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The New Protectorates

International Administration and the Dilemmas of Governance

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Introduction

On 6-8 June, 2007, the Centre for International Studies at the University of Cambridge and the Global Public Policy Institute, Berlin, brought together a highly international and interdisciplinary group of scholars and practitioners for a conference at the Centre for Research in the Arts, Humanities and Social Sciences (CRASSH), Cambridge. The meeting was generously supported by the Fritz Thyssen Foundation, with additional support provided by CRASSH. The event was the second in a series designed to lead to the publication of an edited volume on 'international' or 'new protectorates', which denote a diversity of contemporary efforts to build states under international tutelage which are often discussed under the more specific headings of international administration, trusteeship, or even peacebuilding.

The launch conference of the International Protectorates project was held in February 2006 at the Rockefeller Center in Bellagio, Italy. The conference helped to define the approach and focus of the project: the 'theories of governance' that underpin international protectorates, conceived of as the inextricably linked questions of 'how to govern and how to justify it'. This approach transcends the sharp distinction between the normative debates around ideas of a contemporary 'civilizing mission', on the one hand, and those pertaining to the operational practices of international protectorates (the two major and usually opposing approaches in the literature), on the other. Alternatively, the project's approach sees these as mutually constitutive and understandable only within the same analytical framework.

On this basis, the conference focused on the values, organizational structures, targets and fields of operation of international protectorates. The project defines the 'new protectorates' as territories where a medium- to long-term international presence, invariably under the leadership of Western powers, was established over the last decade and a half in order to accomplish physical reconstruction, the establishment of non-dysfunctional political institutions, and ultimately, the transformation of 'maladjusted' pre-protectorate political cultures. The motivation for such ambitious moves is a complex mix of self-styled altruism and security-inspired concerns, especially since 11 September 2001. Territories that can be deemed 'international protectorates' include those where international trusteeship has been officially declared, as in Kosovo (1999-), Bosnia-Herzegovina (1995-), Eastern Slavonia (1995-97), or East Timor (1999-2002), and some form of explicit executive authority is held by international forces. Beyond such obvious instances, the category also includes states such as Afghanistan and Iraq where an international military and civilian presence is very large; a foreign pro-consul holds important (formal or informal) oversight responsibilities over the direction of policy; a number of governance tasks are performed with significant input by foreigners and often a peripheral role for local officials; and the survival of the state in its current form is inconceivable without the presence of outsiders. We are also interested in the experience of African failed states with extensive multidimensional peace operations

such as Liberia and Sierra Leone. The new protectorate is thus a political, not simply a legal reality, and it is its status as a political project in its own right that is of interest here.

Amongst other questions, the conference addressed the following:

- What is the role of international protectorates in current efforts to promote world order?
- What implicit/explicit theories of governance inform international protectorates, and where do they come from?
- What type of organization (if any) is the international protectorate?
- Do international protectorates emulate Western bureaucratic and socio-economic realities, or are they laboratories for new ideas with only limited currency in the West?
- Are the conservative (establishment and maintenance of political order) and the progressive (the building of liberal states) agendas of the new protectorates compatible?
- How do empowered, as opposed to 'weak' or 'failed', non-Western states perceive the new protectorates?
- What are the prospects of the new protectorates, particular in view of their record thus far? Although connected with their practical viability, this question is primarily related with how international protectorates will fare as a political project in the medium-term.

1 The New Protectorates in Historical Context

Brendan Simms (University of Cambridge) chaired the first panel which embarked on a historical and conceptual overview on the use of imperial analogies for the analysis of the new protectorates as well as a practical perspective on current challenges in Iraq and Afghanistan. Panelists presented in turn and the discussion that followed successfully engaged all panel participants.

Old Empires and the New Protectorates: A Conceptual Critique

Setting the stage for the panel, **William Bain** (University of Wales, Aberystwyth) introduced two alternative ways of thinking about the 'colonial' past and the 'liberal' present. The first draws a sharp distinction between the two while the second seeks to establish continuity between them.

The first approach, according to Bain, is underpinned by a silent emphasis on the fundamentally different *motives* of past vs. present external administrators. Colonialism,

in this view, rested on arrogant perceptions of Self and Other which, in turn, enabled the concomitant brutality of colonial practice and granted it legitimacy. At the same time, such an examination of motives also reveals a 'humanitarian streak' in the self-perception of colonialists. According to Bain, the apparent contradiction in motives within the colonial past demonstrates the fallacy of this first approach. In fact, a clear distinction of motives is impossible as there was, and is, a tapestry of different threads. In reality, Bain suggested, the difference between then and now lies instead in the level of self-confidence in which policies are being implemented. This becomes evident when, for example, one compares the unflinching belief in the success of the colonial project in India as expressed in the works of Thomas B. Macaulay with the considerable self-doubt omnipresent in discussions of contemporary protectorates.

The second approach seeks to establish a fundamental continuity extending from the imperial past to the present. Then as now, according to this perspective, the discourse of trusteeship was essentially based on a lack of ability on the part of those governed to 'live up' to the responsibility of practicing full sovereignty. Based on a fundamental belief that the 'deliberate improvement of the human condition' is indeed possible, this view holds that liberalism and empire have always been inseparable. The fallacy here, according to Bain, is that the new protectorates lack the intellectual coherence of colonialism because of the obvious tension between the liberal ends and their illiberal, or less liberal, means.

In conclusion, Bain put forth two arguments. Firstly, he suggested that the label 'empire' to describe today's protectorates is not very helpful or illuminating. Secondly, he argued, we need to think about the meaning of 'effectiveness' as a precondition for membership in international society (cf. Art. 4 of the UN Charter whereby member states must be 'able and willing to carry out' their obligations under the Charter) which is not explicitly defined and stands in tension with the notion of self-determination.

The British Empire and International Order: Model or Trap?

James Mayall (University of Cambridge) took the historical analogy a step further by discussing the normative value of models of empire for today's international order. To this end, he made three introductory arguments. Firstly, empires are always characterized by a strong fear of 'barbarians' on the periphery. This fear serves as a crucial source of identity for those at the center. Secondly, this 'paranoid disposition' of empires can hardly be remedied by brute force and intelligence gathering only. Rather, to establish sustainable rule over their peripheries, empires depend on a degree of minimum legitimacy. Finally, Mayall distinguished three types of empires: the ancient 'holy' ones, which were simply justified by recourse to a supernatural authority; modern empires, which employed notions of liberalism and self-rule as justification; and the post-modern empire of the 21st century which was aptly and presciently described by Churchill as the 'empire of the mind'.

According to Mayall, it would be impossible today to run a modern or post-modern empire for three main reasons. Firstly, empires depend on a strong and unflagging nationalism at home to such a degree that any sympathy on the part of the domestic

population for colonial grievances and the latter's desire for self-rule would have to be effectively suppressed. No such disposition is currently present in Western countries, particularly not in the United States. Secondly, the need to confront the political power of religion constitutes an insurmountable obstacle in today's world. In the past, imperialists either resorted to force or co-opted elites for indirect rule, both of which are not an option in modern liberal democracies. Finally, one of the key tenets of any liberal imperialism would be educating those colonized according to Western thought – which is essentially self-defeating as new colonial elites base their demands for self-rule on the universality of precisely this liberal philosophy. The only way out of this dilemma is trusteeship (the preparation for independence, inherently a temporary 'solution') or alternately the violent suppression of colonial nationalism, which is no longer a feasible option.

