

UN Vision Project on Global Public Policy Networks


www.globalpublicpolicy.net

GLOBAL NETWORKS FOR DEMOCRACY PROMOTION: ENHANCING LOCAL GOVERNANCE

Timothy D. Sisk

Timothy D. Sisk, Senior Research Associate
Graduate School of International Studies
University of Denver
2201 South Gaylord Street
Denver, Colorado 80208
+1 303 871 2998
+1 303 871 2456 Fax
tsisk@du.edu
www.du.edu/~tsisk

Case Study for the UN Vision Project on Global Public Policy Networks



Introduction

In the last twenty years, and especially in the last decade, a far-reaching global public policy network has rapidly developed to promote democracy worldwide, especially in those countries that became more democratic during the "Third Wave" of democratization.¹ Between 1974 and 1999, more than forty countries experienced transitions from some form of authoritarian rule to more democratic systems. The democracy promotion policy network responded to, and helped shape, this unprecedented wave of regime change. In sum, the recent wave of transitions to democracy has been characterized by a symbiotic embrace between internal forces within countries demanding more access to political power and the external international network that has worked to facilitate and improve open elections and multiparty politics. This combination of domestic demand for more democracy and international promotion of participatory governance accounts for the dramatic growth in new democracies around the world despite some setbacks and failures in particular instances.

The network of actors mobilized in support of democracy promotion includes the governments of major states and their aid agencies, international organizations, international financial institutions, multilateral donors, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) with global programs, region and country-specific NGOs, and philanthropic organizations. In contrast to other networks in this volume, for profit private sector actors have not been directly or extensively involved in this network although in many countries the business community has been a strong advocate of good governance and greater accountability.

The broad-based but loosely structured democracy promotion network has engaged in a wide range of activities. Among the most important of these are creating new international norms on democracy, advocating democratization in specific instances, assisting in the conduct and monitoring of elections in transitional societies, promoting civil society, and directly training political parties and candidates in various countries. The network features a multi-level set of actors -- from universally global to highly local -- that work in formal and informal partnerships. The partnerships, however, are formed on a rather ad hoc, case-by-case basis.

Democracy's spread is a global concern and democracy promotion requires the kind of global system of response embodied in the network. Among the arguments in favor of democracy promotion as a global issue are better adherence to international human rights norms, democracy's potential fostering of good governance to facilitate socioeconomic development, and the argument that over time democracies are inherently more externally pacific (that is, less prone to

¹ See Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (1991).

war).² Many states see democracy promotion (especially in their immediate regions) as an interest based in national security and economic opportunity, whereas others see it in terms of lofty internationalist aims.

Whatever the motive, when gross human rights violations occur, or when endemic poverty and deprivation exist, democracy's decline can yield negative externalities for the international community in terms of conflict and war, anarchic social conditions, economic disarray, and state failure. This has led to the emergence of international and regional norms on a "right to democracy." The democracy promotion network exists in pursuit of the realization of this aim and to implement the new norms in practice.³

Within this democracy promotion network, new emphasis is being placed on promoting innovation to improve the quality and depth of *democracy in local governance*. The emphasis on local governance finds its origins in the globalized contexts in which municipal decision-making occurs and the incomplete nature of many "third wave" transitions. Globalization, or interdependencies across national boundaries, has expanded dramatically in recent years. So, too, has urbanization -- the movement of people from the countryside to towns and cities.

Both new opportunities and unforeseen problems arise from rapid urbanization in this new global environment. *The renewed importance of local democracy originates from the belief that improving democratic development at the local level is the best way to deal with some of the difficulties of globalization.* As markets become more international, decisions that have local impact are often made in faraway places. Enhancing democracy locally may offer distinct advantages for retaining local capacities to improve the quality of life in today's metropolitan centers. While globalization has limited the autonomy and capacity of states to manage their affairs independent of external influences, the promotion of local democracy is one way to restore to the people more direct control over their immediate lives.

This case study describes the global public policy network for democracy promotion and explores the new emphasis on local governance in an era of globalization. One of the principal lessons learned from the democracy promotion field is that local actors need to be more fully and systematically included in the global public policy network if external assistance for democracy promotion is to be more successful. A close, cooperative and equal relationship

² See Bruce Russett, *Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World* (1993).

³ For the purposes of this paper, the democracy promotion network will be used to describe those organizations that have as their principal aim the promotion of electoral democracy and civic engagement. Certainly many human rights organizations, too, have engaged in democracy promotion activities, yet the work of this network also extends to advocating release of political prisoners, improved human rights practices, abolition of arbitrary detention and torture, and repeal of the death penalty to name a few. However, the procedures and routines of this network fall outside the scope of this chapter.

among local and international actors in this network is critical. Without such relationship, democracy promotion can be perceived as external meddling in a country's politics and power. A functional, effective relationship among local and international actors is key to the legitimacy of the network in action. And without external support, many local NGOs would be at risk of suppression from incumbent authorities without the attention and support emanating from the international community.

Another lesson learned is that democracy -- with its common feature of winner-take-all elections -- can be conflict-generating, and transitions need to be carefully managed and executed if social breakdown is to be avoided. In situations such as Algeria or Angola, new conflict has been precipitated when the results of elections were in dispute. Yet another lesson is that democracy promotion can lead to unintended consequences, such as deepening rifts among broad sections of societies along ethnic lines, as has been the case thus far in Bosnia.

Top-down (national level transitions) and bottom up (local democratic development) need to be more carefully integrated if an overall democracy building strategy by the network is to succeed. Although the previous emphasis on national-level democracy has yielded significant gains in recent years in terms of more democratically elected central regimes, more decentralization and local empowerment will be required if the quality of the new found democracies is to be deepened. Moreover, if the potential economic development offered by good (i.e., democratic) governance is to be realized in today's increasingly interdependent world, local democracy promotion will be an essential element. Thus, the deepening and improvement of democracy depends on developing it more locally and, ideally, making democracy more directly relevant and beneficial to people's daily lives.

I. Overview of the Democracy Promotion Network

As a global public policy network, democracy promotion organizations in the international arena are perhaps the most interventionist in terms of the elements of internal sovereignty with which they involve themselves. The construction of a domestic political order, the internal legitimacy of a regime, the means of choosing leaders, and the relative balance of power among domestic social forces are perhaps the most sacred of all aspects of sovereignty when it is defined as freedom from external interference.⁴ Yet pressures for democratization have also arisen from within, as mobilized group pressure incumbent regimes for political liberalization. Thus, coalitions have formed among international, regional, and domestic NGOs to cooperate in common goals. Often, this

⁴ Sovereignty defined in this way has often been abused as a pretext for authoritarian rule and the absence of accountability. See Francis Deng, et.al. *Sovereignty as Responsibility: Conflict Management in Africa* (1996).

relationship has involved external funding by public (i.e., donor state) and private sector (philanthropic foundations) sources for democracy advocacy groups within countries and for general support of an "open society."

