, the promotion of science and technology and of vocational and business training, the continental harmonization of education systems, the improvement of governance capabilities and administrative efficiency, among others.

31b) Educational systems shall incorporate in their curricula teaching in African values, cultures, history, philosophy, etc. Research in African humanities shall be given equal attention with the pursuit of science and technology. All youth shall have the right to the acquisition of basic education.

32) Domestic saving_ and indigenous investment shall be promoted, to replace the ethos of excessive consumption, as part of a general principle of liberal economic development with government support.

33) Transnational resources and infrastructures such as hydroelectric and hydrocarbon energy sources, waterways, forests and coastal zones shall be jointly developed.

34) Economic development shall be pursued through agricultural diversification and transformation industrialization.

34a) Policies shall be adopted to achieve increased food productivity and food self-sufficiency, cooperative research for a Green Revolution for tropical products, continental coordination of food and nutrition policy, full and nutritious utilization of traditional foods, among others.

34b) Policies shall be adopted to achieve multinational and national investment in intermediate and capital-intensive industry, national investment in small and medium industry, domestic resource-based manufacturing and processing to meet local needs, among others.

35) Food self-sufficiency for Africa, affordable sources for self-reliance in energy, including renewable--notably solar--energy, and economical provision of desalinization of water shall be considered as much a security matter as an economic priority.

36) Intra-African trade shall be promoted to foster cooperative development.

36a) Policies shall be adopted to achieve trade preferences for intra-Africa trade in food and agriculture and raw materials and in core and strategic industrial products, to facilitate interstate transportation, communication and payments, and to cooperate in joint ventures to take advantage of economies of scale.

37) Environmental protection is necessary for sustainable development.

37a) Policies shall be adopted to achieve reforestation and management of forestry resources, safe waste disposal and prohibition of foreign toxic waste, and longterm environmental management.

38) African economic integration, joint natural resource development, and continental supranational institutionalization, as well as global interdependence, are necessary conditions for security, stability and development.

39) Institutions of civil society--including trade unions, chambers of commerce, women's organizations, youth associations and professional groups--need expanding and strengthening, both with African countries and cooperatively on a regional and continental basis.

40) A structural, functional model of continental integration shall be based on a minimum timetable for an African Economic Community and through revived and accelerated subregional models.