In conclusion, Mayall argued that any contemporary imperial endeavor would inevitably suffer from a fatal deficit of legitimacy. This effectively turns it into a trap rather than a model.

US Leadership and the Challenge of International Order

Stefan Halper (University of Cambridge) shifted the attention to two concrete and contemporary examples: Iraq and Afghanistan. Providing a survey of the domestic debate in the US from 2004 to 2006, Halper argued that experience in these two countries had shown that building democratic states was far more challenging than previously assumed in Washington. Instead of according primacy to the establishment of liberal institutions, security had finally been recognized as indispensable in this endeavor. Thus, starting about two years ago, Washington's approach to state-building had gradually changed.

As far as the perception of the situation in Iraq and Afghanistan is concerned, Halper suggested that there are two conflicting 'realities': on the one hand the more optimistic assessment which was most prominently put forward by Congress, and on the other the less sanguine view championed by the *New York Times*. He then gave an account of the latest developments in the two countries, and concluded that there had been very little, if any, progress. Returning to his argument on the importance of security, Halper argued that a focus on security for the sake of better preconditions for a free society might have the opposite outcome, namely in the creation of an authoritarian regime. He suggested, however, that life (that is, basic security) was more important than liberty (the full enjoyment of political rights). Yet according to Halper, the US administration was reluctant to accept this trade-off and hence remained vague about the choices at hand.

Part of the reason for this position is that a 'security-first' approach would most likely entail the need to cooperate with illiberal traditional elites: warlords, tribal leaders, or Baathists. According to Halper, how to successfully work with previous elites was one of the forgotten lessons from state-building in Germany and Japan after World War II. Furthermore, putting security, rather than liberty, at the top of the agenda would also mean that local militias would be left intact and Coalition troops would be confined to

the policing of conflicts between the warring sides. Moreover, this would require the acceptance of increased autonomy for the different ethnicities and fractions vis-à-vis a central government.

2 Governing Post-Cold War Protectorates I

The second panel, chaired by **Krishnan Srinivasan** (Indian Foreign Ministry, retired), brought together a set of presentations on various aspects of governance: output effectiveness (Richard Caplan), the United Nations' internally-held images of governance (Thorsten Benner) and choices for a locally applicable system of law (Bill Burke-White).

Achievements and Limitations of UN Trusteeships

Richard Caplan (Oxford University) began by pointing out that scholars hold very different views of international administrations: what to call them, how appropriate are they and are they effective at all, are questions scholars struggle with. His own presentation focused on one question: do international administrations make a positive contribution or do they accomplish the opposite?

In addressing this question, Caplan said, a key problem is posed by the lack of an agreed criterion by which to measure success. Applying the standards of individual missions' mandates is problematic because these may be subject to the prevailing political winds and therefore somewhat arbitrary. For example, can missions with a less ambitious mandate (e.g., Eastern Slavonia) really be said to be more successful than those with more ambitious yardsticks (e.g., Kosovo)? Singling out very basic indicators, such as the achievement of peace, is not without pitfalls either, because such indicators tend to be very vague and the specific contribution of an individual mission may be difficult to isolate. A third option, that of evaluating success in a few specific fields such as DDR or human rights, may be useful for comparison-making but still does not yield a general assessment. Caplan pointed out that due to these problems, the success of a single UN mission may be rated very differently by different actors. For instance, East Timor has been described as both 'an undeniable success' and 'a failed state created by the UN' by two practitioners (Jean-Christian Cady and Jarat Chopra respectively) who were both intimately involved with the country during the same period.

Caplan suggested that one's position on what peace should look like – regardless of whether one takes a minimalist or a maximalist view – has important implications for the selection of criteria according to which success is measured; moreover, one's particular position also determines which policy prescriptions one is likely to make. It is precisely this problem - how to define successful peace - that the Peacebuilding Commission is addressing, and that Caplan's contribution to the edited volume will also be concerned with.

The UN's Peacebuilding Bureaucracy: Changing Self-Images of Governance

Presenting the joint work with his colleagues **Stephan Mergenthaler** and **Philipp Rotmann, Thorsten Benner** (Global Public Policy Institute, Berlin) focused on the change in the self-image of DPKO from 'logistics and support command' for the blue helmet troops to a knowledge-based organization which is engaged in multidimensional peace operations. In relation to historical blueprints of colonial systems of knowledge production where 'bureau-crats were scholars and scholars were bureaucrats' (Myint-U/Sellwood), Benner sketched the evolution of the UN's infrastructure in knowledge production. From a very different starting point as a patchwork of semi-independent bureaucracies without any intelligence machinery or a capacity for specialized knowledge, the UN has since the 1990s slowly obtained a capacity for knowledge creation and management that solidified only most recently through the Guéhenno Peace Operations 2010 reform initiative. Looking at the types of knowledge these institutions produce, Benner argued, we find mostly 'abstract-general' ideas, whether they are normative/legitimatory concepts such as 'local ownership', grand strategic doctrines as the capstone doctrine currently finalized as part of the Guidance project or technically oriented best practices. Specific local knowledge about host territories of operation and thorough evaluations of previous missions are hardly a priority (with few exceptions).

Since functionalist arguments were in Benner's view not sufficient to account for this change in the UN's self-image, he suggested another combination of reasons: crises, changes in personal leadership, generational career cycles and (geo-)political constraints which are translated through mission mandates and structures into the daily realities of peacebuilders. In a final point on the 'promise and pathologies' of the current move towards a business-style learning organization, Benner argued that there is a fine line to be treaded between over-generalization and over-fragmentation of knowledge while, as Wolfgang Seibel's paper proposes, there might be an actual interest in ignorance on the part of various actors in the international system. For the peacebuilding bureaucracy, therefore, the key is to make more room for adversarial contestation of knowledge both within the bureaucracy, in relation to external political principals, and also to the wider public.

The Domestic Legal Framework

In contrast with the previous contributors, **William Burke-White** (University of Pennsylvania Law School) delved into the reality of legal challenges faced within many protectorates. By way of introduction, he offered three alternative mindsets held by international legal professionals in the field of international administrations. The first and predominant approach, according to Burke-White, focuses primarily on law and order. The foremost concern from this view is to stop the violence in a time of crisis. The newly established law is therefore primarily held to the standard of political stability and cessation of violence. The second mindset, according to Burke-White, views law-making as a process of norm construction within the domestic polity. This view is usually underpinned by a greater degree of respect for local values, and takes the long-term view.

The third approach is concerned primarily with building sustainable institutions of governance rather than just halting the violence. In practice, each of these three approaches leads to different conceptions of law and also to different mechanisms of implementation.

According to Burke-White, when determining the applicable law for modern protectorates, there are two essential but conflicting goals: effectiveness versus legitimacy. Effectiveness, on the one hand, relies on rules that are clearly defined and easy to implement, and that trace continuity from previous legal frameworks. Legitimacy on the other hand, Burke-White suggested, has two separate dimensions: international and domestic. The international community looks for compliance with human rights norms and usually takes the outcome-driven view. Domestically, issues such as acceptability, fairness, and an absence of double standards (e.g., in the prosecution of criminal offenses by locals and UN mission staff) are important; any evaluation of the legitimacy of the law tends to be process-driven. These two sets of expectations are often in conflict.