In sum, precisely because external democracy promotion is so inherently interventionist and internal advocates of liberalization are so vulnerable, mutually beneficial global networks allow actors and institutions across borders to cooperate directly and work collaboratively. Networks of actors working in concert from the most global (such as the United Nations) to the most local (citizens' initiatives) are the most effective means of affecting change in this issue area.

The democracy promotion network has also evolved into horizontal and vertical dimensions. The horizontal dimension refers to collaboration and learning among various organizations at the same level -- cooperation, for example, between the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the European Union in a given case such as Bosnia. The vertical dimension is also apparent, as a global level organization such as the United Nation's Electoral Assistance Division assists a local independent election commission to organize itself and run an election. Thus, the process of governance includes linkages among actors at the same level and cooperation on multiple levels of the policy domain. These organizations often cooperate on the basis of comparative advantage that pool diverse resources (such as knowledge and funding) and that address issues that no single organization can address on its own (like launching a major election monitoring mission). And they lend each other legitimacy by mutually reinforcing the purposes and effectiveness of their actions.

Origins and Purposes

The democracy promotion network finds its origins in the need to assist in the domestic elements of internal governance in situations where countries seek to make difficult and uncertain transitions from authoritarian or other forms of non-democratic rule (including, for example, civil strife) to nascent democratic regimes. The 20th century has yielded clear lessons about the threats that authoritarian regimes pose for their own populations and for international security and economic development as a whole. The end of this century offered a truly unique opportunity for the global spread of democracy as formerly one-party socialist regimes collapsed along with the Soviet Union. With the principal ideological alternative to democracy generally undermined (with the possible exception of China), and the notion of "developmental dictatorship" generally discredited, external and internal pressures for democracy began to emerge. Democracy came to be promoted even in the most unlikely circumstances, that is in low-income states and countries that experienced deep-rooted social conflict along ethnic or religious lines.

Certainly the rapid transitions accompanying the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 provided a major catalyst for the further evolution of the democracy promotion network. Although efforts to promote democracy in certain situations had existed since the end of World War II -- such as the imposition of the MacArthur constitution in Japan and the inculcation of democracy by Allied powers in post-War Germany -- during the Cold War democracy promotion by Western powers and interests often took a back seat to ideological affinities related to the mega-conflict between capitalist and socialist tendencies. Nascent efforts at democracy promotion, such as the creation of the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) in the United States in the early 1980s, were seen through Cold War lenses; NED was seen by many observers as a way to undermine socialist regimes -- particularly those in Central America -- by supporting opposition forces more sympathetic to U.S. interests.⁵

Widespread transitions to democracy in the late 1980s and early 1990s significantly changed the ideological overtones of the democracy promotion network; with the removal of the Cold War context, ideological challenges to multiparty democracy withered away. Especially the significant transitions to democracy in the former Soviet bloc (especially Eastern Europe but also including Russia itself), in Africa, and in southeast Asia dramatically changed the context and created global political space for the emergence of a new set of actors engaged in the promotion of democratic governance. These transitions were coupled with, and often stimulated by, new thinking in the international financial institutions that explicitly linked good governance to development and conditioned aid on an improvement in governance to include multiparty democracy.⁶ Between 1984 and 1994, the number of formal democracies doubled by most estimates.⁷ Today, fully 117 states can be considered "democracies," with a combined population of 2.35 billion people (Freedom House 1999: 4-5).

At the same time, differences between the trappings of formal democracy and the realities of continued non-democratic practices indicate that there were serious differences between transition (the movement among regime types) and the deepening and quality of democracy in terms of meaningful choice and public participation. Moreover, in many countries there were serious difficulties within the transitional period itself -- such as a lack of trust among domestic actors on the relative free and fair nature of elections -- which prompted the rapid rise of an external election monitoring "industry," for example. *The global public policy network has its origins in both "supply" and "demand" dimensions of pressures for democracy. The supply of assistance emanates from the international community's pursuit of democratization as a long-term path to global development and stability. The demand for outside help emanates from civil society groups within countries undergoing turbulent transitions to multiparty*

⁵ See Thomas Carothers, "The NED at 10" (1994).

⁶ One of the most influential statements of the new conditionality requirements was the 1989 World Bank report, *Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Development* (1989).

⁷ Larry Diamond, *Promoting Democracy in the 1990s* (1995).

rule. External help can provide them with resources and reduce their vulnerability in their opposition to incumbent regimes.

Roles of Different Actors

A comprehensive review of the various actors in the democracy promotion network requires a much more detailed study than is possible here. The purpose, therefore, is to identify the principal actors involved by type and to provide an illustration of each type and the roles they play.⁸ The democracy promotion network features the following types of players.

- ◆ International organizations. With its mandate to promote global human rights, including government by the "will of the people" (as outlined in the Universal Declaration for Human Rights, the United Nations system -- the Secretariat as well as some of the specialized agencies -- have recently become more involved in democracy promotion. Most important among the UN roles in this sphere is that played by the Electoral Assistance Division (EAD), housed within the Department of Political Affairs. The EAD assists in electoral design and administration of election; however, it is somewhat hamstrung in its activities as it requires a member state's invitation to become involved in any given electoral process. Nevertheless, the EAD has played an important role in bolstering information sharing and capacity building for electoral processes in the situations in which it has become involved.

In several peacekeeping operations, notably the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia, and more recently in the UN-sponsored referendum in East Timor, UN authorities have been called in to actually structure and administration major electoral processes. This role borders on aspects of trusteeship, in which the UN performs tasks normally reserved for sovereign states.

A more common role for the UN, however, is the extensive election monitoring missions that have been carried out in many different states such as Namibia, Nicaragua, Angola, and South Africa to name a few. In this capacity, the UN is also often called upon to organize and accredit monitoring by other intergovernmental organizations (such as the Commonwealth).

- ◆ Regional organizations. Regional organizations such as the Organization of American States, the European Union, or the Organization of Africa Unity may have their origins in the efforts of a group of neighboring countries to manage economic and security co-operation, but their roles have expanded in recent years to include democracy promotion. Among regional organizations, the Organization of American States' (OAS) Unit for the Promotion of

⁸ Two books provide a more extensive treatment of the network. See Larry Diamond, *Promoting Democracy* (1995) and Thomas Carothers, *Aiding Democracy Abroad: The Learning Curve* (1999).

Democracy has been extensively involved in monitoring and country-level assistance efforts in recent years. Building on the Santiago Declaration (also known as Resolution 1080), the OAS Secretariat is called upon by member states to automatically respond to instances of democratic crises (e.g., a coup d'etat) by organizing a collective response.

Similarly, the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe has developed a significant capacity for democracy promotion among its more than 50 member states. The principal OSCE mechanisms for this purpose are the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) and the High Commissioner for National Minorities. P. Terrence Hopmann writes that "The OSCE has devoted considerable effort to promoting democratization [by assisting] new democracies in establishing fair procedures for holding democratic elections, [supervising] the conduct of those elections to assure that the procedures are followed, and [evaluating] their outcome. Since 1991, the OSCE has embraced the argument that the construction of stable democratic systems contributes in the long run to peace and security by reducing the risks of both intrastate and interstate violence."⁹

- ◆ Multilateral donor organizations. Among the multilateral donor organizations, the European Union has become most extensively involved in the democracy promotion network; the primary roles the EU plays are as a "club" to which democratizing states may aspire to join -- provided they have good governance records -- and as a funder of NGOs in transitional states worldwide.

