

UN Vision Project on Global Public Policy Networks

www.globalpublicpolicy.net

INTERNATIONAL PARTNERSHIPS ON THE ROAD TO BAN ANTI-PERSONNEL LANDMINES

Ann Peters

Open Society Institute, Washington D.C.

This article is written by the author in her personal capacity.

Case Study for the UN Vision Project on Global Public Policy Networks




Table of Contents

| | |
|---|-----------|
| I. INTRODUCTION | 3 |
| II. ORIGIN AND PURPOSE OF A GLOBAL PUBLIC POLICY NETWORK FOCUSED ON ANTI-PERSONNEL LANDMINES | 6 |
| III. ROLES OF DIFFERENT ACTORS | 10 |
| Non-governmental organizations..... | 11 |
| Governments..... | 13 |
| International organizations..... | 16 |
| IV. STRUCTURE AND PROCESS OF THE OTTAWA PARTNERSHIP AND BROADER NETWORK | 21 |
| Structure of particular legal forums..... | 23 |
| Structure of NGO campaign efforts..... | 24 |
| Outcome and prospects..... | 26 |
| VI. OUTLOOK | 28 |
| BIBLIOGRAPHY | 31 |

I. INTRODUCTION

Efforts to ban anti-personnel landmines culminated with the 1997 signing of a comprehensive treaty outlawing the weapons. The Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and their Destruction, also known as the Ottawa Convention, marked the first time a weapon in widespread use had been outlawed. It was negotiated in just over a year and entered into force a mere 15 months after it opened for signature in what is considered the fastest pace for a 20th Century treaty to become international law.

The International Committee of the Red Cross and others laid the groundwork for the eventual ban more than 18 years earlier during the preliminary work for the 1980 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons. The subsequent treaty negotiations, however, led primarily to a Convention that merely restricted the use of anti-personnel landmines rather than prohibited the weapons outright. The Convention did little to stop the killing and maiming of civilians long after wars ended. Even the long-awaited Review Conference of the 1980 Convention 15 years later provided only limited improvements and received criticism for changes characterized as steps backwards. The dissatisfaction over the limitations of the 1980 Convention and the results of the Review Conference led to a clearer division among governments on the issue of a comprehensive ban on anti-personnel weapons and fostered firmer links between particular governments and non-governmental organizations.

The partnerships that emerged sparked a new era in the efforts to eradicate a weapon lodged firmly within the doctrine of the fighting forces of most armies and non-state fighting forces around the world. It ultimately led to a comprehensive ban signed by more than 130 countries and to the 1997 Nobel Peace Prize for the International Campaign to Ban Landmines and its coordinator Jody Williams. Few would have predicated this turn of events a mere five years earlier when six NGOs from the United States and Europe formally launched the ICBL in 1992. Yet this type of partnership was considered a necessity for successful action. As Yves Sandoz of the ICRC has said, “Different actors must address the problem at different levels, pursuing a variety of aims, with local and worldwide objectives, in the short or the long term. But the key word for all these efforts is *complementarity*: they should not compete with each other, but be designed to be mutually supportive.” (Sandoz, 1995: 179). The efforts of the Ottawa Process went beyond mutual support to what appeared to be an almost seamless web of cooperation.

The study will analyze the partnerships of the ban movement and the broader network developed around anti-personnel landmines in several phases: as it stood prior to the 1980 Convention, in relationship to the Review Conference for the 1980 Convention, in the so-called Ottawa Process leading to the 1997 Convention and in the wake of that treaty's entry into force just over a year later. It will examine the position of particular governments and non-governmental organizations that were deeply involved within the Ottawa Process. It will consider those governments and other entities that were not intimately involved in the Ottawa Process but which could still be considered part of a broader policy network on landmines. In addition, the study will consider some of the obstacles that arose at various stages, including use of the weapon, the weapon's presence in the military doctrine of a majority of nations and the resistance of countries, albeit a dwindling number of them throughout the process, to the notion of an immediate comprehensive ban.

The success of the process has been attributed to the coalition that emerged of small- to medium-sized nations, frequent consultations and close relations between governments and NGOs, and involvement of NGO representatives as participating observers in the 1997 treaty negotiations. Aside from the diplomatic innovations, the landmine issue caught the attention of internationally recognized individuals, most notably Diana, Princess of Wales. These individuals became committed to efforts to ban anti-personnel landmines, and they employed their ability to attract media attention to bring the vivid images of the devastation caused by these weapons home.

Oftentimes, the movement to ban anti-personnel landmines and the whirlwind Ottawa Process is pointed to as an innovative model for future multilateral negotiations and problem solving because of these characteristics:

- a single, simple, clear message - ban the use, production, trade and stockpiling of anti-personnel landmines, assist survivors and clear the land;
- a horrific humanitarian crisis affecting civilians who were mutilated or killed long after wars ended;
- constant communication between a small network of NGOs that continued to grow worldwide;
- leadership of governments and key government officials who went against the tide;
- removal of the issue from what became a moribund consensus-based international negotiation; and

- a rapid process committed to negotiate a comprehensive ban regardless of the number of countries that might initially join.

It is unlikely however that these traits and their combined outcome can be duplicated exactly for a similar outcome in other areas most notably perhaps simply because of the horrendous impact these weapons have on individuals and communities.

The broad partnership and the even broader network formed around the eradication of anti-personnel landmines and implementation of mine action programs appears poised to remain in place for some time to come, albeit with different short-term focal points while maintaining its sights on the long-term goals of banning the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of the weapon, removal of already emplaced landmines and assistance to survivors. Perhaps the true success of these efforts however will only be seen in the years ahead when the challenges associated with the implementation of the treaty in terms of both human and financial resources are met.

II. ORIGIN AND PURPOSE OF A GLOBAL PUBLIC POLICY NETWORK FOCUSED ON ANTI-PERSONNEL LANDMINES

One of the most critical factors in the origin of efforts to ban anti-personnel landmines was the involvement of humanitarian aid workers and medical personnel who came face to face with the results of these weapons and their impact on civilians and war-torn societies as well as the impact on themselves. They described their experiences to government representatives and brought the field to the negotiation table. Government representatives as well journeyed to mine-infested countries to see the havoc caused by these weapons to communities often marginalized in international relations. This crisis of human suffering identified the challenges and pointed to the immediate need to find a solution to stop the destruction of life and community. It also came head-to-head with ingrained military doctrine on the use of anti-personnel landmines and ideas of national security.

No one could pinpoint the precise number and location of landmines in the world in the ground, even though the figure of 100 million landmines in over 60 countries gained widespread acceptance. Estimates have been as low as 60 million and as high as 200 million. For stockpiled anti-personnel landmines the figures ranged from 100 million to a more current estimate of more than 250 million in more than 100 countries (International Campaign to Ban Landmines, 1999: 11). Regarding victims, often repeated was the image that every 20 minutes another person became a landmine victim. Still the truth was that the exact number of individuals injured or killed by landmines was not known. Advocates will often refer to the land communities will not use either because it is mined or feared mined and to the number of people affected by this actual or perceived landmine threat. Even exact figures for these categories may not be known because of the limited number of surveys conducted in mine-affected countries. (International Campaign to Ban Landmines, 1999: 15). What is known is that regardless of the precise figures, humanitarian workers saw a growing number of individuals killed and injured by landmines primarily as a result of the increased use of landmines especially during civil wars.

Despite these facts and calls for a total ban, one was not forthcoming in the 1970s and 1980s in part because anti-personnel landmines were integrated into the fighting forces of most armies and non-state fighting forces around the world. Landmines are traced back to at least the late 1600s and the development of siege mining techniques that involved the detonation of explosives under enemy fortifications. Modern landmines were first widely used during World War I to free summits or mountain flanks from enemy forces, to destroy large

sectors of barriers and trench systems, to inflict heavy losses on the opposing forces and to create wide breaches. (International Military and Defense Encyclopedia, 1993: 1753, 1757).