Historically, three types of international administration can be distinguished, each with different forms of applicable law. League of Nations mandates (traditional trusteeships) were considered binding by way of their legitimate creation. Hence, outcome- or process-based legitimacy was largely ignored, and in many cases the law of the mandate powers simply became that of the mandate. Immediately after the Second World War, legitimacy flowed from the establishment of military facts on the ground. The occupying powers' monopoly of force made the implementation of the applicable law (the old legal framework minus certain offensive parts) rather easy. In contemporary UN administrations, in contrast, the common approach has been for the international administrator to pick the applicable law, which raises problems of effectiveness and, more importantly, legitimacy since local participation in this process is usually minimal (this was particularly problematic in Kosovo as well as in East Timor).

Burke-White concluded by arguing that the two elements of effectiveness and legitimacy need to be reconciled and that particular attention must be paid to the domestic importance of the latter. Effectiveness, Burke-White argued, could be improved by a number of measures including the drafting of rapid reaction plans, earlier training of locals in applicable law and a general definition of minimal human rights' legislation and its subsequent incorporation into domestic law. In terms of strengthening legitimacy, one option would be to impose temporary law codes which are applicable for a transitional period while in the meantime a legal code that is perceived as legitimate would be drafted.

3 Governing Post-Cold War Protectorates II

Devon Curtis (University of Cambridge) chaired the third panel, which further expanded on the themes raised in the previous session. It featured contributions on the

insights which are to be gained from a political economy perspective (Mats Berdal and David Keen); a review of military lessons from the history of contemporary and complex peace operations (John Drewienkiewicz); and the variety of sources from which international administrations can derive their legitimacy (Dominik Zaum).

The Political Economy of Protectorates

At the outset of the paper, **Mats Berdal** (King's College London) outlined a political economy (PE) perspective on armed conflict. This perspective is valued, among other things, for its illumination of the utility of violence for a large group of actors. While simplistic greed-based explanations are not sufficient, a general PE approach to conflict studies provides a rational understanding of violence from the perspective of its participant actors.

Such a perspective, Berdal argued, yields important insights also for the new protectorates. For instance, it leads to the realization that the distinction between war and peace is blurred by its nature, and that war constitutes not simply the breakdown of an existing order but also may entail the emergence of new alternative systems of power during the conflict itself. Moreover, according to Berdal, a PE perspective highlights the need of understanding the salience of invisible and 'shadow' structures in these failed states. In this vein, 'adversarial cooperation' born during a time of open hostilities may survive into the post-conflict phase, raising the problem of whether to work for a 'pax mafiosi' or to pursue the original statebuilding aims. Finally, Berdal suggested, a PE perspective forces one to adopt a regional outlook rather than one that is purely focused on individual states.

Before turning to concrete examples, **David Keen** (London School of Economics and Political Science) suggested that US/Western exceptionalism and universalism often prevented an appreciation of the specific context and local history of a particular conflict which frequently results in an underestimation of the inevitable backlash against democratization, military conquest, and/or occupation. The case of Sierra Leone, Keen argued, had illustrated that a partial state collapse may precede and shape the ensuing wars. The importance of sensible security-sector reforms had also been highlighted: it was imperative not to sack or underpay soldiers in the absence of alternative livelihoods. Iraq, Keen argued, also offered new insights when viewed through a political economy lens. Under Saddam, the sanctions regime had led to the 'criminalization' of the country's economy. Keen suggested for example that it would be instructive to assess the extent to which networks of illegal smugglers had survived the 2003 invasion and were now fuelling the continuing violence directly with their profits; quite interestingly, two bastions of the insurgency, Fallujah and Tal Afar, had been centers of sanctions-busting before the war. The fact that local beneficiaries of international sanctions could face problems (and thus in turn create problems) once those sanctions were removed was also discernible in Kosovo and Bosnia, Keen argued.

On a concluding note, Keen cautioned against de-emphasizing perspectives other than that of political economy. While economic agendas may be prominent in conflict or

post-conflict societies, one ought not to lose sight of other, more 'grievance'-based aspects of conflict, for example in the case of the Iraqi insurgency.

The Role of the Military in the New Protectorates

Shifting the perspective to the role of military forces in stability operations which underlie the new protectorates, **John Drewienkiewicz** began his presentation by outlining key challenges that the military faces in these endeavors. These include, in his view, the need to commit (and plan) for the long haul and to realize that there are no 'purely military' solutions to the political problems faced on the ground. In addition, peace operations are not what soldiers 'signed up for' and require different training, equipment and doctrines. In particular, the ubiquitous necessity to work closely with various civilian actors who all have their own agendas complicates the decision-making environment for soldiers while the intense media and political scrutiny is often 'unfair' to the troops in that it hardly takes into account the complexity and pressure of the situations in which critical decisions have to be made by mostly young and inexperienced soldiers, Drewienkiewicz argued.

What does this mean for civil-military relations on the ground? Ideally, Drewienkiewicz argued, civil-military relations should be seen as symbiotic: the military's role is to create a safe and secure environment for the civilians who can in turn 'build the state'. There is, however, the risk of a clash between the respective structural and cultural features of the military and civilian levels. While the former arrive quickly and heavily with a largely unified command, lots of resources, a hands-on attitude but also quick rotational schedules which make it harder to forge personal relations with civilian counterparts, the latter arrive somewhat later, in smaller numbers, without joint planning or training, let alone a unity of effort.

To get things done in spite of these differences, Drewienkiewicz suggested aiming for deconfliction, cooperation and at most coordination instead of aiming for any other form of joined-up command and control arrangement. In particular, he argued that the military obsession with force protection runs the danger of becoming an end in itself that jeopardizes the larger mission. In addition, the wealth of resources available to the military needs to be recognized as a source of friction with civilian actors who are endowed with lesser resources. A similar tension arises from the different turnover rates between civilians and the military. Culturally, Drewienkiewicz argued, it should come as no surprise that the 'military way' of doing things is shaped more often than not by elderly men who work in a framework of rigid bureaucracies while the 'NGO way' of doing things is shaped by a much younger leadership and a higher percentage of women who work on shoestring budgets with much less hierarchy. However, it is possible to leverage the respective strengths of both sides sequentially, with the military serving in the more resourceful position during the early months of a mission while the civilians gradually take over as they arrive after stability increases.

After treating civil-military relations, Drewienkiewicz turned to the coordination between different militaries in regard to which he discussed a variety of constraining

factors resulting from different structures of national forces, different military cultures and different political imperatives in their respective home countries. At the end, however, one needs to realize that coalitions are there to increase legitimacy, not effectiveness. In closing, Drewienkiewicz summed up his main conclusions and advised against confusing frantic activity with achievement.

Legitimacy and the New Protectorates

Dominik Zaum (University of Reading) began his presentation by challenging the trade-off presumed by Burke-White, among others, between legitimacy and effectiveness in governance. Instead, Zaum argued, legitimacy is a vital precondition for effective governance. He identified several sources of legitimacy: firstly, process-based legitimacy which flows from certain institutional mechanisms and accountability. Secondly, international administrations which represent and operate in accordance with a set of values that is congruent with those views which are shared by wider communities (local and international). A third type of legitimacy, output-legitimacy, hinges on the ability to provide public goods more effectively than the local government did in a particular post-conflict situation. Fourthly, according to Zaum, international institutions such as the United Nations or the World Bank can make claims to legitimacy on account of their technical expertise. Finally, it is crucial that the interests of both the local and the international community are seen to be served by the specific administration.