The role of European conditionalities on democratic governance and the effects of these stipulations for the further consolidation of Eastern European democracies can hardly be overstated. Along with the incentive of possible membership in the EU, the financial and market access incentives for the continuation of the democratic experiments is remarkable. These states see compliance with these conditions as an important bellwether of their possible future full membership in the EU.

Similarly, the Council of Europe, since its inception in 1949, has been a consistent advocate of democracy promotion and the conditionalities for membership in this pan-European institution have also been a significant factor in promoting democracy, especially in the states of Eastern Europe that aspire to more fully integrate their political, social, and economic futures in Europe.

- ◆ Bilateral state aid agencies. Among the most significant and deeply engaged actors in the democracy promotion network are the bilateral state agencies,

P. Terrence Hopmann, "Building Security in Post-Cold War Eurasia: The OSCE and U.S. Foreign Policy," U. S. Institute of Peace *Peaceworks* (occasional paper series), October 1999, p. 16, 19.

such as the U.S. Agency for International Development (US AID), the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA) and the Norwegian Agency for Development (NAD). These agencies have become extensively involved in funding democracy assistance programs in virtually every corner of the globe. These efforts include strengthening election programs, promoting civic engagement and funding NGOs at the global, regional, and domestic levels, promoting constitutional reform, civic education, legal assistance, gender programs, local governance, and general support for a wide range of civil society organizations. The defense establishments within these countries have also been involved in democracy promotion, including for example collaborative efforts with military officers worldwide to promote democratically oriented civil military relations.

- ◆ Philanthropic foundations. In the West, and particularly in the United States and in Germany, philanthropic foundations -- charitable organizations that usually have their origins in the estate of wealthy and idealistic benefactors -- have been key players in the democracy promotion network. These foundations, such as the New York-based Ford Foundation and the Soros Foundation, have far-reaching global programs for the development of democracy and in the latter case, for broader promotion of "open societies." Foundations have directly support myriad programs that seek to promote civic education, develop pluralistic civil society, enhance free media, train opposition parties, enhance legislative and parliamentary processes, and advance human rights causes such as gender equality and women's participation in political life.
- ◆ NGOs with global programs. Among the NGO's involved in the global democracy promotion network, several have risen to the fore as important and dynamic actors in the network. These would include the International Institute for Democracy and Election Assistance (International IDEA), which is an NGO that is supported by a coalition of member states.¹⁰ IDEA's programs include country-level capacity building, new thinking on democratic practices, the development of codes of conduct for political parties and election observers, aspects of election administration, and serving as a general forum for the incubation of new ideas and approaches to democracy development. IDEA works closely with other global-level NGOs such as the Washington-based International Foundation for Election Systems (IFES), the US-based party institutes (the National Democratic Institute and International Republican Institute), the German party foundations (e.g., Hans Seidel Foundation, the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, or the Konrad Adenauer Foundation).

¹⁰ This organization is difficult to categorize, as it has as members both states and global NGOs, and it works closely with UNDP and other international organizations. It operates independently of the policies of its member states and for this reason it is considered here to be an NGO.

Other significant NGOs with global programs include the Carter Center, based at Emory University in Atlanta, Georgia (USA), which has become the standard-bearer for organizing unofficial, neutrally perceived election monitoring missions around the world.

- ◆ Regional NGOs. The extent to which there is extensive participation by organizations in the global South in the democracy promotion network, this participation is provided by regional NGOs. Among the most important of these nonprofit organizations with regional programs are CODESRIA (Center for Democracy and Security in Africa), based in Accra, Ghana and the Institute for Democracy in Eastern Europe. These organizations run regional programs to promote democratic practice and they specialize in particular on the development of regional transnational networks of local NGOs, election administrators, political parties, and mass media.
- ◆ Country-specific NGOs. Many transitional countries have seen the development of national-level NGOs that work for democracy promotion and implement programs in myriad aspects of democratic development. A good example is the Institute for Democracy in South Africa (IDASA), which played a pivotal role in advocating for a transition to democracy, facilitated the transition with many programs and activities to build confidence among various domestic actors, and which subsequently has played an important role as a promoter of accountability, good governance, and civic education. Among the projects IDASA has developed in the democratic consolidation phase include parliamentary watchdog functions, advanced political party training, and extensive public opinion polling.

Network Structure and Processes

This description of the democracy promotion network just begins to describe the vast array of actors involved. In any given country-level process of democratization -- such as a new election cycle -- a coalition of actors emerges often in an ad hoc fashion. This rather informal and case-specific confluence of interested parties describes well the rather unstructured nature of the democracy promotion network and the processes by which the network comes together. That is, the coalition of actors and the means by which they come together and communicate, coordinate, and collaborate to achieve democracy promotion in any specific instance varies case by case. *It is virtually impossible to make broad generalizations about the structure and processes for democracy promotion due to the ad hoc and case-by-case variation in the coalition.*

It may be useful, however, to analyze how various actors have come together and worked together in a single case. The 1994 elections in South Africa is a good example of the network in action. In the run-up to the inaugural (or "founding" transitional) elections that ended apartheid and launched a new, nonracial democracy, a plethora of organizations at all levels of the networks

came together and worked to ensure the relative freeness and fairness of the elections in very difficult circumstances.¹¹ The elections turned out successfully, in part due to the tireless efforts of literally thousands of official and unofficial international monitors fielded by international organizations such as the UN, the Organization of African Unity, the Commonwealth, and the European Union along with NGOs with global programs and domestic South African NGOs.

The processes by which the network was coordinated involved a loosely structured accreditation and coordination process carried out by an international organization in cooperation with the Independent Electoral Commission of South Africa. The overall election monitoring effort was coordinated by the United Nations Observer Mission in South Africa (UNOMSA) but the placement and role of monitors was carefully coordinated with the South African election authorities. The role of the network was critical in assuring the parties competing in the elections that -- despite numerous difficulties -- the overall outcome of the elections was perceived as relatively free and fair. Interestingly, NGOs carried out specific tasks such as monitoring polling stations, providing logistical support, working with the political parties, and developing extensive civic education programs on the process and meaning of voting. Although the South African process is exemplary of the network in action, it is perhaps unusual in the intensity of involvement by the international community in democracy promotion.

One effect of the network working closely together in a major case such as South Africa is that these experiences serve as crucial events that bring the network together and establish patterns of working relationships for future instances of collaborative involvement. The same constellation of actors that came together for South Africa, for example, was also involved in monitoring Nigeria's tenuous transition to civilian rule in 1999. The development of trust relationships among these actors has been good, and as a result they easily come together the next time that events demand a major international effort to monitor a potentially difficult or dangerous transition. Personal ties and institutional learning are two important factors in explaining how the democracy promotion effort congeals in each situation and how it plans and carries out its difficult tasks.

