

Doctrine Development in the UN Peacebuilding Apparatus: The Case of UN Constabulary Police, 1999-2006

*Thorsten Benner, Stephan Mergenthaler, Philipp Rotmann**

Paper prepared for the 49th Annual International Studies Association Convention

San Francisco 29 March 2008

Panel on “Multidimensional Peace-Keeping and -Building and the United Nations”

Abstract:

This paper presents a framework for the analysis of doctrine development in the UN peacebuilding apparatus and applies it to the case of constabulary police (“formed police units”) in UN peace operations. After initial resistance from the UN Secretariat and years after their first deployment under the UN flag to Kosovo and East Timor, constabulary police have become a standard tool for missions tasked with interim public security provision. Even this breakthrough, however, did not secure the smooth development and adoption of more detailed conceptual guidance on their functions and operation alongside military contingents. This paper traces the process of developing such doctrine and presents preliminary hypotheses on the key factors that enabled and hindered this process of doctrine development.

Introduction

In the wake of the enormous expansion of UN peacebuilding operations since the late 1990s, the role of police has shifted from being an afterthought to assuming the position of a “missing link” between military stabilization and civilian statebuilding. The figures alone are striking. In 1960, the first peacekeeping operation with a civilian police component only included a few officers. In 1998, there were still only 35 unarmed UN’s “blue berets” deployed in only a single mission (Cyprus). By 2008, the picture had changed dramatically. Today there are nearly 10,000 police officers from more than 100 countries deployed in UN peace operations, from forensics or management specialists to constabulary police units (“formed police units” or FPU in UN terminology). They are a critical part of the

* Global Public Policy Institute (GPPi), Reinhardtstr. 15, 10117 Berlin, Germany (corresponding author: Philipp Rotmann, protmann@gppi.net). We gratefully acknowledge the financial support provided by the German Foundation for Peace Research (DSF). We also thank Till Blume and Wade Hoxtell for valuable comments on an earlier draft, as well as Ben Parry for editing assistance.

quantitative and qualitative expansion of peacebuilding “from border monitoring to political engineering” (Durch 2006: 597). Nearly 99% of UN police officers are concentrated in eight large multidimensional peace operations, all but three of which are in Africa (the three exceptions being the missions to Kosovo, Haiti and Timor-Leste).

It is particularly in these large and complex operations that the “‘quantum leap’ in the role and responsibilities given to UN policing” (Bellamy and Williams 2007: 20) has presented the UN peacebuilding apparatus with enormous challenges both operational and doctrinal. In the realm of doctrine, the emergence of transitional administration and the subsequent proliferation of tasks given to UN police made the need for a common set of guidelines more pressing than ever before. At the same time, the few existing guidance publications from the 1990s were based on the traditional Cold War paradigm of UN civilian policing. As they featured long treatises on the basic principles of neutrality and impartiality but devoted hardly a couple of paragraphs to the new core tasks of interim law enforcement and police reform in post-conflict countries, these manuals became obsolete in the new era.

Further underscoring the need for doctrine development is the increasing heterogeneity of UN police. Up to the late 1990s, less than two dozen countries contributed police officers to peace operations and between a third and half of these contributors were from Europe. This number is getting lower both in relative and absolute terms as total deployments soar and the European Union increasingly mounts its own police operations. The huge growth in demand for UN police is instead met by a growing number of African and South-East Asian states in addition to long-time contributors such as Bangladesh and Jordan. While the bulk of these countries’ contributions come in the form of formed police units (FPUs) the supply of individual officers remains dominated by the Western world. Nonetheless, DPKO has been increasingly forced to rely on personnel from countries with poor human rights records or dysfunctional police services. Structural factors further reduce the effectiveness even of well-meaning, well-trained and well-equipped officers: Capped at six to twelve months by most governments, tours of duty are short and the same individuals seldom deploy again. Very few countries provide mission specific pre-deployment training to their officers, let alone joint training for international teams scheduled to deploy to the same mission (Smith, Holt and Durch 2006: 21-23, UN DPKO 2007).