With World War II, anti-personnel mines were used to surround anti-tank mines to protect them from removal and eventually they were used as weapons in their own right. Advances in mine technology accelerated, and Korea and Vietnam became testing grounds for new generations of weapons, including the introduction by the US in the early 1960s of remotely delivered mines or scatterables, to stop the flow of troops and supplies from North Vietnam to South Vietnam through Laos and Cambodia. The most commonly deployed scatterables were the BLU-43 and BLU-44 nicknamed 'dragon tooth' because of their needlelike shape. They were the forerunners of the Soviet PFM-1, or 'butterfly' mines, used extensively in Afghanistan. (Human Rights Watch Arms Project, 1993: 17). Civil Wars in Mozambique, Angola, Bosnia, Croatia and other countries significantly increased the spread of these weapons.

The 1980 Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects (CCW) resulted from international conferences held in 1974 and 1976 convened under the auspices of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), less than a decade after a generation of new anti-personnel weapons emerged in the Vietnam War. (International Committee of the Red Cross, 1975; International Committee of the Red Cross, 1976). In light of these international conferences, the UN General Assembly took up the matter and convened preparatory meetings and subsequently a conference. Eighty-five countries participated in the final conference, which produced the CCW and its three original annexed protocols that were the first prohibitions and restrictions on the use of conventional weapons since states adopted a ban on dum-dum bullets in the 1899 Hague Declaration. Yet by 1990, not even half of those countries that had participated in the final conference had consented to be bound by the CCW and its Landmines Protocol. Scores of mines were still being laid, especially in civil wars.

Cambodia and the former Yugoslavia are two parts of the world connected by the extent of mines laid despite the distance between them. In Cambodia, the ICRC has estimated that there were approximately six to ten million landmines compared to a population of eight million to nine million inhabitants. While the majority of those mines were believed to have been laid between 1983 and 1992, Cambodian officials and NGOs reported in 1996 that landmines continued to be laid. (International Committee of the Red Cross, 1996: 1).

In comparison, the extent of the problem in the former Yugoslavia occurred relatively quickly. A 1995 report by the Vietnam Veterans of American Foundation estimated that Bosnia and Croatia had a combined figure of between two-and-a-half million and four-and-a-half million landmines, and that mines were still believed to be being laid as the first CCW Review Conference approached. They included some of the world's most difficult mines to detect and many of the mines had been neither marked nor mapped. (Roberts and Williams, 1995: 193). Then US Secretary of Defense William Perry told soldiers training for duty in the former Yugoslavia in 1995 that mines posed the greatest threat to US forces. (Atkinson, 1995). US Army figures indicated that 4.4 percent of the US soldiers killed in action in World War II were slain by mines. The figures climbed to 10 percent in the Korean War and to 33 percent in Vietnam. In the Gulf War, 20 percent of those killed in action fell victims to mines.(Atkinson, 1995).

Therefore, both in the decades immediately before and immediately after the 1980 Convention, the number of mine casualties ballooned. While the Convention was initially seen as a way to stem the bloodletting, it subsequently became seen as insufficient to deal with the humanitarian crisis witnessed by relief workers and medical personnel in countries that were becoming saturated with landmines. In the late 1980s a former British army sergeant went to Afghanistan to begin agricultural development programs but discovered that such work was impossible because of mines and subsequently founded the Mines Advisory Group, one of the first NGO humanitarian mine clearance programs. In the summer of 1991, the Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation opened its first prosthetics clinic in Cambodia and soon recognized that providing prosthetic devices alone did not solve the mine infestation of that country. Medico International joined with VVAF to launch an advocacy campaign to ban landmines. About the same time, Human Rights Watch Asia Division and Physicians for Human Rights issued "Landmines in Cambodia: The Coward's War," and jointly called for a ban on anti-personnel landmines. Handicap International became more of an advocacy organization after years of assisting landmine victims in the field and launched its campaign to "Stop the Coward's War" with a petition calling for greater restrictions on mines use. (Williams and Goose, 1998: 20, 21).

The launch of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines stemmed from these and similar experiences of a handful of individuals and organizations in mine-infested countries at a time when the landmine issue was less than center-stage on the international agendaThe NGOs working in war-torn societies then were the ones who gave the clarion call focusing on

the destruction caused by anti-personnel landmines and on the obstacles they placed before peacekeeping efforts and post-conflict reconstruction.

Handicap International, Human Rights Watch, Medico International, Mines Advisory Group, Physicians for Human Rights and Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation issued their “Joint Call to Ban Antipersonnel Landmines,” and hosted the first NGO-sponsored international landmines conference in May 1993. These six groups became the ICBL’s steering committee and Jody Williams of the VVAF became its coordinator.

At the instigation of NGOs, in particular the French group, Handicap International, the government of France called in 1993 for the first Review Conference of the 1980 Convention and the UN General Assembly agreed. The hope was that the only international agreement dealing with these weapons could at least be strengthened. A comprehensive ban, while called for, was not expected. However even the narrow expectations of an improved treaty were dashed for NGOs, IOs and what became a growing number of governments when the negotiations dragged on in 1995 and 1996, and the final revisions to the Landmines Protocol were a mixed bag.

Even before the final revisions were finalized, the growing dissatisfaction led to a meeting of a small number of government and NGO representatives who met on the periphery of the Review Conference and began discussions that ultimately led to the so-called Ottawa Process, the whirlwind shakeup of international diplomacy and treaty negotiations. Canadian Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy gave even the most avid ban supporters a jolt when he challenged governments in October 1996 to return to Ottawa in roughly 14 months to sign a comprehensive ban.

III. ROLES OF DIFFERENT ACTORS

As mentioned, the actors involved primarily have been non-governmental organizations, governments, and international organizations. The media as well played a key role in the movement to ban landmines by documenting the impact of the weapons around the world and providing the vivid images of maimed victims. The business sector was principally absent from the early stages of the efforts to ban mines, though it may become more of a factor as the predominant actors seek financial support in their attempts to implement efforts to ensure the eradication of the weapon, to return land to communities and to assist individuals harmed by landmines. In terms of the individuals and in terms of the governments or organizations involved, there have been some changes since the early days of the efforts to focus attention on this issue. But during the critical last few years, there has been a fairly steady involvement of key players.

Each of the actors brought to the table different contributions at various stages of the process: Government actors, divided among policy makers and the military, provided the platforms from which to discuss the issue, the ability to change and create law, and financial resources; NGOs and international organizations brought to the table knowledge, field experience and the ability to maintain a spotlight on the issue. The media provided yet another platform in which to raise the issue and to disseminate the information that became the rallying cries for the ban advocates.

The actors were able to raise the issue on the international, national and local levels, and to keep it on the agenda in order to achieve the treaty and its entry into force. Longer term objectives would be to gain greater adherence and to institute implementation of the treaty provisions, reduce and halt use, production, export, transfer and stockpiles of landmines, and reduce and ultimately halt the number of landmine victims. In essence, the NGOs with assistance from the media were the information providers and initial agenda-setters, and the governments and their public were the information recipients. This pairing set the stage for the partnership that led to the Ottawa Process.

Each of these sectors was not monolithic. There were differences over strategy and tactics at various times during the process. The actors themselves were not selected by others for the most part; they 'selected' themselves. This self-selection process became one of the calling cards of the Ottawa Process, though it should be considered a natural process of coalition building. Within the confines of each sector, certain governments and NGOs chose not to participate in the partnership that led to the Ottawa Convention, or chose to participate

in mine clearance and other assistance to communities without focusing on efforts to ban anti-personnel landmines. (Flynn, 1999). The work of several of these governments and NGOs still contributes greatly to the broader overall efforts to assist in eradicating anti-personnel landmines.