Tasks Performed & Initial Results

The variety of tasks performed by the network can be summed up with a typology that includes advocacy, funding or the provision of external resources, education and training, consulting and information sharing, and monitoring.

Advocacy

- ◆ Promotion of new global norms. The network has at times been involved with the creation of new norms in the international arena, particularly for example

¹¹ For a comprehensive look at the 1994 elections in South Africa, see Andrew Reynolds, ed., *Election '94 South Africa* (1994).

within regional organizations such as the OAS, OSCE, and OAU, as well as "soft law" norms such as the authoritative statement of the UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali in his 1996 *Agenda for Democratization*.¹² Funding has been provided directly to NGOs globally for creation and sustaining the network, and also directly to civil society actors in domestic contexts, to include capacity building, training, the media, labor unions, and in some instances political parties.

- ◆ Targeting Specific Cases. The network has also engaged in efforts to promote democratization in specific instances. Probably the best example of a concerted effort by the network to advocate democracy in a specific instance is the case of Burma; an interesting aspect of this particular case is the widespread use of the Internet to create and maintain the network. There are myriad instances of the network's promoting or supporting specific advocates for democracy within countries, such as Nobel laureate Aung San Suu Kyi.

Funding

- ◆ Providing financial support for NGOs. One of the most important tasks of the network has been provided financial resources for local-level actors such as democracy promotion NGOs in transitional countries. The actors providing this function include donor states, multilateral aid agencies, international organizations, and philanthropic foundations. Issues in the direct, external funding of opposition-related NGOs are equity, intrusion into internal affairs, sustainability over time, transparency, and the legitimacy of local actors when they receive external financial support.

Education and Training

- ◆ Capacity Building. Elements of the network, such as the party-affiliated organizations in the United States (NDI and IRI) have been at times involved in directly training political party officials and candidates in transitional countries. Similarly, training has been provided for functions such as electoral administration and election-related dispute resolution. International IDEA, for example, convened a major international meeting of the world's "election management bodies" in September 1999.
- ◆ Civic education. International NGOs have been extensively involved in mounting civic education campaigns in transitional societies, from "get out the vote" campaigns to "street law" (practical applications of human rights), to awareness of constitutional concepts and the meanings and purposes of democracy.

¹² Reports A/50/332 and A/51/512, November 17, 1996.

- ◆ Training for government reform or improved practices. The network has promoted democracy through training programs aimed at improved transparency and accountability, and through more effective aspects of governance such as parliamentary rules and guidelines. The international NGO Parliamentarians for Global Action, for example, has provided opportunities for training of newly elected legislators in law-drafting procedures.

Consulting and Information Sharing

- ◆ Best practices, comparative information, and specific consulting. Due to the highly technical nature of aspects of democracy such as constitutional design and electoral system choice and administration, a key function of the democracy building network has been to provide information and specific consultative advice on these often complex issues. In 1995, for example, the UN's Electoral Assistance Division helped sponsor the work of the Fiji Constitutional Review Commission, which toured the globe meeting with scholars, NGOs, and officials in states on best practices for constitutional design in multiethnic societies.¹³
- ◆ Providing country-level assessments. In countries where democracy promotion has been extensive, actors in the network have teamed up to provide country-level assessments of the challenges to democracy, options for transition, and provided recommendations. International IDEA, for example, has produced detailed assessments of the prospects for improving democracy in Burkina Faso, Romania, Guatemala, and Nepal.

Election Administration and Monitoring

- ◆ Election monitoring. The most celebrated function of the network has been its extensive work in monitoring transitional elections. Monitoring involves everything from placing international poll watchers at voting booths, to assessing media coverage, to evaluating vote tabulation and results, tracking public opinion, and the often controversial practice of parallel vote tabulation independent of the authorities. Election monitoring has been a particularly regular instrument in post-war situations, a practice which was first widespread in Namibia in 1989 and which has been a remarkable feature of virtually every post-war election since then.
- ◆ Election administration. At times, although rare, the international network has been called in to actually administer an election within boundaries of a sovereign state. The most recent example is the UN-administered referendum in East Timor; important antecedents include the OSCE-managed elections in

¹³ See the report of the Commission, titled *Towards A United Future*, along with the multitude of submissions received by members of the network around the world.

Bosnia and UNTAC's administration of the 1993 elections in Cambodia. On the horizon, the OSCE is expected to once again play this role in Kosovo.

The initial results of the democracy promotion network's performance of these tasks are highly difficult to measure. Success in the creation and consolidation of democracy can be defined in so many ways, different actors may use different criteria in evaluating whether a democracy has been advanced, and assessment of education and training programs involves very long term tracking of individuals and their attitudes and behaviors. Success might be viewed as an election that is relatively free and fair and without violence, or it might be the fact that a training program was run, trainees came and listened, but the actual impact on the political dynamic of the hard to truly know. In sum, there are good short term measures of successful programs and efforts, but evaluating whether democracy is truly taking root in a society in the long term entails a much more difficult means of evaluating progress.

On the broadest level of analysis, it is clear that with the phenomenal growth in the number of democracies worldwide, democracy promoters can point to a clear aggregate trend of success. Among the celebrated examples of democracy promotion have been Poland, El Salvador, and South Africa. Among the disappointments experienced by the network are efforts to promote democracy Algeria, Angola, Bosnia, and Burundi.

Many elements of the network can boast specific successes in their actual impacts in promoting democracy. The work of the OSCE's High Commissioner on National Minorities in promoting democratic resolution of many of Eastern Europe's nationalities problems in the wake of the dramatic fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 has been acclaimed. Election monitoring by the Carter Center is widely praised in the international news media, and the organization has proved an essential, neutral, third party observers in elections as far afield as Liberia and Nicaragua.

At least one of the lessons learned is that national-level elections are well and good, but one or even two elections do not make a democracy. The democracy promotion network has been seen as myopic in its pursuit of elections in circumstances where the believed conditions for electoral democracy arguably don't exist. The dramatic failure of national-level election processes in cultivating democracy has often been cited by critics of democratization in many countries (particularly in post-war environments) as *the* fallacy of democracy promotion. Surely a national election to establish the legitimacy of a democratic government is critical and necessary. But democracy involves more than elections, it requires a bottom-up dynamic that has often been lacking in transitional states. *The result is that many of the formal democracies offer "choiceless" national-level elections that have little to do with the major issues that affect the daily lives of the majority of the populations.*

Top down approaches to democracy are insufficient and indeed inefficient for promoting democracy; bottom-up approaches are not just complementary, but in the long term are more important for successful democracy promotion. Many cite Bosnia as an example in which the international community has devoted significant resources to hold two major post-war elections, with the elections' outcomes described as nothing more than an "ethnic census." At the same time, local democracy promotion efforts have seen at least some success in encouraging multiethnic accommodation in a very difficult postwar situation such as Bosnia (Demichelis 1998).