According to Zaum, common challenges to the legitimacy of international administrations come in two kinds. Firstly, critics point to the fact that it is generally the international normative framework that is referenced rather than the values of the local community. For example, for UNMIK it was crucial to engineer Milosevic's consent as the legal sovereign in the territory, rather than the consent of Kosovars. Likewise, the 'standards before status' process placed a higher priority upon international norms of human rights and the protection of minorities instead of on local interests. Secondly, the creation of legitimacy is supposed to work as a process of reasoning, in contrast to the view of legitimacy which springs from meeting rather static criteria.

In terms of statebuilding as opposed to governance, Zaum suggested that a lack of legitimacy puts not so much the administration itself in jeopardy but the administration's legacy. Most importantly, when statebuilders adopt a liberal-democratic model of government according to international norms and local norms point in another direction, the institutions which result might be short-lived. In conclusion, Zaum argued that while challenges to the legitimacy of international administrations might loom large and constrain the political space, they can be not impossible to overcome and legitimacy is attainable.

4 The Geopolitics of Protectorates and 'Out-of-area' Perceptions

The fourth panel, chaired by **Christopher Hill** (University of Cambridge), focused on the positions taken by three major international actors concerning the new protectorates. The skeptical, though not uniformly negative, attitude of India (Aswini K. Ray) and China (Shogo Suzuki) were portrayed, and the EU's engagement in the Balkans in the 1990s was discussed (Spyros Economides).

India and the Challenge of the New Protectorates

Aswini K. Ray (University of Delhi) began his presentation by arguing that the absence of state sovereignty is essentially the only attribute shared by the new international protectorates. Since, in contrast to earlier counterparts, there is no clearly defined goal of self-government, it is unsurprising that the populations of internationally administered territories are skeptical of international governance, since they often perceive it to be exercised by Western marionettes using the guise of international organizations. India, Ray argued, shares this skepticism. Generally, Ray suggested, international protectorates are viewed in the non-Western world as at best temporary aberrations in a world of legally sovereign states and at worst as Western imperialism in a new cloak. This can be attributed to the relatively recent acquisition of and the great value attached to sovereignty in many post-colonial states ('good governance is no substitute for self-governance'), and is also rooted in the 'operational marginalization' of the UN and the Western dominance of the World Bank, IMF, WTO and IAEA. Hence, the expectation in India and elsewhere, Ray argued, is that international protectorates will be operated on the understanding that they will lead to self-rule as quickly as possible.

According to Ray, the challenge of new protectorates is a 'catch-22' situation between, on the one hand, upholding the 'rules of the game' of global order and respecting national sovereignty, and on the other hand, introducing a new comprehensive definition of human security. Therefore, Ray argued, it is imperative to create mechanisms by which the governance of new protectorates is accountable to a democratically legitimated body such as the General Assembly.

In administering protectorates, Ray advocated greater sensitivity to local traditions and stressed the need for local participation in governance. Moreover, the selection of external advisers should proceed with an eye for greater international diversity; including people from countries such as India, China, Brazil or South Africa. This would result in the building of more effective institutions in the areas of security, economy, and politics. Ray also proposed a clear prioritization for the different imperatives of 'the generic recipe' for good governance. Order has to take precedence over law, which can only be established lastingly once a certain degree of social stability is achieved; the satisfaction of basic human needs ought also to be addressed before civil or political rights are secured; any such prioritization must, however, be case-specific and time-bound, Ray argued.

Paternal Authority, Civilized State: China's Evolving Attitude towards International Trusteeship

Shogo Suzuki (University of Cambridge) began by pointing out that China has traditionally viewed international administration with considerable suspicion, largely because of its own history in the nineteenth and early twentieth century. Today, however, China's attitude to the challenge of 'failed states' is beginning to change (although the term is still being used reluctantly, once again because of China's own history). Interestingly, China did not vote against the Security Council resolution that put the multi-national force (MNF) in charge of Iraq.

The Chinese, according to Suzuki, differentiate between traditional and new protectorates. While the state is not favorably disposed toward unilateral administrations, multilateral efforts might be viewed with less skepticism. This shift, Suzuki argued, might in part be due to the emergence of a subtle notion of sovereignty, which may have to be suspended in the case of human rights disasters. The Chinese leadership is also realizing, according to Suzuki, that the refusal to participate in a number of UN operations might have resulted in negative consequences; in order to be accorded with the status of a responsible great power that Beijing aspires to (this is in tune with the 'Peaceful Rise' policy), and also in order to divert some attention from its own human rights record, China is willing to take part in a few selected operations (albeit only in those where the host state consents to the mission). The audience for China's changing attitude, Suzuki argued, is thus primarily the West. For this reason, it is at least partly up to the West to determine in which direction China's attitude will continue to evolve.

In a final point, Suzuki pointed out that China is not immune to the paternalism it has accused the West of; the missions that it involves itself with are unequivocally portrayed as being helpful to the host countries.

The European Pull in the Balkans

In his paper, **Spyros Economides** (London School of Economics and Political Science) considered two main questions: whether the European Union can be considered a state-builder, and, if so, what kind of a state-builder. According to Economides, the 1990s and the experience in the Balkans were formative for the EU's role as an international actor, in terms of the development of a common foreign policy and the instruments thereof, but also in terms of building a fundamental willingness to project its influence abroad.

Economides described three ways in which the relationship between the EU and the Balkans since the early 1990s might be conceived. Firstly, it can be viewed through the prism of containment of the violence in the Balkans and its consequences (refugees, etc.) as well as of the revival of nationalism witnessed there. Secondly, Economides argued, there was an element of constructive engagement by the EU, even with those regimes viewed with considerable skepticism, such as Milosevic's, in a hope of a brighter future. Finally, one can focus on the element of conditionality, and it is this perspective that Economides argued is the best starting point if one wants to think of the EU as a state-

builder. More than simply 'conservative' (i.e. with a focus on stability and security), this approach seeks to build institutions; it is through conditionality, Economides suggested, that the EU has exerted the greatest pull in the Balkans. Moreover, such a pull has not only had institutional but also 'civilizational' effects (with the dissemination of ideas such as democracy, etc.) and has resulted in a level of Europeanization of the Balkans with respect to values and identities.

In conclusion, Economides argued that the perspective on conditionality makes it apparent that the EU is trying to form states in its own image in the Balkans, at least to the extent that this is a realistic endeavor at all, given the practical constraints in the short and medium terms.

In a concluding comment, **Clapham** pointed out that the unifying thread connecting the three papers was that they all dealt with the respective 'near abroad' of each country or region addressed, and the construction of the morale for trusteeships.

5 Liberal Peacebuilding and the Production of Global Order

Masayuki Tadokoro (Keio University) chaired the fifth and final panel, which addressed broader aspects of the conference topic: perceptions on the part of the population in modern protectorates (Christopher Clapham), the mixed record of the notion of the 'Responsibility to Protect' and the ways in which the international community is coming to terms with it (Wolfgang Seibel), and finally the very model on which modern protectorates are based (Ricardo Soares de Oliveira).