Non-governmental organizations

Foreign Minister Axworthy recognized the importance of the NGOs in creating the ban movement and praised them for the effective arguments they used in bringing governments around. (Axworthy, 1996). The ICBL's work was based on three pillars: a ban on anti-personnel landmines, increased and sustained resources for mine clearance and increased and sustained resources for victim assistance. The primary focus for the campaign was the achievement of an international treaty to ban the weapon. The reasoning being that it would be impossible to halt the proliferation of the weapon, clear the mines already planted and assist the survivors without a ban on the use, production, trade and stockpiling of the weapon.

The NGOs served several roles: articulate advocates for marginalized communities, information providers, and coalition builders. In the last two roles, NGOs provided information to and built coalitions with other NGOs and the public as well as governments in order to achieve the goals of a comprehensive ban and more resources for mine clearance and victim assistance. A major strength of the ICBL was its ability to "cut across disciplines to bring together a diverse array of NGOs to work towards a single goal." (Williams and Goose, 1998).

The experiences of primarily Western NGOs at first provided the individuals and countries affected by mines with a voice. One of the more chilling statistics often cited was that one in every 236 Cambodians was an amputee compared with one in every 22,000 Americans (Human Rights Watch Arms Project, 1993: 126, 127). Humanitarian aid workers would tell of the horrors and the human suffering they encountered in countries miles from home. At times, the aid workers themselves would tell of their own mine accidents and their months in hospitals as they recuperated from amputations and other injuries. Soon landmine survivors from mine-affected countries journeyed to international events to tell their stories directly as well and to tell government representatives that efforts to only control the use of the weapon were inadequate.

While the estimate of mines sown has been disputed and criticized in later years, the earlier figures were what galvanized the ban movement as organizations attempted to get a handle on the extent of the problem. Research in the late 1980s and early 1990s, most notably by Human Rights Watch, documented the conditions in some of the worst affected countries. Governments also provided critical information, in particular the US State Department with its publication of *Hidden Killers*.

In addition to research and the vivid images of horrific injuries, NGOs used the information they received from the field to place pressures on their governments to change their policies. For example, Italy's long-standing reluctance to a ban eventually turned to support and was critical in as much as Italy was one of the world's leading producers. Among the reasons for Italy's about-face: NGO pressure, the divestment by Italian businesses of subsidiaries that produced anti-personnel mines, and the pressure from the timetable of the Ottawa Process itself.

By 1996, the once small coalition forming the ICBL had expanded to include more than 450 human rights, humanitarian, medical, development, arms control, religious and environmental groups in more than 30 countries. Just a year later it numbered more than 1,200 NGOs in some 60 countries. The ICBL's steering committee would grow to over a dozen with representatives added from both within and outside the US and Europe, including Afghanistan, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, South Africa, Sweden and Switzerland.

The NGOs built coalitions both within their communities and with the governments. The national campaigns were enveloped under the umbrella of the ICBL and tended to be NGOs involved in human rights or humanitarian aid programs in their countries. Each brought their own brand of activism, advocacy and experience. The ICBL recognized that to achieve its goals "its members would have to work at the national, regional, and international level to build public awareness and create the political will necessary to bring about a landmine ban." (Williams and Goose, 1998: 22).

Still coalition building efforts were not enough in all cases. Some NGOs were more effective than others and some had different levels of success within their governments. NGOs in the US had an uphill battle even though one of the leading proponents of a ban was US Senator Patrick Leahy. While they had a standard-bearer in Senator Leahy, they realized they also needed the support of the US military to move President Clinton. One of the roles of US NGOs and especially the Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation was to try to secure the military backing for a ban. In a letter to President Clinton subsequently reprinted as an ad

in the New York Times in April 1996, 15 retired US generals and other senior officers said they viewed a permanent and comprehensive international ban on the production, stockpiling, sale and use of anti-personnel landmines as militarily responsible. The officers included Gen. David Jones, former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Gen. John Galvin, former Supreme Allied Commander Europe; Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf, commander of Operation Desert Storm; and Lt. Gen. DeWitt Smith Jr., former commandant of the US Army War College.

The officers compared anti-personnel landmines to poison gas. They said such weapons were hard to control, often had unintended harmful consequences and were insidious because their indiscriminate effects persisted long after hostilities had ended. They argued that such a ban would not affect anti-tank mines or command-detonated weapons such as Claymore mines. The letter pulled together by VVAF was a significant step in the efforts to try to move the United States toward a comprehensive ban and came prior to Canada's initiative. However, the letter and subsequent efforts were not enough to bring the Clinton Administration on board without reservations. (Center for International Policy, 1999: 14, 15).

Governments

If the NGOs brought many other governments around to the notion of a ban, the governments and their receptiveness to a real partnership with NGOs allowed both of them to achieve their goals. "While NGOs were critical, then, the importance of governments and government officials should not be underplayed, since it was the officials who participated in the core group of states supporting the comprehensive ban. Without this initial catalyst, the ICBL campaign might have remained marginalized at the edges of the international conferences from which they were initially routinely excluded." (Long and Hindle, 1998: 251)

The efforts of key governments, namely Canada, Norway, Belgium, Austria and South Africa among other small- to medium-sized countries, drove the Ottawa Process along with the work of the ICBL and the ICRC. The governments built pressure on other states to join the Ottawa Process and allowed them to feel that they were part of a momentous time in history. There also were individual champions within the Ottawa negotiations such as South African Ambassador Jacob Selebi and within countries that ultimately did not join the Ottawa Convention, such as Senator Leahy in the United States. It was Senator Leahy's early landmines work, including his engineering of a US moratorium on the export of landmines in 1992, early support for U.S. leadership in the U.N. General Assembly and promotion of a

rehabilitation fund for war victims, that made a ban movement seem feasible. (Clines, 1997: 10A)

Prior to the Ottawa Process, the path toward a comprehensive ban had begun to move from an emphasis on international consensus-based forum, such as the 1980 CCW and its 1995-96 Review Conference, to increasing unilateral decisions by governments to stop, even temporarily, the export, production and use of landmines. (Peters, 1996: 38). The United States undertook the first unilateral initiative in the world in 1992 with the one-year moratorium on the export of anti-personnel landmines through the Leahy Export Moratorium. One year later, the US Senate unanimously passed a three-year extension that has since been made permanent. In 1994, Senator Leahy organized the first congressional hearing on landmines, "The Global Landmine Crisis."

Just after the approval of the one-year US export moratorium, French President Francois Mitterrand announced during a visit to Cambodia in February 1993 that his country would make official a voluntary abstention it had undertaken since the mid-1980s regarding the export of anti-personnel landmines. Mitterrand's pronouncement was soon followed by the enactment of comprehensive export moratoria and other more extensive actions by more than a dozen countries. In 1994, the Swedish parliament voted that its government declare an international ban as the only real solution to the humanitarian problem caused by mine use, and the Italian Senate ordered its government to "immediately activate the necessary legal instruments to launch a moratorium on the export of anti-personnel mines, to cease production of those mines by Italian companies or companies operating in Italy and support workers in that sector; and to promote demining in countries contaminated with anti-personnel mines." (Williams, 1998: 27). In March 1995, Belgium became the first government to ban the use, production, trade and stockpiling of anti-personnel landmines. Norway followed a few months later

In the midst of these critical changes in individual government policy, US President Bill Clinton addressed the UN General Assembly in September 1994 and called for the eventual elimination of anti-personnel landmines. Senator Leahy's legislation became the basis for a US-sponsored UN General Assembly resolution that urged nations to enact export moratoria and seek solutions to the mine problem, with a view towards the eventual elimination of anti-personnel landmines. The UN resolution passed 156-0. Two years later in December 1996, the UN General Assembly adopted another critical resolution 51/45S that urged States to "pursue vigorously an effective, legally binding international agreement to ban

the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel landmines with a view to completing the negotiation as soon as possible.”