II. New Emphases on Local Democracy

Increasingly, the international democracy promotion network is turning its attention to decentralization and the democratization of local governance as a complement to its ongoing work at national-level democracy promotion. Why have existing and new global policy networks begun to emphasize local democracy? As scholars Caroline Andrew and Michael Goldsmith write (1998: 109):

In the evolving modern state, with its variety of institutional forms and practices (governance), and in an ever-interdependent world, the time is right for a reconsideration of the role which local democracy, elected local government, and representatives might play. First, there has been a reconsideration of existing values, and in particular the role of local government in promoting democracy through the enhancement of citizenship and participation by the individual.¹⁴

International organizations, bilateral aid agencies, the international financial institutions, and democracy building NGOs (non-government organizations) are placing greater emphasis on promoting democratic local governance. The new emphasis is a direct result of the inadequacy of focusing too much on national-level governance and an appreciation of the potential role local democracy can play in ameliorating the adverse effects of globalization. In emphasizing local governance, these organizations are also building global public policy networks that significantly rely on bolstering the activities of local organizations working closest to the immediate interests and needs of people.

Challenges for Local Governance

Local governance refers to *the institutions, influences, and processes that lead to the authoritative resolution of public decisions at the tier of government closest to the people*. This definition of local governance implies that *local*

¹⁴ See also Wolman and Goldsmith, eds., *Urban Politics and Policy: A Comparative Approach* (1992) and Judge, Stoker, and Wolman, eds., *Theories of Urban Politics* (1995) for recent scholarly thinking on the character of modern municipal governance.

government is the tier of public authority that citizens first look to solve their immediate social problems. Increasingly, in many instances, democratic governance involves publicly elected politicians, administrative officials, NGOs, and citizen-led community based organizations, all playing vital roles in managing the commons.

Local systems of governance are facing increasingly complex challenges in an era of rapid globalization. Local authorities in today's diverse cities face difficult problems that are borne from new global economic interdependencies of migration, free trade, and unbridled flows of information and communication. Recent findings from economists also suggest that global trends are converging to create conditions whereby economic development may be best approached at the local, not national, level.¹⁵ Globalization implies the need to devolve to municipal entities the power to make and implement economic decisions. Hence, the thrust of many multilateral and international financial institutions is on decentralization as a prerequisite to promoting economic and social development.

No city or municipal area is immune from some of the effects of globalization. Among the types of effects of globalization new inequalities and among and within countries, threats to the environment such as declining biodiversity, increased refugee flows in many parts of the world where armed conflict in neighboring countries produces instabilities, the impact of new infectious diseases, and the spread of organized crime and corruption. Surely the increased flow of information and communication, while opening up societies to the free flow of ideas, something puts pressure on longstanding social and cultural traditions. In many countries, indigenous peoples are particularly threatened. Migration is a major issue in most cities today. In sum, globalization has produced social dislocation in many parts of the world that has in turn created a rapidly changing context in which democracy is practiced.

Globalization, however, produces more than these global "evils." It offers opportunities for new sustainable economic development, growth and prosperity and new flows of experience and information on how to manage a rapidly urbanizing context.¹⁶ There are also new opportunities for improving social relations in societies that have been divided by deep-rooted conflict. Practices and lessons learned to promote democracy in other parts of the world can be attempted, adapted and improved upon in other corners of the globe. Ways in which some cities have dealt with the problems induced by globalization -- which sometimes produces new winners and losers, for example as factories close and move elsewhere -- can be potentially transferred to other settings.

¹⁵ For an application of the principle in the Americas as an example of the arguments for decentralization to stimulate economic development see, George Peterson, *Decentralization in Latin America: Learning Through Experience (1997)*.

¹⁶ The opportunities for local democracy to capitalize on globalization are highlighted in Klodawsky, Fran and Caroline Andrew "Acting Locally: What is the Progressive Potential" (1999).

Managing Globalization Locally

As a result, many participants in the global public policy network have emphasized local governance in their priorities, such that there have been fairly successful privately funded efforts to bolster local democracy in Eastern European countries, especially Poland, Hungary, and the Czech and Slovak republics. In a recent assessment of the activities of major foundations such as the Open Society Institute¹⁷, the Ford Foundation, the Mott Foundation, and the Rockefeller Brothers Fund, Kevin Quigley found that the success has been real, but more attention needs to be focused on civic engagement (Quigley 1997).

It is readily apparent that in seeking to address these globalization-induced challenges in a democratic framework, local authorities need new, innovative options and practices in managing municipal decision-making. Legitimate, sustainable democracy and development will only be possible if citizens can be involved to have meaningful control over their lives. The list of challenges above also suggests that local democratic development in the 21st century will feature *democratization as conflict management*. To face these challenges, local authorities need to become masters of social mediation, utilizing tools to enhance citizen and stakeholder participation in policy making and service delivery. For this reason, recent trends in the study of local government emphasize the need for an "innovative, renewable, sustainable city" (Andrew and Goldsmith 1998: 103) and the importance of consensus-based decision making practices over the issues that directly affect people's lives. How has the global public policy network developed to promote these ends?

III. Promoting Democratic Local Governance

The network for the promotion of local self-governance can be fruitfully considered as a sub-network of the larger effort to promote democracy worldwide. It is in a slightly less developed stage but recent developments suggest that this network is evolving rapidly and that a critical mass of organizations has congealed to promote local, democratic self-governance in part as a direct response to globalization. International organizations, in particular the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) Management and Governance Program have made significant efforts throughout the world in promoting decentralization and local democracy as a key to good governance, economic development, and improved quality of life through the rubric of "sustainable human development." In particular, the UNDP's LIFE program on decentralization has emphasized participatory policy making in development; its "Magnet" on-line resource base offers information dissemination on democratic local practices through the

¹⁷ In January 1997, the Open Society Institute launched a Local Government and Public Service Reform Initiative, based in Budapest. The Initiative seeks to generate and disseminate information on local government; collect information on local government and disseminate throughout the region, and to assist national OSI foundations in their grant making.

Internet.¹⁸ Similarly, the UN sponsored Commission on Human Settlements (CHS) has played a critical role in setting the agenda on the priorities of local governance.¹⁹

The efforts of regional organizations in promoting local governance are also significant. Both the OSCE's OHIDR and the OAS's Unit for the Promotion of Democracy have significant local democracy promotion programs. Bilateral aid agencies have also played a critical role; for example, the Norwegian Foreign Ministry has bankrolled more than \$35 million in support of local governance and municipal reform South Africa. US AID has worked extensively on promoting local governance in the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union.

An interesting aspect of the emerging local democracy network is the growing linkages among local government officials and administrators. Municipal networks in emerging democracies have been pivotal players in advocating for local self-government and international linkages have been important to them in arguing their case for greater devolution of powers. In particular, the International Union of Local Authorities (IULA), with a general secretariat in The Hague, has served as a convenor of mayors and other city officials.

Democracy promotion NGOs with global reach, such as the International Foundation for Election Systems (IFES), NDI, IRI, the German party-based *Stiftungen*, have devoted considerable resources and support for local political party development, the training of local electoral management bodies, and programs in public administration that emphasize democratic decision making programs. Universities, too, have been involved with such training, notably the University of Birmingham's Institute on Local Government's work to evaluate and assess local governance in Russia and the Baltics. Another example of a university-based center is the Mega-Cities Project of the City University of New York, which has programs in virtually every one of the 22-some cities in the world with more than ten million inhabitants. Similarly, university centers have also turned their attention to the importance of decentralization and improved local governance in growth, development, and conflict management in divided societies (e.g., Bollens 1998a and 1998b).