Africa and Trusteeship in the Modern Global Order

At the outset, **Christopher Clapham** (University of Cambridge) defined his aims as taking a conceptual approach linked to Bain's paper, and as presenting the perspective of the 'trusteed'. Similarly to Berdal and Keen, Clapham argued, he wanted to treat African or other local actors as agents, not only as subjects.

He suggested that, while we as academics have vast experience with quasi-protectorates, we have virtually no experience with formal trusteeship administrations; this is an important element because of the long history with trusteeship-like arrangements (i.e. colonies) that plays such an important role in shaping the skeptical outlook of African actors on trusteeships. Clapham suggested that there are two continuities between previous episodes in African history and modern day experiences: firstly, as William Brown has argued, the motives of the Berlin Congress of 1884/85 which are quite similar with those of the British government's Commission for Africa; secondly, the 'dual mandate' of the colonial conquests which resembles closely justifications made for trusteeship nowadays. Clapham also pointed out that there has recently been an attempt

to turn some African nations into trustees for other African states, for example through methods like NEPAD's peer review mechanism.

To turn to the views of the 'trusteed', Clapham elaborated on two modern examples: Sierra Leone and Liberia. He argued that a high level of external co-optation of the two governments under the guise of indigenous statehood is detectable in these two cases, which is apparent from the fact that the President and his entire cabinet in Liberia had been parachuted in from international financial institutions and that the largest gap in the country was the one between the government with its external allies (such as the US) on the one hand, and the rest of the population on the other. Clapham also suggested that these two show the greatest promise in terms of the great prestige enjoyed by the UK and the US, respectively, and that anything that will not work there is unlikely to work anywhere else. Sierra Leone, Clapham argued, also illustrated that the key challenge is that of statebuilding. While peacekeeping and policing efforts are successful, the establishment of stable institutions has proven to be much more intricate.

Peace Operations and Modern Protectorates: The Logic of Successful Failure

Wolfgang Seibel (Konstanz University) began his presentation by retracing the protectorates' 'intellectual superstructure' as it is captured most clearly by the evolution of the 'Responsibility to Protect' (R2P). Seibel further argued that R2P was the product of a tiny window of opportunity following the end of the Cold War when, due to the absence of Russia and China from the world stage for seven years, the interests and values of the international community and the institutional mechanisms of the UN were 'mutually compatible'. Now that the two non-Western great powers have (re)asserted themselves, the climate has changed accordingly and the previous compatibility is no longer as evident. Moreover, Seibel argued, the invasion and occupation of Iraq have damaged the credibility of any form of modern interventionism, including protectorates.

This, according to Seibel, leads to a dilemma: there is no way to abandon the obligations of R2P (collective security and humanitarian interventions) but at the same time it is becoming largely impossible to make these ventures successful. As a result, protectorates turn into 'permanently failing ventures'; 'successful failure', Seibel argued, represents the international community's coping mechanism for this dilemma. Based on a modified principal-agent view of why and how peace operations are established, he suggested that several principals might in fact not be interested in success but in failure and might even prefer to be ignorant about failure itself. The Security Council is one example of such behavior, as reluctant abstainers such as Russia and China are potentially interested in the failure of missions such as UNMIK in Kosovo. There are also cases of national governments interested in remaining ignorant about failures, e.g., in Seibel's view, the German government vis-à-vis its Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan. As a final example, Seibel mentioned apathetic publics who are uninterested in finding out what really was happening in Rwanda, Srebrenica and now in Darfur.

Government and Governance in the New Protectorates

Picking up on what Seibel had called ‘permanently failing ventures’, **Ricardo Soares de Oliveira** (University of Cambridge/GPPI) set out to illuminate the organizational model behind these ventures. Was statebuilding, i.e. the establishment of stable institutions which guarantee human security, really at the center of the peacebuilding project?

Soares de Oliveira argued that early 20th century attempts at exogenous state building by Western powers (including admittedly varied experiences such as the Allied occupation of Japan and Germany, American colonialism in the Philippines, and some instances of late colonial European ‘developmental imperialism’) were based on an understanding of the state that was Weberian in character. In other words, these attempts did not presuppose an organizational model that was radically different from that of classical state building. This classical state building approach, Soares de Oliveira argued, was dependent on the acquisition of a great deal of knowledge about the host state and an unquestioned assumption that the ultimate goal was the establishment of full territorial coverage and hierarchical institutions with the monopolies of violence and taxation at their core. The new protectorates share the same goal as this previous generation of exogenous state building, namely, the wholesale reform of societies. Their key difference is that the implementation of that blueprint is to be enacted through radically different organizational models: instead of strong governments marked by an authoritative core and a clear division of institutional labor, we observe ‘patchwork governance’ by networks of numerous actors with no established hierarchy (IFIs, involved militaries, UN agencies, elements of previous governments, NGOs, etc.). Thus, the new protectorates are not really the exact copies of Western states they rhetorically aspire to be. They are distinctive in that they lack an authoritative real center; are non-hierarchical and unaccountable; and their economic policies, which include a great deal of subcontracting to the private sector, are more ‘neo-liberal’ than those observed in even the most lightly regulated Western economies. Without an institutional core, he added, it is no surprise that contemporary statebuilders largely lack an institutional memory with the result that the new protectorates are ‘partially blind’.

Soares de Oliveira spelled out a number of pathologies in the patchwork governance model: the undefined nature or status of governing institutions (e.g., of the CPA in Iraq) undermines their legitimacy; the institutional blockades preventing even assertive leaders to force through difficult policy decisions (e.g. Michael Steiner and UNMIK); the difficulties in implementing the rule of law; the competition for resources (including personnel) between different international agencies and between international agencies and local governments; and finally the obsessive, if often disappointing, focus on ‘sexy tasks’ such as the construction of schools to the neglect of other priorities such as electricity generation.

This ‘network approach’, Soares de Oliveira argued, must not be depoliticized as a technocratic set of ‘coordination problems’ but should be viewed as a conscious choice, one among several available options. Weberian models of state building (which admittedly do not provide foreigners with roadmaps to build other peoples’ states) are consciously dismissed in favor of decentralized, multi-actor operations which have as yet

never delivered 'state building' however defined. The fragmentation of authority in new protectorates is therefore a structural factor and not an unintended consequence. In part, he suggested, this conscious choice is due to the liberal urge to limit the power of institutions rather than to strengthen them, even under conditions of state collapse. As a result, contemporary state-builders built anything but viable states: 'no central power, no monopoly of violence, no fiscal base'. The necessary organizational approach would rather consist of a high degree of vertical integration that, in Soares de Oliveira's view, is most likely unattainable under current conditions.