Yet it was Canada’s challenge to other countries in October 1996 during the International Strategy Conference: Towards a Global Ban on Anti-Personnel Mines that set the stage for the fast-track negotiation of what became known as the Ottawa Convention. Minister Axworthy’s challenge was critical to revitalize the ban efforts and build momentum for the cause at a time when only 50 countries had publicly declared their support for a comprehensive global ban through their participation in the 1996 Conference as full participants. Even among these 50, there were countries that subsequently did not join the Ottawa Convention, most notably the United States.

The role of smaller European nations also was important in advancing the comprehensive ban, but the involvement of larger European states, namely Germany and subsequently the United Kingdom and France, was perhaps more critical for gauging the initial success for the treaty negotiations. If these three countries had remained outside of the efforts or joined forces to push the issue harder in the Conference on Disarmament, the Ottawa Process would have had a distinctly different flavor and would not have been able to claim signatories from all of NATO except Turkey and the United States. (Long and Hindle, 1998: 253-256). France, for example, was the country that called for the CCW Review Conference, albeit under pressure from French NGOs. It subsequently became a proponent of the Conference on Disarmament as the next best forum to control mines, before finally supporting the Ottawa Convention.

The role of mine-affected countries also was significant. Few had joined the Convention on Conventional Weapons, yet they were active participants in the Ottawa Process. The African nations in particular, whether mine-affected or not, were instrumental in securing the ban treaty. The ICBL identified southern Africa as a target region in which to create a mine-free zone and organized an international NGO conference on landmines in early 1997 in Mozambique. Days prior to the meeting, South Africa announced a unilateral ban on anti-personnel landmines; Mozambique followed and the Organization of Africa Unity and the South African government subsequently organized an OAU conference in Kempton Park that was considered critical to securing African support for the Ottawa Process.

Ultimately several Central European countries and all members of the European Union except Finland and Greece also signed the Ottawa Treaty. This position was an about-face for many European governments that at the start of the process were either opposed to or

provided only marginal support for the idea of a total ban within the Canadian proposed timeframe. As characterized by several authors the support by European countries ranged from “the highly active and influential in support of the Ottawa Process (for instance, Austria, Belgium, Ireland), through the initially reluctant, but subsequently converted (United Kingdom, France, Italy and much of Central and Eastern Europe), to the unconvinced and recalcitrant (for much of the time, Greece and, ultimately, Finland and Turkey). (Long and Hindle, 1998: 248). Subsequently the core group of what has been termed the new superpower came to include Austria, Belgium, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, Switzerland and Norway.

For the United States, its role fluctuated between leader and holdout. By the time of the Ottawa Process, the United States indicated it would sign a ban treaty if the exceptions it sought were granted. However, its was unable to persuade its fellow governments to change the text of the 1997 Convention. Long-term ban proponent Senator Leahy among others pointed out that permitting different countries to use different standards would weaken efforts to stigmatize the weapon and weaken the effect of a comprehensive ban treaty. (Lawson, 1998: 178). While President Clinton has been criticized by NGOs for not showing more leadership on the issue, he has said it was one of his bitterest disappointments to have not been able to join the Ottawa Convention. (Clinton, 1999).

International organizations

The role of international organizations divides primarily into the work of the ICRC and the work of the UN. As it describes itself, the ICRC is an “impartial, independent and neutral humanitarian organization whose mission is to protect the lives and dignity of victims of war and internal violence and to provide them with assistance.” (International Campaign to Ban Landmines, 1999: 993). The ICRC’s long history of providing medical care and treatment to war victims and of developing international humanitarian law placed it squarely in the midst of the mines issue. Its involvement was educated by the work of its field doctors and other medical personnel. It came to the issue on the grounds of humanitarian concerns for civilians and international law. It developed these traditional aspects of its work and eventually moved into a more non-traditional stance when it launched a media campaign, calling for a ban on landmines.

Before its momentous call for a comprehensive ban, the ICRC took what has been described as a more pragmatic view for the 1970s when experts at a series of international experts conferences organized by the ICRC discussed weapons and humanitarian law. While total bans on particular weapons were advocated by some participants at the ICRC conferences, others believed that bans could not be achieved at that stage. They considered that restrictions on the use of particular weapons would achieve greater progress. (Mathews and McCormack, 1999). However, when the 1980 Convention negotiated after those conferences did not assist in stemming the use of anti-personnel landmines, the ICRC called for a complete ban on the weapon at the opening of the 1994 preparatory meetings for the CCW Review Conference.

Then for the first time in its history, the ICRC launched a public advertising campaign promoting a comprehensive ban in November 1995. The ICRC acknowledged its efforts to ban landmines as an unprecedented appeal to the public. According to the ICRC's submission for the Landmine Monitor, "The objectives of this campaign were simple. Inform the general public of the horrific injuries caused by these weapons and their effects on communities in war-torn countries. Influencing public opinion was a key element in helping to create the political will necessary to bring a ban treaty to fruition. To this end, the ICRC employed a variety of electronic and print tools including publications, public service announcements, videos, a traveling exhibition, kits and archive packs for press and news media and a web site." (International Campaign to Ban Landmines, 1999: 994).

One of the most striking parts of the ICRC's efforts was a series of advertisements for print and electronic media that were estimated to have reached approximately 745 million people worldwide. (International Campaign to Ban Landmines, 1999: 995). All space for the print and television ads were donated, which according to the ICRC "reflected the widespread belief that AP mines had to be stigmatized." (International Campaign to Ban Landmines, 1999: 996). The value of donated ad space exceeded \$2 million in 1996. The print ads were particularly frank, and the associated photographs showed individuals, especially children, maimed by landmines. In one particular ad for National Societies of the Red Cross to use, various prosthetic devices are lined up along a wall. A headline states "Forget London, Paris and Rome. This is what the women in Phnom Penh are wearing." The text of the ad starts by saying, "Today the growth industry in Cambodia isn't fashion. It's prosthetics. The country has around 20,000 amputees from a population of just 8.5 million. This means one amputee for every 236 people (compared to a figure of one for every 22,000 people in America)." (ICRC, 1999a).

The ICRC also repeated the role it played leading up to the CCW Review Conference when it hosted symposium on anti-personnel landmines in 1993 and 1994. During the Ottawa Process, it gathered expert analysis of the landmines issue, organized a series of roundtables with representatives of the military and released a significant report dispelling the arguments in support of the military utility of the weapon. (ICRC, 1996a). The ICRC's links with states' militaries were key contributions to the ban efforts. The ICRC has pointed to its special status as an international organization and its network of professional military officers that work with armed forces on humanitarian law. These characteristics of the ICRC gave it access to governmental and military circles that NGOs often lacked. At the same time, those within the ICRC have acknowledged the strengths of NGOs, and especially the ICBL, in its ability to openly criticize government positions. (Maslen and Herby, 1998).

For its part, the position of the United Nations has evolved noticeably over the last three years. With the close in 1996 of the first Review Conference for the 1980 Convention on Conventional Weapons, then UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali registered his deep disappointment that efforts to prohibit landmines had failed to progress further. He pointed to the oft-repeated consequences of the millions of landmines laid since World War II and especially in the conflicts during the last 30 years. In his message to CCW delegates, Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali outlined the array of evils posed by mines and concluded that the "impact which landmines are having, both on the civilian population and on the economy as a whole in affected countries, is so appalling, so devastating, that a total ban on all anti-personnel mines is the only solution. That must be the aim of the next Review Conference." (Boutros-Ghali, 1996).

Therefore Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali recognized the need for a ban and essentially called for one. But he did not force it more immediately onto the international agenda, even though the next Review Conference was not scheduled to occur until 2001, and many of the provisions of the amended landmines protocol would not be implemented for a decade or more. The Secretary-General did not step outside of the CCW framework to call for a separate effort to place a ban on a faster diplomatic track, despite the calls of the NGO community and the significant experience in mine action the UN had accumulated primarily through mine clearance starting in 1988 in Afghanistan and then in 1992 in Cambodia.