The need for developing, applying and revising doctrine for police in UN peace operations is therefore obvious. It is equally important to better understand the promise and pitfalls of the very process of developing and applying doctrine in the UN peacebuilding bureaucracy, so far an under-researched topic. This paper aims to make small contribution to closing this gap by zooming in on the case example of doctrine development for a particular feature of UN police in peace operations, the use of constabulary police (“formed police units”). Our empirical research is based on a wealth of official and non-official documents provided by the UN

Secretariat as well as a series of interviews with present and past UN officials and outside experts.¹

Our paper proceeds in four steps. First, we develop a framework for analyzing doctrine development in the UN peacebuilding apparatus. Second, we present a brief overview of the evolution of the organizational infrastructure for doctrine development within the Secretariat's Department for Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). Third, we apply the framework to doctrine development on the use of constabulary police forces covering the period from the late 1990s to the present. Fourth, we develop a number of hypotheses on the factors supporting and hindering doctrine development and suggest avenues for further research and comparison with other cases.

Analyzing doctrine development in the UN bureaucracy

Outside military circles, doctrine is often considered a “notoriously elusive” concept (Rid 2007: 16), largely because the term is often not consistently defined and employed. Within the military realm, however, the concept has a clear meaning that is remarkably consistent across cultures and international military bureaucracies. Following consultations with military representatives from across the world, including Egypt and China, the Military Advisor at DPKO issued in 2001 an official definition of military doctrine for UN peacekeeping as the “fundamental principles, practices and procedures that guide the military component of UN peacekeeping missions in support of mandated UN objectives” (UN DPKO 2001). Doctrine in this sense as a set of principles and standard operating procedures is no stranger to civilian bureaucracies. In fact, despite the often imprecise use of the term, it is at the core of any bureaucracy, including national police services. The central doctrine development agency of the British police, for example, uses the term “doctrine” to describe “regulations or codes of practice [...], or guidance on operations as manuals or practice advice” (UK NPIA 2007).

While doctrine is by definition official, i.e. endorsed by the leadership of the organization concerned, it is not necessarily formalized. The British Army, for example, started to codify doctrine only after World War II (Nagl 2005: 7). As for the United Nations, “there is still no single document entitled ‘doctrine for UN peace operations’” (Ahmed, Keating and Solinas 2007: 13), nor is there an equivalent document for the police component in peace operations. As far as doctrine exists in UN peace operations, most of it remains at an informal or overly specific level. Since late 2005, however, this is beginning to change. When Under-Secretary-General Jean-Marie Guéhenno devised his *Peace Operations 2010* reform agenda, he placed doctrine development at its core. The aim, as set out by Guéhenno himself in a letter to DPKO

¹ Our research is part of an ongoing two-year research project on organizational learning in the UN peace operations bureaucracy entitled “Learning to Build Peace? The United Nations, Peace Operations, and Organizational Learning” that is funded by the German Foundation for Peace Research (DSF).

staff in November 2005, was “to define and clearly articulate ... what it is that UN peacekeeping can do and how, ... followed by the development of effective guidance on how to achieve these standards. ... We need uniform practices and procedures that ... will be the basis for guiding you in carrying out your job. It will be a living doctrine that adapts to ongoing experiences and conditions” (Guéhenno 2005: para. 11).

As a result of Guéhenno’s push for reform, a peace operations doctrine for the UN is now slowly emerging. It is organized in a variety of guidance publications such as policy directives, standard operating procedures (SOPs), manuals and guidelines for the various functional areas of peace operations. At the top of this hierarchy, a so-called Capstone Doctrine seeks to define the fundamental principles of UN peace operations as a whole (UN DPKO/DFS 2008, Nitzschke and Wittig 2007: 92). All the progressively more fine-grained and technical elements of doctrine in each of the functional areas of peace operations link these abstract principles to the mission-specific planning and implementation on the field.