Annex I: Conference program

6 June

Arrival of participants

16.30 Discussion panel open to the public

Building order in a post-imperial age: lessons from and perceptions of international protectorates since the end of the Cold War

Chair: James Mayall (University of Cambridge)

Stefan Halper (University of Cambridge)

Aswini Ray (Burdwan University)

Shogo Suzuki (University of Cambridge)

Dominik Zaum (University of Reading)

19.30 Pre-dinner drinks (Old Combination Room, Christ's College)

20:00 **Welcome dinner with participants** (Old Combination Room, Christ's College)

7 June

9.30 **Introduction**

James Mayall (University of Cambridge) and *Thorsten Benner* (Global Public Policy Institute)

9.45 **Historical Context**

Chair: Brendan Simms (University of Cambridge)

Old Empires and the New Protectorates: A Conceptual Critique (Will Bain, University of Wales, Aberystwyth)

The British Empire and International Order: Model or Trap? (James Mayall, University of Cambridge)

US Leadership and the Challenge of International Order (Stefan Halper, University of Cambridge)

11.30 **Governing Post-Cold War Protectorates I**

Chair: Krishnan Srinivasan (Indian Foreign Ministry, retired)

Achievements and Limitations of UN trusteeships (Richard Caplan, Oxford University)

The UN's Peacebuilding Bureaucracy: Changing Self-Images of Governance (Thorsten Benner, GPPi)

The Domestic Legal Framework (William Burke-White, University of Pennsylvania Law School)

- 14.30 **Governing Post Cold War Protectorates II**
Chair: Devon Curtis (University of Cambridge)
The Political Economy of Protectorates (Mats Berdal, Kings College London, and David Keen, LSE)
Civil-Military Relations (John Drewienkiewicz)
Legitimacy and the New Protectorates (Dominik Zaum, University of Reading)
- 16.00 End of Conference
- 19.00 Pre-dinner drinks (Cloister Court, Sidney Sussex College)
- 19.45 **Conference Dinner** (Mong Building, Sidney Sussex College)

8 June

- 9.30 **The Geopolitics of the New Protectorates and ‘Out-of-Area’ Perceptions**
Chair: Christopher Hill (University of Cambridge)
India and the Challenge of the New Protectorates (Aswini Ray)
Paternal Authority, Civilised State: China’s evolving attitude towards International Trusteeships (Shogo Suzuki, University of Cambridge)
The European Pull in the Balkans (Spyros Economides, LSE)
- 11.30 **Liberal Peacebuilding and the Production of Global Order**
Chair: Masayuki Tadokoro (Keio University)
Africa and trusteeship in the modern global order (Christopher Clapham, University of Cambridge)
Peace Operations and Modern Protectorates: The Logic of Successful Failure (Wolfgang Seibel, Konstanz University)
Government and Governance in the New Protectorates (Ricardo Soares de Oliveira, University of Cambridge/GPPi)
- 20.00 **Conference Dinner** (Riverside Restaurant, University Centre)

Annex II: Participants' Biographies

William Bain is a Lecturer in International Relations Theory at the Department of International Politics at Aberystwyth. He joined the department in 2004, after having taught international relations theory, international ethics, and eighteenth century political thought at the University of Glasgow. William Bain specializes in international relations theory and normative approaches to world affairs. He published *Between Anarchy and Society: Trusteeship and the Obligations of Power* (Oxford University Press, 2003) as well as a number of articles and book chapters on these subjects. William Bain holds a BA from the University of South Carolina and an MA and PhD from the University of British Columbia in Vancouver, Canada.

Thorsten Benner is Associate Director of the Global Public Policy Institute (GPPi) in Berlin. Prior to co-founding GPPi in 2003, he worked with the German Council on Foreign Relations, Berlin; the UN Development Program, New York; McKinsey & Company, Berlin and the Global Public Policy Project, Washington D. C. His commentary has appeared in *DIE ZEIT*, the *International Herald Tribune*, *Süddeutsche Zeitung* and the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, among others. His publications include *Critical Choices. The United Nations, Networks, and the Future of Global Governance* (Ottawa 2000). He directs the two-year research project on *Learning to Build Peace? The United Nations, Peacebuilding and Organizational Learning* funded by the German Foundation for Peace Research (DSF) as well as GPPi's project on *Crisis and Change: The UN Secretariat and the Quest for Accountability*. Since 2004 he has been a co-director of the Hertie School of Governance executive education program on global public policy. Thorsten Benner studied Political Science, History, and Sociology at the University of Siegen, the University of York (UK) and the University of California at Berkeley. He was a McCloy Scholar at the Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, where he received a Master of Public Administration (MPA).

Mats Berdal is Professor of Security and Development in the Department of War Studies at King's College London. From 1999 to 2003 he was Director of Studies at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in London. He is currently completing *The UN and the Search for International Order*, a book that covers the immediate post-Cold War period and focuses in particular on the UN's involvement in the mitigation, containment and resolution of civil wars. He is also working on an Adelphi Paper for the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) examining the relationship between security and development in international relations. Other publications include 'The UN, Peacebuilding and the Genocide in Rwanda', *Global Governance*, vol. 11 no. 1, 2005, and *Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars* (edited with David Malone, Lynne Rienner, 2000). Mats Berdal holds a DPhil from Oxford University.

William Burke-White is Assistant Professor of Law at the University of Pennsylvania Law School. From 2002-2005 he was Lecturer and Senior Special Assistant to Dean Anne-Marie Slaughter at Princeton's Woodrow Wilson School, where he assisted with the launch of the Princeton Project on National Security. His research interests are at

the intersection of international law and international politics. He is one of the leading scholars in the fields of international criminal law and international investment law. Burke-White has written widely on the structure of international legal regimes, the effectiveness of international courts and tribunals, investor-state arbitration, international criminal law and US foreign policy. His scholarship addresses the operation of international tribunals, post conflict justice systems, the International Criminal Court, human rights, sovereign bankruptcy, amnesty legislation and the 'international constitutional moment' after September 11. He was the 2001 recipient of the Deak Prize for the outstanding article published in a student-edited international law journal. He regularly serves as an expert for foreign governments in international investment disputes and has advised the Government of the Democratic Republic of Congo on the creation of international criminal accountability mechanisms for the massive crimes committed there in the 1990s. Previously he has worked with the Government of Cambodia and the U.N. Transitional Administration in East Timor on the establishment of international criminal tribunals. Burke-White has also served as Special Rapporteur and Advisor to the Legal and Constitutional Commission of the Government of Rwanda for the drafting of a new Rwandan constitution, as visiting scholar at the International Criminal Court, as legal assistant at the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, and in the international law group at Clifford Chance, L.L.P. in London. Burke-White, a frequent commentator in the media on issues of international law and international relations, has been published in *The Financial Times*, *The International Herald Tribune*, and *Washington Times*, and *Foreign Policy*, and is a regular guest on various public radio stations.

Richard Caplan is currently a Professor in International Relations and Official Fellow at Linacre College, University of Oxford. Until 2001, he was a Lecturer at the University of Reading, a Research Associate at the International Centre for Strategic Studies (IISS), and an Advisor to the House of Commons Select Committee on Foreign Affairs, among other appointments. His research centers around international organizations and conflict management, peacekeeping, European security, the Western Balkans, humanitarian intervention and nationalism. His most recent monographs, in addition to many scholarly articles and papers, are *International Governance of War-Torn Territories: Rule and Reconstruction* (Oxford University Press, 2005), and *Europe and the Recognition of New States in Yugoslavia* (Cambridge University Press, 2005). He also co-edited (with John Feffer) *Europe's New Nationalism: States and Minorities in Conflict* (Oxford University Press, 1996) and (also with John Feffer) *State of the Union: The Clinton Administration and the Nation in Profile* (Westview Press, 1994). Caplan holds a DPhil from the University of Oxford, an MPhil from the University of Cambridge and a BA from McGill University.