What new international norms have been recently established?

Alongside the development of new thinking and emphasis on the importance of local governance is the development of new global norms, or standards and regional mandates by international organizations on the importance of local democratic development. Among the most important of these was the Istanbul Declaration emanating from the Habitat II conference in June 1996

¹⁸ See <http://magnet.undp.org/>. The site offers 808 links, many of which are pointers to other participants in the local governance network.

¹⁹ The Commission can be found at <http://www.unhabitat.org/>.

which demands of member states a to partnership and effective decentralization and self-government.

Regional organizations have been particularly progressive in establishing new norms that ensure a proper place for local governance in a country's political life. The Council of Europe and the Organization of American states have been particularly assertive in creating new regional standards for structuring a role for local government. In the context of Europe, there have been efforts to assure a role for local governance in light of increasing economic integration in congruence with the principle of *subsidiarity*. The most extensive of these is the 1985 European Charter on Local Self-Government, which seeks to give concrete assurances of continued local decision-making authority in the context of regional integration and increasingly interdependent political and economic policy making by the countries of the European Union.²⁰ The European norms are the most extensive, and they are indicative of new norms also developing in other regions.

In Latin America, the Organization of American States' Unit for the Promotion of Democracy describes decentralization, local government and citizen participation as issues of "growing importance to the Hemisphere's democracy agenda," and the organization has been promoting this approach through training, workshops, research, publications, and technical assistance.²¹ This work is done in the context of new norms or regional standards adopted by the organization in the early 1990s in defense of the new democracies that had replaced authoritarian governments.

The most important development on the horizon is the development a draft World Charter on Local Self-Government that will offer "soft law" on the right to local democratic governance. This draft charter is advocated by IULA and many NGOs involved in local governance, such as the Istanbul-based World Academy on Local Governance and Democracy. The draft charter -- for consideration by the United Nations General Assembly -- would commit states to a specific concept of democratic local self-governance. It's draft provisions state:

Article 3 - Concept of local self-government

1. Local self-government denotes the right and the ability of local authorities, within the limits of the law, to regulate and manage a substantial share of public affairs under their own responsibility and in the interests of the local population.
2. This right shall be exercised by councils or assemblies composed of members freely elected by secret ballot on the basis of direct, equal, universal suffrage, and which may possess executive organs responsible to them.

²⁰ See the The European Charter on Local Self-Government, Council of Europe, (European Treaties ETS No. 122), Strasbourg, October 15, 1985.

²¹ Annual Report of the Secretary General, Organization of American States, 1998 (OEA/Ser.D/III.48), p. 105.

How do they go about promoting democratic local practices?

Various approaches have been used by the network in promotion of local democracy. UNDP has been engaged in establishing tripartite networks that involve public officials, local authorities and administrators, and private sector enterprises for participatory development projects at the local level (see the MagNet site, referenced above). Conference diplomacy has also been a feature of this network in setting the agenda for the promotion of local self-governance to meet the challenges of urbanization and globalization, in particular the UN sponsored Habitat I and II conference on human settlements and Agenda 2000. Out of the conferences, a number of important partnerships and innovations in urban governance have been germinated.²²

At times, there have been examples of ad hoc networks for local democracy promotion that sprouted in much the same way the democracy promotion forces come together for election monitoring. During the 1990-1994 transition to South Africa, political violence seriously challenged the transition from apartheid to democracy. Through the December 1991 National Peace Accord, a nationwide network of local and regional peace committees was eventually established. NGOs were critical in organizing, launching and staffing the committees, and providing the human resources necessary for their facilitation, monitoring, and observation functions.

These committees helped monitor political rallies, investigate instances of violence, calm tensions, and enhance communication among disparate groups. In many cases, the committees handled numerous locally sensitive issues such as "taxi wars," factional strife, "no-go areas," and demonstrations and protests. The Peace Committees were an important, home-grown model for effective participation across historical divides. The Peace Committees sometimes suffered from illegitimacy, ineffectiveness, gender and sometimes racial imbalances, inadequate power and resources, and they failed to bring down overall levels of public violence. Even so, it is reasonable to speculate that without them the problems generated by the ongoing, transitional strife would have been much worse (Sisk 1994).

A particularly interesting innovation emanating from the National Peace Accord experience in South Africa was the linkages forged among international monitors (the United Nations Observer Mission in South Africa, UNOMSA, as well as European Union, Commonwealth, and Organization of African Unity personnel), NGOs, anti-apartheid community activists, and the security forces and local authorities. The Peace Accord structures were disbanded (for the most part)

²² See for example the Columbia University/ United Nations Urban Habitat Project for a summary of the innovations and links to members of the network that was spawned by the Habitat conferences. <http://sipa.columbia.edu/CURP/affiliates/habitat/index.html>

after the celebrated 1994 elections in South Africa, but the experiment has contributed to the formation of transitional metropolitan councils that amalgamate apartheid-era divided cities into unified post-apartheid municipalities.

In South Africa and elsewhere, NGOs have been critical in the network, and again the post-war arenas offer examples of the critical nature that these organizations have played in concert with international and regional organizations.²³ International and home-grown NGOs are increasingly taking on the task of international peacemaking, and some would argue that they have a comparative advantage in dealing with conflicts at the local level. Although NGOs clearly have strengths and weaknesses as peacemakers in a changing world, they are increasingly called upon to engage in peacemaking in arenas where states and international organizations are simply not up to the task. As international humanitarian relief specialist Andrew Natsios asserts (1997: 344):

NGOs carry on their work at the very lowest level of social order, the rural village and city neighborhood. Their highly participatory system of decision-making and program management, while time-consuming and laborious, does tend to engage the energy and commitment of the community. This approach to development creates loyalty and trust between NGOs and the communities in which they work, and this can serve an important purpose in conflict resolution.

In Bosnia, NGO staff working to promote conflict resolution in divided cities such as Banja Luka, Jajce, Mostar, Sanski Most, Sarajevo, and Vitez have found that:

Many of Bosnia's divided cities are controlled by 'half-mayors,' who oversee the municipal functions on their side of a city's ethnic dividing line. Aid donors and non-governmental organizations involved in Bosnia's reconstruction have been stymied in their attempt to build up local capacities, as these half-mayors often use aid to achieve their political ends, strengthen their sides, and funnel aid disbursements to favored local suppliers and contractors (Demichelis 1998).

²³ Conflict management specialists have been increasingly concerned with efforts to build local capacities for consensus-building skills that feature negotiation, mediation, and coalition making capabilities for problem solving. This is especially the case in post-conflict societies. For example, John Paul Lederach, a leading figure in the conflict management field, has argued that international approaches to post-settlement peace building have focused too often on the national level elites. Peace building efforts have proceeded without an integrated strategy that seeks to promote conciliation by "middle-range actors" (such as regional and local party functionaries or militias) and the "grass roots" (Lederach 1997). Lederach's vision is of a more integrated strategy of peace building that explicitly seeks to build peace at myriad levels of society, including and especially at the neglected middle and grass-roots tiers.