While the formal development of doctrine beyond the Secretariat’s internal bureaucratic procedures is a novelty for the United Nations, it has been a core practice of military organizations for decades. It is therefore not surprising that the most refined and insightful studies on the matter are found in the field of military studies where researchers are dealing with complex national bureaucracies that are heavily based on formal and informal doctrine and not considered particularly open to change. Nonetheless, a number of recent studies found crucial cases of doctrinal evolution and development. This line of research has been rediscovered lately in relation of the contemporary British and American experiences with low intensity conflict (Downie 1998), counterinsurgency (Nagl 2005) and strategic communications (Rid 2007).

Our basic analytical framework builds on these studies. For this first cut at the specific domain of doctrine development in UN police, such a model can only remain at a very abstract level, organizing empirical observations without prejudice to potential causal hypotheses which can only be generated at a later stage. A basic heuristic framework for doctrine evolution follows the following stages:

1. *Initiation*: “the recognition of shortcomings in organizational knowledge or performance” (Nagl 2005: 6) by some authorized part of the organization which initiates a process of doctrine development or adaptation.
2. *Formulation*: a group within the organization is tasked with searching for alternatives and drafting a proposal for a new doctrine. The drafting process might include consultations and negotiations with different departments within the organization, external stakeholders such as representatives of UN member states and sources of expertise such as academic researchers.

3. *Promulgation*: the relevant authority within the organization takes a decision to make the new doctrine official and binding to the extent that its general nature allows.

In line with our focus on formal as well as informal doctrine, this three-stage model is compatible with DPKO's new policy and SOP on doctrine development (UN DPKO 2005b; 2005c) as well as with general bureaucratic decision-making procedures such as those applied by DPKO to draft mission-specific strategies and plans. By their striking similarities in content despite often huge contextual differences on the ground, many of these documents reveal informal doctrine the same way that the evolution of peacekeeping as a whole is being "inferred from ... the evolutions in the Security Council mandates assigned to [specific operations]" (Ahmed, Keating and Solinas 2007: 13).

Our model stages are depicted as consecutive in the sense that each stage follows the previous one. At the same time, the process can be interrupted at any stage and the proposed doctrine abandoned (or stalled until it is revived later). For this limited analytical model of doctrine development, it is irrelevant what happens after the promulgation stage, i.e. whether or not the new doctrine is applied in practice. Of course, the practitioners' normative ideal closes the loop by disseminating and mainstreaming the new doctrine into training and organizational practice, from which new performance gaps can be identified and the whole process would continue indefinitely. Analyzing the full cycle is beyond the purview of this paper. However, further research needs to include the crucial question to what extent doctrine is actually followed in practice and if and how it is revised based on experience on the ground. .

The literature suggests a range of influences on this process of doctrine development. In his comparative study on doctrinal innovation in the British and American armies, John Nagl argues that organizational culture plays a "critical role in the organization's abilities to adapt" (Nagl 2005: 6) through five distinct mechanisms: promoting suggestions from the field, encouraging subordinates to question superiors and policies, regular questioning of the organization's basic assumptions, routine contact between high-ranking officers and people in the field, and local and informal creation of standard operating procedures that are fed to the center and mainstreamed instead of a purely centralized process (Nagl 2005: 10). Some of these facets of organizational culture manifest themselves in the organizational structure, formal processes and resource base ("organizational infrastructure") dedicated to doctrine development, how bureaucratic competition impacts the decision-making process and what incentives are in place for individuals to support or hinder doctrinal innovation. Other authors, however, point to a wider range of factors in play. In his recent study on the U.S. military's efforts to improve its strategic communications doctrine, Thomas Rid adds factors such as technology and three distinct levels of leadership whose influence varies in terms of their formal powers and legitimacy within the organization: external leaders (civilian bureaucrats and politicians or, in the case of the UN, member state officials), internal senior leaders and

mid-level officers. Each of these groups, according to Rid (2007: 19-21) has a particular role to play if doctrinal innovation is to succeed.