The field experiences in Afghanistan and Cambodia did not transform the UN headquarters as an institution into as vocal an advocate for a comprehensive ban in the same manner as the ICRC. The UN General Assembly had focused on the landmines issue in a

series of resolutions since 1993, and particular agencies, such as UNICEF, were more outspoken regarding a ban at an earlier stage than other agencies within the UN system. But no consensus arose within the UN prior to the Ottawa Process on how to move forward on a comprehensive ban.

During his tenure, Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali focused attention on attempting to secure funds and improve training for mine clearance. He indicated that one key role of the UN was to assist in the production of locally recruited mine clearance teams trained for the task in their countries. He noted that UN programs for mine clearance and victim assistance were in urgent need of greater international financial and political support. (Clearing the Fields, 1995: xiii). Unfortunately, a donor conference held in July 1995 raised less than one-third of the UN's goal of \$75 million for its newly established UN Voluntary Trust Fund. (Peters, 1996: 43).

The UN as an institution has now become more involved with more comprehensive approaches to mine action, defined by the UN in the light of the Ottawa Process as including mine awareness and risk reduction education, minefield survey, mapping, marking and clearance, victim assistance, and advocacy to stigmatize the use of landmines and support a total ban on anti-personnel landmines. This emphasis reflects Secretary-General Kofi Annan's position, and the fact that the UN is the repository for the Ottawa Convention. "The United Nations will take every opportunity to stigmatize the continuing use of landmines and to support a total ban on antipersonnel landmines. In order to receive assistance, relevant parties should be committed to supporting mine action actively, and to desisting from producing, stockpiling, using and transferring antipersonnel landmines. ... Exceptions to the above principle should be based only on humanitarian considerations: ..." (UN Mine Action Service, 1999a).

In 1997, the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) was established in 1997 within the Department of Peacekeeping Operations to be the UN's focal point on landmine-related matters. Its charge was to coordinate the mine-related activities of UN departments and agencies, including Department of Disarmament Affairs; Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, United Nations Children's Fund, United Nations Development Programme, United Nations Office for Project Service, World Food Programme and Food and Agriculture Organization. It also was to be the liaison on the issue with the World Health Organization and World Bank.

UNMAS is to ensure that there is UN assistance in the creation of sustainable national capacities and in the implementation of overall programs. “UNMAS is responsible for the strategic management and coordination of all UN activities in the area of humanitarian mine action as well as peacekeeping demining funded through assessed contributions. The complementary actions being implemented by the Mine Action Service, with the support of collaborating partners and donors, are designed to be implemented in a systematic but flexible manner.” (UN Mine Action Service, 1999b). UNMAS is to develop policy related to the mines issue, assess and monitor the global landmine threat, identify needs, and develop appropriate responses in light of that determined threat. For dialogue with organizations outside of the UN, a Steering Committee on Mine Action is to support coordination of UN mine action initiatives with non-UN partners. The Steering Committee would include the members of the UN Inter-Agency Coordination Group on Mine Action, which would include UN agency and World Bank representatives as well as representatives from such NGOs and IOs as the ICBL and the ICRC. UN literature concludes that such a coordinated approach “clearly minimizes the potential for overlapping responsibilities and duplication of effort.” However the Steering Committee is not yet well established, and it is still relatively early in the history of UNMAS to conclude what the long-term implications of creating this focal at the UN will be on mine action.

IV. STRUCTURE AND PROCESS OF THE OTTAWA PARTNERSHIP AND BROADER NETWORK

By the early 1990s, the original CCW Landmines Protocol had been deemed ineffective: the devastation imposed on civilians by landmines had not ceased and was considered to have increased. Forces used landmines unimpeded and were well supplied. By the end of 1992, only 32 countries had consented to be bound by the Landmines Protocol. Furthermore, the CCW only dealt with the use of landmines and imposed minimal restrictions. It failed to cover non-international conflicts. It did not prohibit so-called non-detectable mines or mines with low metal content. It offered no compliance or verification procedures, nor measures to prohibit transfer and production. These deficiencies led to the CCW Review Conference. Yet despite calls for a comprehensive ban, the CCW Review Conference negotiations resulted primarily in only revising the restrictions instituted by the original Landmines Protocol. While portions of the protocol were strengthened, others were weakened. (Peters, 1996: 44).

The Ottawa Process refers to the period between October 1996 when Minister Axworthy invited other countries participating in a landmines conference in Canada to return to his country to sign a ban treaty and December 1997 when the Ottawa Convention opened for signatures. Minister Axworthy's deadline and the rapid series of meetings to meet the goal he set has been alternately described as foolhardy and heroic (Tomlin, 1998: 206). Still the early deadline set by Minister Axworthy provided the momentum to carry the plan forward and the pressure to force governments to move on their policies or risk chastisement from the growing number of Ottawa Process participants. By calling for countries to sign a ban treaty in just over a year, Minister Axworthy took advantage of public support at a time when NGOs and governments had become frustrated by the legal structures that had come before to deal with the landmines problem. Minister Axworthy credits this "genuine partnership" in moving the issue at a speed "unheard of in traditional disarmament negotiations." (Axworthy, 1998: 453).

There were several crucial events that occurred between the creation of the original CCW Landmines Protocol in 1980 and the creation of the Ottawa Convention: the ICRC's initial involvement and its subsequent decision to launch a public advocacy campaign against landmines; creation of the ICBL; leadership of several individuals from the NGO side; leadership of several individuals from the government side; impasse at the CCW Review Conference negotiations; media focus on the issue, especially when Diana, Princess of Wales, took the cameras to Angola and Bosnia and then upon her death; the selection of Ambassador

Selebi from South Africa as chairperson for the Oslo negotiations for the Ottawa Convention. Relations between the actors fluctuated depending on the state of the treaty negotiations and differences over tactics. The level of transparency improved vastly since the first days of the CCW. NGOs became fairly well-integrated into the process though at times both NGOs and governments reverted back to their own environs and more adversarial roles when a breakdown occurred over particular tactics, such as when the US sought exemptions during the treaty negotiations and questions arose over whether other countries would accept the proposals. Even so efforts have been made to maintain and improve transparency especially in the context of treaty implementation.

Part of the success of the most recent efforts to ban landmines stemmed from the rallying cry primarily of the ICBL to secure a treaty with “no exceptions, no reservations and no loopholes.” It also stemmed from the organization of a core group of committed pro-ban governments that began meeting informally to discuss how to push forward the Ottawa Process and from a calendar filled with frequent meetings of various sizes in the form of large government-sponsored conferences, smaller NGO seminars, and bilateral meetings spanning the globe from Africa to Asia. The ICRC paralleled the regional efforts of governments and NGOs by hosting several critical meetings and seminars for government representatives, especially the military. For example during the Budapest Regional Conference on Anti-Personnel Mines in March 1998 co-hosted by the Government of Hungary and NGOs, the ICRC held a parallel meeting for defense and foreign affairs officials from 19 Eastern and Central European countries. Regional meetings also were held in the Philippines in July 1997 for more than 30 military experts from Asia, and in Zimbabwe in April 1997 for experts from the Southern African Development Community.

These meetings and personal contacts both between the respective sectors (government-NGO) and within the respective sectors (NGO, intra- and inter-governmental) were part of a learning process. Strategy and assessment meetings occurred formally and informally, in public and more private settings, with varying degrees of frequency depending on the stage of the process toward a ban. Furthermore there was constant contact between particular participants driving the Ottawa Process via email, telephone and fax when they were not meeting face-to-face.

Structure of particular legal forums

Prior to the Ottawa Convention, the primary international legal structure for regulations of anti-personnel landmines was the 1980 CCW. As mentioned previously, the CCW came about as a result of preparatory government meetings that included the ICRC and UN agencies as observers and a UN-sponsored conference with limited NGO participation. No permanent secretariat for the CCW existed outside the framework established to assist when direct negotiations and Review Conferences were held. It did not prohibit bilateral agreements or unilateral actions by governments. While the consensus-based CCW negotiations left little room for radical moves regarding the eradication of anti-personnel landmines, ban proponents saw the CCW Review Conference as another “platform from which to educate the public and governments alike on the nature and scope of the AP mine problem.” (Williams and Goose, 1998: 26).