As a result, aid specialists recommend, among other things, that donors should rely more systematically on "participatory programming in post-conflict relief work. Strengthen the community, not the leaders of the conflict. Empower community leaders on both sides of the city's ethnic dividing line to create their own solutions" (Dimechelis 1998: 2). This approach has worked not only to provide reconstruction aid more fairly and efficiently, but the participatory planning process has promoted the resolution of disputes in areas such as property and employment rights, access to health education and social services, and the reconnection of utilities.

IV. Assessment: Lessons Learned

There are some lessons learned from these attempts at local conflict management through innovative democratic practices. One such lesson from these and other experiences -- such as participatory development projects -- is that it is too much to expect that collaborative problem-solving processes make conflict go away. This is true of postwar societies, but participatory practices also have their limits in urban arenas in developed countries, in which cities are increasingly segregated by ethnic differences.²⁴ In most cases, people won't give up their long-held interests of principle, religiosity, territory, of property, rights of assembly and speech, or their material needs for housing, clean water, or sanitation, just to seek accommodative solutions. Consensus-oriented approaches are limited by the hard facts and entrenched positions of many situations of deep-rooted conflict. But, when people can work to turn their attention toward the problem and instead of turning toward their adversaries, practical consensus solutions can be found in even very acrimonious, post-war relationships.

The situations of post-war societies offer important lessons for the efforts to build local democracy and self-governance through participatory practices, and these lessons learned may have implications for other global public policy networks. An important finding is that multi-layered approaches to democracy promotion must increasingly emphasize the importance of bottom-up approaches and fully integrate local NGOs and officials into the global public policy network. The multi-layered approach has several distinct advantages: it allows actors in the network to develop comparative advantages; a layered approach allows for the development of more sustainable local NGOs; and the cooperative interaction between global-level and local actors can be mutually reinforcing, with each lending legitimacy to the work of the other. That is, global level democracy-promotion NGOs find their intrusive work more legitimate when they can show that there is a local demand for democratic reform. Similarly, local actors can

²⁴ Scholars Sako Musterd and Wim Ostendorf comment that: "Segregation, social polarization and social exclusion are central concepts in today's urban debates. In many countries, these concepts have not only dominated the urban transformation debate for a long time but, according to many people, urban realities, too, and they still do. Cities in the Western world in one way or another reflect the socio-spatial outcomes of polarization, segregation and exclusion processes (1998: 1).

point to the worldwide movement for greater democracy to legitimate their mission and activities.

Other lessons learned relate to institutional and individual learning over time. Within the short time frame in which democracy promotion has been a major feature of the international system, there has been considerable learning about how to go about enhancing elections and direct participation. For example, election systems need to be carefully considered; multiparty competition can be very divisive, and indeed incendiary in societies that are deeply divided along identity lines. Another lesson is that sufficient numbers of election observers are needed to ensure that trust in the process is present; election observation missions "on the cheap" are unlikely to achieve their aims of building confidence (Kumar 1998).

Coordination is critical in the network. When no single organization is able to mount a major mission such as an electoral observation activity, or when grass-roots involvement requires a keen appreciation of the local scene, coordination among actors in the network is essential. International organizations have proven to be very well placed to serve this coordination function. They have implicit "convening power" (the ability to get all relevant parties around the table) and they are normally perceived as neutral and unbiased.

A final lesson learned is that sustainability of local-level actors in the network is a serious concern, and more attention needs to be paid to ways in which local NGOs can become more self-sustaining. In some instances, such as in Mozambique, a major election assistance mission has helped in the inaugural election in 1994. More than \$80 million in assistance was provided, much of it with the aim of bolstering a local capacity for ongoing promotion of democracy in that fragile, war-torn country. In local elections in 1998, however, the international community's financial assistance was much more limited, and an absence of sufficient engagement from abroad is at least one reason why the municipal elections were not very successful (some 85% of the population did not participate). In 1999 national elections, donors sharply reduced the assistance provided and there are now serious questions about the sustainability of a significant democracy promotion NGO sector in Mozambique. Democracy promotion is a long-haul project, and donor commitment to sustaining local actors in the network is an important challenge for the years ahead.

V. Outlook

The development of transnational networks for the promotion of local democracy are incipient but at the same time evolving quickly. Experiments with local self-government are the consequence of pressures from abroad for decentralization and devolution provide while at the same time, there are new challenges facing local settings that will require participatory policy making and a significant role for NGOs both in terms of policy formation and service delivery.

As in the broader network in which local democracy promotion is a part, there are thus both supply side and demand side dimensions of the increasing importance of local democracy networks.

A critical step in the further evolution of this network is the furtherance of international norms on local democracy. It is useful to note that even in countries where competition in national level democracy is constrained, for example in China and Iran, there have been recent instances of vigorous local level democracy. That is, there are few ideological barriers to the recognition of the importance of local self-governance and the basic tenets of local democracy. Moreover, there are strong developmental reasons for enhancing local democracy which are widely recognized in the international community. The approval by the General Assembly of the draft World Charter on Local Self-Government would give a significant boost to the further development of the network. The new norm would establish a clear right to democracy and stimulate institutional change in countries around the world.

Other avenues for fruitful development of this network include the further sharing of information and experience on options for enhanced participation at the local level and a better recognition of the inherent dilemmas of participatory practices. If collaborative policy making is to be a hallmark of the future of democracy promotion and high on the agenda of members of the network, more needs to be understood on the conditions in which participatory democracy at the local level is possible, desirable, and appropriate. The importance of skills transfers and learning across experience -- for example on difficult issues of governance of cities with significant migrant communities -- is a critical challenge for this network in the years to come.

Democracy promotion will require more emphasis on local governance as the forces of change for billions of urban dwellers are increasingly affected by influences beyond the parameters of a single country or region. In the 21st century, rates of urbanization will continue to be very high in the developing world, with the advent of dozens of new mega-cities in Asia and Africa a virtual demographic certainty. Effective governance of new and old cities alike in an urbanizing world is critical to the project of promoting human rights, international security, and sustainable development. Innovation in urban democracy is a global challenge. It will require further development of the nascent global public policy network for local democracy promotion, featuring above all the more systematic inclusion of local level NGOs and local elected officials in the multi-layered system of governance that will inevitably be required.