Christopher Clapham is an associate of the Centre of African Studies at Cambridge University, and editor of *The Journal of Modern African Studies*. He was previously Professor of Politics and International Relations at Lancaster University, and President of the African Studies Association of the United Kingdom. His main area of interest is in the international relations of Africa. His books include *Africa and the International System: The Politics of State Survival* (Cambridge University Press, 1996) and *African Guerrillas* (ed.,

1998). He has a specialist interest in Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa, on which he has written two books, *Haile-Selassie's Government* (1969), and *Transformation and Continuity in Revolutionary Ethiopia* (1988, revised 1990), as well as a large number of articles. He is a member of the Africa policy advisory group for the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, and has briefed UK and other ministers and officials on issues related to Africa. He has carried out a number of consultancies on behalf of the UK Department for International Development and other agencies.

Devon Curtis is a College Lecturer in Politics at the University of Cambridge, and a Fellow of New Hall. Her main research interests and publications deal with power-sharing and governance arrangements following conflict, the 'transformation' of rebel movements to political parties, and security and development. Her field research has concentrated on the Great Lakes region of Africa. Previously, Curtis was a Post-doctoral Research Fellow at the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University, and a Pre-doctoral Fellow at Stanford University's Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC). She has also worked for the Canadian Government, the United Nations Staff College, and the Overseas Development Institute. Curtis received her Ph.D. in International Relations from the London School of Economics.

Major General **John Drewienkiewicz** CB CMG was commissioned into the Royal Engineers in 1966 and studied engineering at Sidney Sussex College Cambridge. He served in Germany, Denmark, Canada, the Gulf and the UK, becoming the Chief Engineer of the British Army in 1994. Selected to be the Chief of Staff of the NATO SFOR Headquarters, he formed and trained this new unit in mid 1996. He deployed to Sarajevo in Oct 1996, remaining there until Aug 1997. He then served as Military Advisor to the High Representative Jan to Aug 1998. In Oct 1998 he moved to Vienna at 6 hours notice to plan the unarmed OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission, subsequently moving to Pristina as the KVM's Chief of Operations. He remained through the violent winter of 98/99, until the KVM was ordered to leave on 20 Mar 1999. He returned to Pristina with KFOR in mid June. Since retiring from the Army in early 2001 he has remained connected with the Balkans. In 2002 he spent 8 months with the OSCE in Sarajevo assisting with the downsizing of the entity armed forces. In late 2003 he returned to Sarajevo to assume the triple hatted post of Military Advisor to the High Representative, Vice Chair of the Defence Reform Commission, and Director of the OSCE's Department of Security Cooperation. The Defence Reform Commission having completed its work of developing the unified Armed Forces of BiH, he returned to the UK in Dec 2005.

Spyros Economides is a Senior Lecturer in International Relations and European Politics at the London School of Economics and Political Science. He came to LSE in 1993 from the Centre for Defence Studies at King's College London where he had been a research associate since 1991. He was a Research Associate at the IISS 2001-2 and at the same time acted as specialist adviser to the House of Lords EU committee on their inquiry on EU Aid to the Balkans. He specializes in the Balkans, the study of civil wars and European security issues as well as US foreign policy. Economides has published widely in academic journals, most recently 'The Europeanization of Greek Foreign

Policy' (*West European Politics*, 2005), 'Balkan Security: Which Security? Whose Security?' (*Journal of Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, 2003) and "The International Criminal Court: Reforming the Politics of International Justice (*Government and Opposition*, 2003). He is the co-editor (with Mats Berdal) of *Strategic Thinking: An Introduction and Farewell. Essays by Philip Windsor* (Lynne Rienner, 2002) and the co-editor (with M. Berdal) of the *UN Interventionism 1991-2004* (Cambridge University Press, 2007). Spyros Economides holds a B.Soc.Sc. from the University of Birmingham as well as an M.Sc. and Ph.D. in International Relations from the London School of Economics and Political Science.

Stefan Halper is a Senior Fellow at the Centre of International Studies, University of Cambridge and a Senior Research Fellow at Magdalene College, Cambridge. He directs the Atlantic Studies Programme at the Centre of International Studies and lectures on Anglo-American relations, US national security policy and contemporary international security issues. His most recent books are *America Alone: The Neo-Conservatives and the Global Order* (with Jonathan Clarke, Cambridge University Press, 2004) and *The Silence of the Rational Center: Why American Foreign Policy is Failing* (with Jonathan Clarke, Basic Books, 2007). Stefan Halper holds doctorates from both Oxford and Cambridge. He has served four American presidents in the White House and Department of State and is an expert on U.S. foreign policy, national security policy, the United Nations, and Anglo-American relations.

Christopher Hill M.A. DPhil (Oxon) is Director of the Centre of International Studies and Sir Patrick Sheehy Professor of International Relations. He joined the Centre in October 2004 from the LSE, where he was the Montague Burton Professor of International Relations from 1991 to 2004. During his career he has held visiting positions at the Royal Institute of International Affairs, the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington DC, the Department of Government at Dartmouth College, New Hampshire, the European University Institute, Florence, the Università di Catania, the Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, the University of California at San Diego and the Università di Siena. He has written many scholarly articles and book chapters, as well as being author, joint author or editor of nine books including *Cabinet Decisions on Foreign Policy*, *Two Worlds of International Relations: Academics, Practitioners and the Trade in Ideas*, and *The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy*. His most recent book is *International Relations and the European Union* (co-edited with Michael Smith, 2005). At the LSE, Professor Hill was successively Chair of the Department of International Relations and Vice Chairman of the Academic Board 1999-2002; He was also Vice-Chair and then Chair of the British International Studies Association, 1996- 2000. He is coordinator of FORNET, a foreign policy research network involving 25 European partners, under the auspices of the European Commission's Framework Program V.

Julian Junk is a PhD candidate and a research assistant at the University of Konstanz within the Department of Politics and Management and the Collaborative Research Centre (SFB) 'Norm and Symbol'. His research interests include planning of international peace operations, international organizations, public administration, and

issues of international intervention. He holds an M.A. in Politics and Management from the University of Konstanz and also studied at the University of Lund (Sweden) and IEP Aix-en-Provence (France).

David Keen is Reader in Complex Emergencies at the Development Studies Institute of the London School of Economics and Political Science. He got his doctorate from Oxford University. His study of the political economy of famine was published by Princeton University Press as *The Benefits of Famine* (1994). He is also the author of *The Economic Functions of Violence in Civil Wars* (Oxford University Press, 1998) and *The Best of Enemies: Conflict and Collusion in Sierra Leone* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2005). He formerly worked as a researcher, consultant and journalist.

Daniel Large studied Mandarin at Qingdao Ocean University (1998-1999) before obtaining his MSc in International Politics in 2000 from the School of Oriental and African Studies, where he is completing his doctorate. With Ricardo Soares de Oliveira and Christopher Alden, he co-convened a conference on China-Africa relations at Sidney Sussex College, Cambridge in July 2006, and is editing the resulting book (Hurst, forthcoming). He has undertaken consultancy work for a number of organizations including UNDP, UNICEF, Transparency International, the ODI, Christian Aid and DFID. He directs the Rift Valley Institute's Sudan Archive (www.sudanarchive.net). His recent research has focused on China's relations with Sudan, where he has conducted extensive fieldwork.