The Ottawa Process provided a different legal framework and was crafted through a different intergovernmental process. A core group of committed pro-ban countries focused attention on the process of moving the world toward the 1997 Convention by hosting a series of governmental meetings, each with a different agenda that was seen as another step in reaching their goal of signing a treaty in Ottawa. The Austrian government took responsibility for preparing a draft text and organized a meeting in Vienna in February 1997 attended by representatives from more than 110 governments who discussed the contents of such a proposed treaty. The Austrian government then revised its text and issued its second draft of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction.

The next major meeting hosted by a core group member, Belgium, was the International Conference for a Global Ban on Anti-Personnel Mines held in Brussels in June 1997. The Brussels conference in fact was the official follow-up to the 1996 Ottawa Conference, and it adopted a declaration that forwarded the third draft of the Austrian text for negotiation to the Diplomatic Conference that was to be held in Oslo, Norway, in September 1997. Of the more than 150 States represented at the Brussels Conference, 97 signed this “Brussels Declaration.” The Declaration referred to UN General Assembly 51/45 S, which urged the vigorous pursuit of “an effective, legally binding international agreement to ban the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel landmines.” It affirmed that the essential elements of such an agreement should include “A comprehensive ban on the use, stockpiling, production, and transfer of anti-personnel landmines, the destruction of stockpiled

and removed anti-personnel landmines, (and) international co-operation and assistance in the field of mine clearance in affected countries.” By signing the declaration, countries affirmed their objective of concluding the negotiation and signing of such an agreement before the end of 1997.

Next came the actual negotiations themselves for what became known as the Ottawa Convention and another core group member, Norway, was the host for these three weeks of meetings in September 1997.

With the advent of the Ottawa Process and the subsequent agile negotiations led by Ambassador Selebi, ban proponents no longer worried about the effect of consensus and on their inability to sit at the table with government representatives during negotiations. A two-thirds majority rule was agreed to by participants and even that measure turned out to be unnecessary because no vote was ever taken during the negotiations. States were officially recognized as participants to the Diplomatic Conference, and therefore entitled to vote, only if they had formally supported by Brussels Declaration. Other states were recognized as observers along with such organizations as the United Nations, the ICRC and, for the first time, the ICBL.

The Ottawa Convention changed the framework of government and non-government action on the landmine issue in terms of the legal structure, the obligations placed on States Parties and the involvement of non-States Parties. As with the CCW, it does not bar unilateral action, but it provides specific obligations that must be met by States Parties within a set timeframe. At the First Meeting of States Parties in May 1999, States Parties established several working groups to assist in carrying out these obligations and to evaluate progress in areas ranging from mine clearance to victim assistance. NGOs have been instrumental in crafting the debate since the inception of these working groups, known as the Intersessional Committees of Experts, and through their initial meetings in 1999.

Structure of NGO campaign efforts

Regarding the structure of the NGOs, the diverse coalition united behind the need for a ban, operated with tremendous flexibility and without a central secretariat or bureaucracy. Member organizations pursued the campaign’s goals as best fit their mandates. “US-based NGOs would not try to dictate to African NGOs how to operate, nor would African NGOs try to tell Asian or European colleagues how to move their governments and militaries towards a ban.”

(Williams and Goose, 1998: 22, 23). The commitment to a ban paralleled the commitment to a “constant exchange of information” with fellow campaign members and with governments, the media and the public. Early on there was no overarching media strategy other than the strategies of individual organizations.

Member organizations provided the ICBL coordinator with information, and the information was distilled into quarterly newsletters and periodic mailings. “This ability to provide its members with a sense of the overall activities of the campaign was key to the creation and maintenance of the momentum of the ICBL.” (Williams and Goose, 1998: 23). *Landmine Update*, a quarterly newsletter, was one of the earliest communication tools of the ICBL. As it chronicled the country-by-country activities of the ban movement, it created “a sense of the inexorable momentum towards the ban.” (Williams and Goose, 1998: 23, 24).

Jody Williams, the campaign coordinator who led the ICBL during its critical years, has said that “a bit of mythology” developed surrounding ICBL reliance on electronic mail. New communications technologies facilitated communications within the campaign, but at the beginning the ICBL depended more on telephones and the then emerging technology of fax machines. Communication in this manner early on helped to create the immediacy that a small diverse group of NGOs needed to feel part of a campaign. These forms of communication were expensive, but costs were not prohibitive because the campaign’s early work was undertaken largely in the North, where these costs were lower than in the South.

It was not until the ICBL network broadened from largely mine-producing countries to mine-affected countries that its members began to shift to communications via email. The lower costs and increased reliability of email as compared with other forms of communication facilitated dialogue between campaigns in the North and the South. It also facilitated information exchanges and organization of major conferences at strategic points in the campaign, notably in Cambodia in 1995 and in Mozambique in 1997. The appearance of a growing number of newer members from Africa, Asia and to a lesser extent the former Soviet Union promoted readjustment as well within the governing body of the ICBL, which has come to include representatives from Cambodia, Afghanistan and Kenya. This shift pre-dated the shift seen in the greater participation of governments from these regions in the ban movement, notably from Africa.

Again as with the government conferences, and the ICRC-convened military experts meetings, seminars and conferences were the hallmarks of the ICBL coalition as it grew. Such gatherings aided in the development of personal relationships within the campaign and

between individual campaigners and government and military representatives. The much remarked upon close cooperation between governments and NGOs during the Ottawa Process was more the result of face-to-face meetings than any other form of communication. (Williams and Goose, 1998: 24, 25).

Outcome and prospects

The Ottawa Convention was the important paper outcome of the network, and its obligations imposed on States Parties were some of the key methods by which to eradicate anti-personnel landmines. Among the other critical outcomes of the process in creating this document were the moral and legal norms established in stigmatizing a weapon in widespread use and the alliances forged. The Ottawa Treaty borrowed from previous international law by incorporating into its preamble the ideals of the so-called Martens Clause emphasizing the importance of the “role of public conscience in furthering the principles of humanity.” It reminded States Parties that the rights of the parties to an armed conflict to choose methods or means of warfare are not unlimited, that weapons and methods of warfare are prohibited that are of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering, and that a distinction is necessary between civilians and combatants. (Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction, 1997).

The treaty is more than a ban to end the use of a weapon in that it obligates countries to undertake particular actions within a specific timeframe to reverse the tide of humanitarian suffering caused by anti-personnel landmines. (International Campaign to Ban Landmines, 1999: 13). It also urges international cooperation and assistance, including financial assistance, between States Parties in fulfilling those obligations. By most assessments landmines are not being planted at as high a rate as previously estimated and more landmines are coming out of the ground than are being laid. (International Campaign to Ban Landmines, 1999: 3). The questions remaining are whether the paper treaty that garnered so much attention for so long can be implemented and adhered to by all sides in conflict, including non-States Parties, and whether it will reduce the number of victims while freeing up more land to communities.

As part of an effort to try to ensure adherence, NGOs established the “Landmine Monitor,” a research and public information program designed to watch over government

action and inaction related to treaty obligations for States Parties as well as the activities of non-States Parties and of military groups not associated with particular governments. A core group of five ICBL members is organizing this massive project utilizing the ICBL's network of NGOs and assigning in-country researchers and specialists to monitor developments around the world. Landmine Monitor is a systematic effort to not only monitor implementation of the treaty, but also to report on the landmines situation generally in the world. For its part, the International Movement of the Red Cross and Red Crescent prepared a long-term strategy related to mine action. The issue of landmines was incorporated into the Plan of Action 2000-2003 adopted by the Movement's Council of Delegates in late 1999. The Plan of Action focused on the protection of victims of armed conflict through respect of international humanitarian law, humanitarian action in times of armed conflict and other disasters, and strategic partnerships to improve the lives of vulnerable people. Among its goals, the Movement will seek conformity of weapons with international humanitarian law, the establishment of effective controls on the availability of arms and ammunition, and "an end to the human tragedy caused by anti-personnel landmines." (ICRC, 1999b).