V. References

- Andrew, Caroline and Michael Goldsmith. 1998. "From Local Government to Local Governance--and Beyond?" *International Political Science Review* 19 (2): 101-117.
- Aziz, Abdul and David D. Arnold. 1996. *Decentralized Governance in Asian Countries*. New Delhi: Sage Publications India.
- Ball, Nicole. 1998. *Managing Conflict: Lessons from the South African Peace Committees*. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Agency for International Development, Center for Development Information and Evaluation.
- Bhatnagar, Bhuvan and Aubrey C. Williams. 1992. *Participatory Development and the World Bank*. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank.
- Bollens, Scott. 1998a. *Urban Peacebuilding in Divided Societies*. Boulder: Westview Press.
- Bollens, Scott. 1998b. "Urban Policy in Ethnically Polarized Societies." *International Political Science Review* 19 (2): 187-215.
- Boutros-Ghali, Boutros. 1996. *An Agenda for Democratization*. New York: United Nations.
- Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Violence. 1997. *Preventing Deadly Violence: Final Report*. Washington, D.C.: The Carnegie Commission.
- Carothers, Thomas. 1999. *Aiding Democracy Abroad: The Learning Curve*. Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
- Carothers, Thomas. 1994. "The NED at 10." *Foreign Policy* 95: .
- Chandler, James A. and Terry Nichols Clark. 1997. "Local Government." In *The Encyclopedia of Democracy*, Larry Diamond, Juan Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset, eds. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Dahl, Robert. 1961. *Who Governs?* New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Demichelis, Julia. 1998. *NGOs and Peacebuilding in Bosnia's Ethnically Divided Cities*. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace *Special Report*.
- Deng, Francis, et.al. 1996. *Sovereignty as Responsibility: Conflict Management in Africa*. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press.

- Diamond, Larry. 1996. *Promoting Democracy in the 1990s: Actors and Instruments, Issues and Imperatives*. Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict.
- Diamond, Larry, Juan J. Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset. 1995. "Introduction: What Makes for Democracy." In *Politics in Developing Countries: Comparing Experiences with Democracy*, Diamond, Linz, Lipset, eds. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.
- Fishkin, James. 1991. *Democracy and Deliberation*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Freedom House. 1999. *Freedom in the World: The Annual Survey of Political Rights and Civil Liberties*. New York: Freedom House.
- Hamel, Pierre. 1998. Urban Politics in the 1990s: The Difficult Renewal of Local Democracy." *International Political Science Review* 19 (2): 173-186.
- Hermann, Margaret S., ed. 1994. *Resolving Conflict: Strategies for Local Government*. Washington, D.C.: International City/County Management Association.
- Hill, Dilys M. 1974. *Democratic Theory and Local Government*. London: George Allen and Unwin.
- Horowitz, Donald L. 1994. "Democracy in Divided Societies," in Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner, ed. *Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict, and Democracy* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press): 35-55.
- Horowitz, Donald. 1985. *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Huntington, Samuel P. 1991. *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
- International City/County Management Association. *Local Government in Transition Countries: A Perspective for the Year 2000*. Washington, DC: ICMA.
- King, D. and Gerry Stoker, eds. 1996. *Rethinking Local Democracy*. London: McMillan.
- Klodawsky, Fran and Caroline Andrew (1999) "Acting Locally: What is the Progressive Potential?" *Studies in Political Economy*, 59, 149-171.

- Kumar, Krishna, ed. 1997. *Rebuilding Societies After Civil War*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Kumar, Krishna, ed. 1998. *Postconflict Elections, Democratization, and International Assistance*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.
- Kumar, Krishna and Marina Ottaway. 1997. *From Bullets to Ballots: Electoral Assistance to Postconflict Societies*. Washington, D.C: U.S. Agency for International Development, Center for Development Information and Evaluation.
- Judge, David, Gerry Stoker, and Harold Wolman. 1995. *Theories of Urban Politics*. London: Sage Publications.
- Lederach, John Paul. 1997. *Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies*. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press.
- Lijphart, Arend. 1977. *Democracy in Plural Societies*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- McCoy, Jennifer, Larry Garber, and Robert A. Pastor. 1991. "Making Peace by Observing and Mediating Elections." *Journal of Democracy* 2 (4): 102-114.
- Migdal, Joel S., Atul Kohli, and Vivienne Shue. 1994. *State Power and Social Forces: Domination and Transformation in the Third World*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Musterd, Sako and Wim Ostendorf. 1998. *Urban Segregation and the Welfare State: Inequality and Exclusion in Western Cities*. London: Routledge.
- Natsios, Andrew. 1997. "An NGO Perspective." In *Peacemaking in International Conflict: Methods & Techniques*, I. William Zartman and J. Lewis Rasmussen, eds. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press.
- Nickson, Andrew R. 1995. *Local Government in Latin America*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.
- Norton, Alan. 1994. *International Handbook of Local and Regional Government: A Comparative Analysis of Advanced Democracies*. Gower, Aldershot: Edward Elgar Publishing Co.

- Peterson, George E. 1997. *Decentralization in Latin America: Learning Through Experience*. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank.
- Quigley, Kevin F. 1997. *For Democracy's Sake: Foundations and Democracy Assistance in Central Europe*. Washington, D.C.: The Woodrow Wilson Center Press.
- Reilly, Ben. 1997. "Preferential Voting and Political Engineering." *Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Studies* 35: 1-19.
- Reynolds, Andrew and Ben Reilly. 1997. *The International IDEA Handbook of Electoral System Design*. Stockholm: International IDEA.
- Reynolds, Andrew, ed. 1994. *Elections '94 South Africa: The Campaigns, Results, and Future Prospects*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Rietbergen-McCracken, Jennifer. 1996. *Participation in Practice: The Experience of the World Bank and Other Stakeholders*. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank (World Bank Discussion Paper No. 333).
- Rudebeck, Karin. 1997. "Local Government in Romania." In *Democracy in Romania*. Stockholm: International IDEA (Capacity Building Series 1/97).
- Russett, Bruce. 1993. *Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
- Rustow, Dankwart. 1970. "Transitions to Democracy." *Comparative Politics* 2(3):337-363.
- Sartori, Giovanni. 1994. *Comparative Constitutional Engineering: An Inquiry into Structures, Incentives, and Outcomes*. New York: New York University Press.
- Shaw, Mark and Antoinette Louw. 1998. *Environmental Design for Safer Communities: Preventing Crime in South Africa's Cities and Towns*. Halfway House, South Africa: Institute for Security Studies (ISS Monograph Series, No. 24).
- Schulz, Ann. 1979. *Local Politics and Nation-States: Case Studies in Politics and Policy*. Santa Barbara, CA: Clio Books.
- Sisk, Timothy D. 1996. *Power Sharing and International Mediation in Ethnic Conflicts*. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press and the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflicts.

- Sisk, Timothy D. 1994. "South Africa's National Peace Accord." *Peace & Change* 19 (1): 50-70.
- Sklar, Richard. 1987. "Developmental Democracy." *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 29 (688-714).
- Stewart, John. 1996. "Democracy and Local Government." In *Reinventing Democracy*, Paul Hirst and Sunil Khilnani, eds. Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishers.
- World Bank. 1996. *The World Bank Participation Sourcebook*. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank.
- World Bank. 1994. *Governance: The World Bank's Experience*. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank.
- World Bank. 1992. *Governance and Development*. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank.
- Wolman, Harold and Michael Goldsmith. 1992. *Urban Politics and Policy: A Comparative Approach*. Oxford, UK: Blackwell.
- World Bank. 1989. *Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth*. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.