James Mayall is Former Director of the Centre of International Studies at the University of Cambridge and fellow of Sidney Sussex College, Cambridge. In 1997, he was the first Sir Patrick Sheehy Professor of International Relations in the University of Cambridge, a position he held until 2004. He was elected a Fellow of the British Academy in 2001. After a period as a National Service Officer in West Africa and six years in the British Civil Service, including a period in the British High Commission in New Delhi, James Mayall taught International Relations at the London School of Economics and Political Science between 1966 and 1998. From 1991-94 he was Convenor of the Department of International Relations. Over the past decade his research and writing has concentrated on the resurgence of ethnic, national, and religious conflicts since the end of the Cold War and the international reaction to them. His recent publications include *World Politics: Progress and its Limits* (Polity Press, 2000), *The New Interventionism 1991-1994: United Nations Experience in Cambodia, former Yugoslavia and Somalia* (Cambridge University Press, 1996) and *Nationalism and International Society* (Cambridge University Press, 1990).

Stephan Mergenthaler is a Research Associate with the Global Public Policy Institute, Berlin where he focuses on UN peace operations as well as the EU-China relationship. He is also a PhD Candidate in International Politics at the Berlin Graduate School of Social Sciences, Humboldt University Berlin. Stephan holds an M.Sc. (Practice of International Affairs) from the London School of Economics and a Master in International Affairs from the Institut d'Etudes Politiques de Paris (Sciences Po). In 2003-2004 he spent a year at the Elliot School of International Affairs at George Washington University in Washington D. C., and he is a graduate of Sciences Po's

Franco-German undergraduate program. His experience includes work with the International Institute for Strategies Studies in London, the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research in Washington D. C., the South Asia Human Rights Documentation Center in New Delhi, the German and French Ministries for Foreign Affairs in Berlin and Paris, and the German Mission to the UN in New York.

Mitja Müller is a summer intern with the Global Public Policy Institute, Berlin. He is an undergraduate student at the University of St Andrews, Scotland, pursuing a Joint Honors degree in International Relations and Modern History. He will spend the academic year 2007/2008 at the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA), focusing on US and South Asian politics, foreign policy, and history. Mitja holds a scholarship from the German National Academic Foundation. His previous work experience includes an internship at the Foreign Affairs Committee of the German Parliament.

Aswini Kanta Ray is currently a Visiting Professor at Burdwan University, West Bengal. He was Professor of International Relations and Comparative Politics at Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, a post from which he retired in 2003. Previously, he taught at the universities of Calcutta and Delhi. He has also been associated with the universities of Tokyo, Mexico, Colima, Southampton, the London School of Economics, the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign and the Sorbonne. His books include *Domestic Compulsions and Foreign Policy* (New Delhi, 1975), *The Global System: A Historical View from the Periphery* (Tokyo, 1996), *Democratic Rights in a Post-Colonial Democracy* (CNRS, Paris, 1997) and *Western Realism and International Relations: A Non Western-View* (New Delhi, 2004). He holds an MA from Calcutta University and a PhD from the University of Heidelberg.

Philipp Rotmann is a Research Associate with the Global Public Policy Institute, Berlin as well as a student in the two-year graduate program in international relations offered jointly by Humboldt University Berlin, the Free University Berlin and the University of Potsdam (M.A. expected August 2007). He holds a B.A. from the University of Erfurt (Germany), where he studied economics, political science and law. In 2004/05, he spent an academic year at the University of Essex (UK). His work experience includes an internship with the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in Bosnia-Herzegovina. He co-authored, with Thorsten Benner and Andrea Binder, *Learning to Build Peace? United Nations Peacebuilding and Organizational Learning: Developing a Research Framework* (2007) and with Thorsten Benner, *Learning to Learn? UN Peacebuilding and the Challenges of Building a Learning Organization* (forthcoming 2008, Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding).

Wolfgang Seibel is Professor of Political and Administrative Science at the Department for Politics and Management, University of Konstanz, Germany, and board member of the Center of Excellence 'Cultural Foundations of Integration'. Since 2005, he is also an Adjunct Professor of Administrative Science at the Hertie School of Governance, Berlin. He has been a fellow at the Institute for Advanced Studies (Wissenschaftskolleg) in Berlin, a guest scholar at the Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton University, and a visiting professor at the University of California at Berkeley. Publications include *Networks of Nazi Persecution. Business, Bureaucracy and the Organisation of the Holocaust*

(2005, editor together with G.D. Feldman), *Verwaltete Illusionen. Die Privatisierung der DDR-Wirtschaft durch die Treuhandanstalt und ihre Nachfolger 1990-2000* (2005) and *Successful Failure. An Alternative View on Organizational Coping* (1996). He currently directs the research projects on *Administrative Science Meets Peacekeeping* (supported by the German Foundation for Peace Research) and on 'Casualties of the New World Order?': *The Political Construction of Success and Failure of International Interim Administrations* (supported by the DFG).

Brendan Simms is an historian, writer and Newton-Sheehy teaching fellow at the University of Cambridge in the Centre of International Studies. He is also a fellow of Peterhouse, Cambridge. He currently lectures and leads seminars on international history since 1945. Dr. Simms' main research projects deal with the history of foreign policy in countries such as Britain and Germany. A contributor to the *London Review of Books*, he is the author of *Unfinest Hour: Britain and the Destruction of Bosnia* (Penguin, 2001) and *The Impact of Napoleon: Prussian High Politics, Foreign Policy and the Crisis of the Executive, 1797-1806* (Cambridge University Press, 2002). He is co-president of the Henry Jackson Society, which advocates the view that supporting and promoting liberal democracy should be an integral part of Western foreign policy.

Ricardo Soares de Oliveira is the Austin Robinson Research Fellow at Sidney Sussex College, Cambridge, an Associate of the Centre of International Studies, University of Cambridge, and a Fellow with the Global Public Policy Institute, Berlin. He will be University Lecturer in Comparative Politics (African Politics) at the Department of Politics and International Relations, Oxford University, and Fellow of St Peter's College, Oxford, from September 2007. During the academic year 2006-07 he is a visiting scholar at the Centre d'études et recherches internationales (Sciences-Po) in Paris. Earlier, he was a Joseph C. Fox Fellow at the Centre of International and Area Studies at Yale University. He has worked in the field of governance and the energy sector for the World Bank, the European Commission, Catholic Relief Services, the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI) and the French Ministry of Defense, among others. His research interests include African politics (particularly West and Central Africa), comparative politics and international political economy, especially in the fields of natural resource extraction, organized crime, state decay and post-conflict reconstruction. Most recently, Soares de Oliveira has focused on the issue of oil and governance in the Gulf of Guinea, where he has conducted extensive fieldwork. He is the author of *Oil and Politics in the Gulf of Guinea* (Hurst Publishers and Columbia University Press, 2007), a co-editor of the forthcoming *China Returns to Africa: A Superpower and a Continent Embrace* (with Daniel Large and Christopher Alden, Hurst Publishers) and a contributing author to *Bottom of the Barrel: Africa's Oil Boom and the Poor* (Catholic Relief Services, 2003). He holds a BA in politics from the University of York, an MPhil in International Relations and a PhD, both from the University of Cambridge.

Krishnan Srinivasan is a former Indian Foreign Secretary and Deputy Secretary-General of the Commonwealth. Before these appointments he had served as India's Ambassador/High Commissioner to six countries, including Bangladesh. He has been a visiting fellow of the Centre of International Studies, Cambridge, and the Institute of

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