Regarding the alliances forged during this process, dialogue continues among particular government and NGO players in terms of the Intersessional Committees of Experts established by States Parties to the Ottawa Convention to focus on the treaty's core issues. Areas also have been opened up for further cooperation on the landmines issue in regard to joint government-NGO projects, calls for greater transparency in regard to government funding of mine action programs, and efforts to create a more rapid response to humanitarian crises involving landmines. In addition, landmine survivors have played more of a critical role than ever before in attempting to craft policy and increase assistance.

Challenges to the partnership created in pursuit of a global ban on anti-personnel landmines include whether it will be able to maintain the momentum built up during the rapid pace of the Ottawa Process, to raise the necessary funds to carry out the goals of a comprehensive ban inclusive of victim assistance and mine clearance and to entice individuals, organizations and the private sector that have not been as involved in the issue to come on board especially in terms of financial support of these efforts. In Canada and the United States, through such entities as the charitable Canadian Landmine Foundation, the US State Department Global Humanitarian Demining 2010 Initiative, and several NGOs, efforts are underway to broaden private sector involvement especially in terms of seeking to bring in private funds to primarily support mine clearance projects.

VI. OUTLOOK

The partnership forged to create the Ottawa Convention may be described alternatively as a well-oiled machine or the one-time alignment of the right forces and players. Often it has been lauded as a new method of international relations and diplomacy, and as an model to follow for other campaigns, such as child soldiers or small arms. The success of the Ottawa Process has led to a series of descriptions of why the premise succeeded: the determination of a global network of committed NGOs, the use of the newest communication technologies, the emergence of true partnerships between governments and non-governmental sectors. This global mobilization of a variety of actors promoted the creation of a new international moral and legal norm.

Yet by one analysis of the movement, the changes also should be viewed as “much less the result of a ‘hands across the world’ strategy as it is an out-and-out political fistfight.” (Muller, 1998: 22). “To be prepared for this world, non-governmental humanitarian organizations, like the Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation (“VVAF”), must engage in difficult and relentless political work that involves building sophisticated political strategies, mounting expensive public awareness campaigns, and forging alliances with unlikely allies as well as friendly champions.” (Muller, 1998: 22).

This description is not necessarily out of line with other analysis of the innovations that made the Ottawa Process a success: a partnership built by states and NGOs, the direct involvement of NGOs in the negotiation of a multilateral treaty, small- and medium-sized countries working in a coalition, a close-knit core group within that partnership, and negotiations held outside the “normal channels and mechanisms.” (Cameron, Lawson and Tomlin, 1998: 5). These criteria are not a magical potion. They are criteria that relate to coalition building for a variety of issues. If this unique coalition was brought about in part by the end of the Cold War, it is not inconceivable that the types of actors involved could come together again on other issues and attain success as well. Already, organizations and governments have indicated their desire to utilize some of the tactics and strategies of the landmines campaign, tailoring it to the particular needs of their issues and communities.

In recent years, the issue of small arms or arms availability and transfers has become more of a focus for particular governments, NGOs and the ICRC and has brought comparisons to the landmines campaign. NGOs are focusing more on building a network as a way to bring even greater attention to the matter and exchange ideas on how to pursue the issue further. To that end, NGOs have created the International Action Network on Small

Arms. Governments also are meeting to exchange information on their control measures and proposed approaches. Although aspects of the landmines campaign may be incorporated into these activities, an exact replication of it may not be appropriate or feasible.

In one analysis of the arms availability issue, it is noted that the suffering caused by anti-personnel landmines could be traced to one type of weapon of questionable military utility that was victim-activated and that the solution of a comprehensive ban was “as simple as it was dramatic.” (Herby, 1998). With arms availability, the issue and efforts to find solutions are considered less clear. For example, most of the weapons involved would not be considered illegal under humanitarian law and perhaps an even greater investment, if funds necessary for mine clearance are not compared, would be necessary to stem trade and improve border controls. Still it is important to recall that the notion of a comprehensive ban had met a roadblock with the Review Conference of the CCW, and it took torchbearer governments willing to go against the trend in treaty negotiations to take charge of the process and join with NGOs to pursue a global ban at a rapid pace. The lessons the arms availability issue may take from the landmine campaign may be the need to engage the public consciousness and demonstrate the impact on communities of the items to be regulated or banned; credible research and exchange of information, specific proposals to address the problem, a high level of cooperation and trust among governments, NGOs and international organizations, and establishment of the principle that arms suppliers in situations where international law is violated will share responsibility for the use of those weapons. (Herby, 1998).

It is interesting to note the perception of some Ottawa Process participants, both in terms of the significance of their accomplishment and in terms of whether the process could be replicated on other issues. According to one survey of participants in the Ottawa Process, state representatives felt that they were “making a positive difference in the world, rather than just signing a symbolic treaty.” More than 92 percent of the convention participants believed confidently or very confidently that the regime would reduce landmine activities among signatories. Only four percent of the participants believed that signatory countries would not abide by the rules of the Ottawa Convention (Rutherford, 1999: 43). Government representatives indicated that the role of NGOs throughout the process was invaluable and atypical with respect to the high degree of cooperation. They indicated that allowing NGOs to participate in the treaty negotiations as observers with the right of intervention was a “powerful force” in influencing policy decisions. (Rutherford, 1999: 46). NGO and government representatives differed as to whether the Ottawa process could be generalized to other disarmament issues. Most NGO representatives believed that the process was applicable

to disarmament issues, such as child soldiers. Government representatives were more likely to say that the landmines issue may have had too many unique aspects for it to be repeated.

UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan often points to the landmines campaign as an example of what can be accomplished in the “era of ever greater partnerships.” When NGOs, international organizations, the ICRC and government join together to pursue an objective, the Secretary-General contends that “there is nothing we can take on that we cannot succeed in, and this partnership of NGOs, the private sector, international organizations and governments, in my judgment, is a powerful partnership for the future.” (Annan,1999). It is important that this point is not overstated as the component parts of the landmines efforts shows that its unique traits may not be able to be replicated exactly and that each component of the partnership may not always be able to set aside a mistrust or traditional way of working in their field. The more important questions may be whether the message is as clear, the images as vivid, the alliance as strong, individual spokespeople as charismatic and the strategy as dynamic as during the Ottawa Process. Still its underlying premises of working together toward a common goal and step-by-step bringing on board others within key sectors are critical when considering how local or international communities address issues in their societies.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Annan, Kofi (1999), Remarks to the Forum on Global Issues, Berlin, April 29, 1999, UN Press Release, SG/SM/6973, "Secretary-General Calls Partnership of NGOs, Private Sector, International Organizations and Governments Powerful Partnership for Future."
- Atkinson, Rick (1995), "GIs Must Tread Lightly in a Land of Lethal Mines," Washington Post Service, International Herald Tribune, December 13, 1995.
- Axworthy, Canadian Foreign Minister Lloyd (1996), Statement at the closing session of the International Strategy Conference "Towards a Global Ban on Anti-Personnel Mines," Ottawa, Canada.
- Axworthy, Canadian Foreign Minister Lloyd (1998), "Towards a New Multilateralism, in Maxwell A. Cameron, Robert J. Lawson, and Brian W. Tomlin (ed.) *To Walk Without Fear – The Global Movement to Ban Landmines* (Don Mills, Ontario, Oxford University Press), pp. 448-459.
- Boutros-Ghali, UN Secretary-General Boutros (1996), Statement to the closing session of the Review Conference of the 1980 UN Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, delivered on his behalf by Vladimir Petrovsky, director general of the UN Office in Geneva, Geneva, Switzerland.
- Cameron, Maxwell A., Lawson, Robert J., and Tomlin, Brian W. (1998), "To Walk Without Fear," in Maxwell A. Cameron, Robert J. Lawson, and Brian W. Tomlin (ed.) *To Walk Without Fear – The Global Movement to Ban Landmines* (Don Mills, Ontario, Oxford University Press), pp. 1-17.
- Center for International Policy, Demilitarization for Democracy Project (1999), "Commander-in-Chief: Contrasting Presidential Roles in the World Campaigns to Ban Chemical Weapons (1919-45) and Land Mines (1990s)," International Policy Report, November 1999.
- Clines, Francis X. (1997), "28-Year Quest to Abolish Land Mines Pays Off for Veteran, Who Fights On," The New York Times, December 3, 1997.
- Clinton, President William Jefferson (1999), Remarks by the President at the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Event, October 6, 1999, released by the White House Office of the Press Secretary.

Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, (1997).

Demilitarization for Democracy (1997), Exploding the Landmine Myth in Korea, August 1997 (Washington, D.C., Demilitarization for Democracy).

Final Declaration for the Brussels Conference on Anti-Personnel Landmines, June 27, 1999.

Flynn, Michael (1999), "Political Minefield," The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March/April 1999, Vol. 55, No. 2. (www.bullatomsci.org/issues/1999) (accessed October 14, 1999).

Goose, Stephen D. (1996), "CCW States Fail to Stem Crisis; U.S. Policy Now an Obstacle," Arms Control Today, July 1996, Vol. 26, No. 5, pp. 9, 14-17.

Herby, Peter (1998), "Arms Transfers, Humanitarian Assistance and International Humanitarian Law," International Review of the Red Cross, 1 December 1998, No. 325, pp. 685-691. (www.icrc.org/icrceng.nsf) (accessed November 10, 1999).

Human Rights Watch Arms Project (1997a), Exposing the Source, U.S. Companies and the Production of Antipersonnel Mines, (New York, Human Rights Watch).

Human Rights Watch Arms Project (1993), Landmines: Deadly Legacy, (New York, Human Rights Watch).

Human Rights Watch Arms Project and Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation (1997b), In its Own Words, The U.S. Army and Antipersonnel Mines in the Korean and Vietnam Wars, (New York, Human Rights Watch).

International Campaign to Ban Landmines (1999), Landmine Monitor Report 1999 – Toward a Mine-Free World, (New York, Human Rights Watch).

International Committee of the Red Cross (1996a), Anti-personnel Landmines: Friend or Foe? A study of the military use and effectiveness of anti-personnel mines. (Geneva, International Committee of the Red Cross).

International Committee of the Red Cross (1999a), ICRC Campaign against anti-personnel landmines, (ICRC and National Society print advertisements) (www.icrc.org/icrceng.nsf) (accessed November 10, 1999).

- International Committee of the Red Cross (1999b), Daily bulletin of the 27th International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, Issue 7, 7 November 1999. (www.icrc.org/icrceng.nsf) (accessed November 10, 1999).
- International Committee of the Red Cross (1999c) 27th International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, Reference Document, 16 September 1999. (www.icrc.org/icrceng.nsf) (accessed November 10, 1999).
- International Committee of the Red Cross (1996b), Landmines in the Killing Fields: The Carnage Continues – Cambodia (Geneva, International Committee of the Red Cross).
- International Committee of the Red Cross (1975), Report on the Conference of Government Experts on the Use of Certain Weapons: Lucerne 1974 (Geneva, International Committee of the Red Cross).
- International Committee of the Red Cross (1976), Report on the Conference of Government Experts on the Use of Certain Weapons: Lugano 1976 (Geneva, International Committee of the Red Cross).
- International Military and Defense Encyclopedia 4 (1993), Col. Trevor N. Dupuy (ed.) (Brassey's US Inc.).
- Lawson, Robert J., Gwozdecky, Mark, Sinclair, Jill, and Lysyshyn, Ralph (1998), "The Ottawa Process and the International Movement to Ban Anti-Personnel Mines," in Maxwell A. Cameron, Robert J. Lawson, and Brian W. Tomlin (ed.) *To Walk Without Fear – The Global Movement to Ban Landmines* (Don Mills, Ontario, Oxford University Press), pp. 160-184.
- Long, David and Hindle, Laird (1998), "Europe and the Ottawa Process: An Overview," in Maxwell A. Cameron, Robert J. Lawson, and Brian W. Tomlin (ed.) *To Walk Without Fear – The Global Movement to Ban Landmines* (Don Mills, Ontario, Oxford University Press), pp. 248-268.
- Maslen, Stuart and Herby, Peter (1998), "An International Ban on Anti-Personnel Mines - History and Negotiation of the 'Ottawa Treaty,'" *International Review of the Red Cross*, 1 December 1998, No. 325, pp. 693-713. (www.icrc.org/icrceng.nsf) (accessed November 10, 1999).
- Matheson, Michael J. (1996), "New Landmine Protocol is Vital Step Toward Ban," *Arms Control Today*, July 1996, Vol. 26, No. 5, pp. 9-13.

- Mathews, Robert J. and McCormack, Timothy L.H., "The Influence of Humanitarian Principles in the Negotiation of Arms Control Treaties," *International Review of the Red Cross*, 1 June 1999, No. 834, p. 331-352. (www.icrc.org/irceng.nsf) (accessed November 10, 1999).
- Muller, Robert O. (1998), "New partnerships for a New World Order: NGOs, State Actors and International Law in the Post-Cold War World," *27 Hofstra Law Review*, pp. 21-xx.
- Peters, Ann (1996), "Landmines in the 21st Century," *International Relations XIII* (2) (August 1996), pp. 37-50.
- Price, Richard (1998), "Reversing the Gun Sights: Transnational Civil Society Targets Land Mines," *International Organization* 52 (Summer 1998), pp. 613-644.
- Prokosch, Eric (1995), *The Technology of Killing: A Military and Political History of Antipersonnel Weapons* (London, Zed Books Ltd.).
- Roberts, Shawn and Williams, Jody (1995), "After the Guns Fall Silent: The Enduring Legacy of Landmines," (Washington, D.C., Vietnam Veterans of American Foundation).
- Rutherford, Ken (1999), "The Hague and Ottawa Conventions: A Model for Future Weapon Ban Regimes?" *The Nonproliferation Review* 6 (3) (Spring/Summer 1999).
- Sandoz, Yves (1995) "Turning Principles into Practice: The Challenge for International Conventions and Institutions," in Kevin M. Cahill (ed.) *Clearing the Fields – Solutions to the Global Mines Crisis*, (New York, Basic Books and Council on Foreign Relations).
- Tomlin, Brian W. (1998), "On a Fast Track to a Ban: The Canadian Policy Process," in Maxwell A. Cameron, Robert J. Lawson, and Brian W. Tomlin (ed.) *To Walk Without Fear – The Global Movement to Ban Landmines* (Don Mills, Ontario, Oxford University Press), pp. 185-211.
- UN Mine Action Service (1999a), *Mine Action and Effective Coordination: The United Nations Policy*, (www.un.org/depts/dpko/mine/htm) (accessed October 14, 1999).
- UN Mine Action Service (1999b), *Overview*, (www.un.org/depts/dpko/mine/htm) (accessed October 14, 1999).
- UN Report of the Secretary-General (1998), *Assistance in Mine Clearance*, Fifty-third session, U.N. Doc. A/53/46, October 14, 1998.

Williams, Jody and Goose, Stephen (1998), "The International Campaign to Ban Landmines," in Maxwell A. Cameron, Robert J. Lawson, and Brian W. Tomlin (ed.) *To Walk Without Fear – The Global Movement to Ban Landmines* (Don Mills, Ontario, Oxford University Press), pp. 20-47.

World Bank (Undated), *A Framework for World Bank Involvement in Post-Conflict Reconstruction*, (www.worldbank.org accessed August 19, 1999).