In adapting these insights from the national military context of modern industrialized states such as the U.S. and Britain to the peace operations bureaucracy of the United Nations, we find that the most basic enabling factors such as resources, organizational structure and personal (career) incentives for individual officials at various levels increase in importance. This is not only due to the much tighter financial constraints of the UN but also because the very idea of becoming a learning organization through doctrine development and doctrinal innovation is a very recent venture for the UN peace operations bureaucracy.

Scholars of military learning sometimes erroneously equate doctrinal change and organizational learning. Nagl, echoing the mainstream of this literature, considers the observation of doctrinal change “an efficient way to track the development of learning” (Nagl 2005: 8). This inference is based on two assumptions that are highly problematic even in the context of the U.S. military with its huge investment in training and performance evaluation, as Rid argues: first, that “change in doctrine ... automatically [translates] into a change of organizational action and behavior”; and second, that “doctrine ... is a sufficient representation of an army’s organizational memory” (Rid 2007: 22). In the context of UN peace operations with their myriad deficits in training and institutional coherence, they are even less convincing. For our present purpose, we therefore analyze the development of formal and informal doctrine as an important process in its own right, a necessary but not sufficient component of organizational learning.

The organizational infrastructure for police doctrine development

This section analyses the evolution of the infrastructure for doctrine development on UN police as the interplay between two components: the sluggish building of institutional capacity within DPKO and its Police Division in particular, and a series of outside contributions made by other UN agencies, think tanks and member state governments designed to substitute for the lack of in-house capacity. Such outside contributions range from logistical and financial support for conferences and workshops to the provision of funds for research projects and consulting assignments to produce entire draft doctrines (Broer and Emery 1998: 389, Serafino 2004: 11). Over the years, the bulk of support in the UN police sector has been provided by the U.S. and Canadian governments and think tanks based in the English-speaking world, primarily the U.S. Institute for Peace and more recently the Henry L. Stimson Center, in addition to numerous smaller institutions and other governments that were mostly involved in only one or two projects (Malone and Nitzschke 2004).

The Civilian Police Unit and doctrine development in the 1990s

In 1993, DPKO established a Civilian Police Unit at DPKO with the task “to support all aspects of United Nations international police operations, from doctrinal development through selection and deployment of officers into field operations.” However, for a long time the unit was unable to live up to its ambitious brief. Short on staff, resources and bureaucratic standing, in the words of the 2000 Brahimi Report, it could “do little more than identify personnel, attempt to pre-screen them ... and then see that they get to the field” (United Nations 2000: para. 179).

Initially, the unit consisted of a Police Adviser, Musa Abdulkadir of Nigeria, and his secretary. The two of them were supposed to manage relations with member states regarding the recruitment of suitable candidates for civilian police operations, advise DPKO and field operations leadership on police matters, plan civilian police involvement in future missions, support the development of training materials and, finally, to develop “standard operating procedures (SOPs) and other guidelines for CIVPOL on UN missions” (Chappell and Evans 1999: 202-203). In a joint venture with DPKO’s Training Section, the unit produced in October 1995 a first *Civilian Police Handbook* which set out the general rationale and procedures for traditional civilian police operations, i.e. “to monitor the local police [as] decided by the Security Council” (UN DPKO 1995: 31). The handbook also reprinted the *UN Criminal Justice Standards for Peacekeeping Police* that the Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Branch at the UN’s Vienna Office had developed a year earlier.

On November 27, 1995, the first Police Adviser was succeeded by Om Prakash Rathor of India. Under his leadership, the Civilian Police Unit and DPKO’s Training Unit produced a few additional documents such as draft selection and training standards that were still based on the Cold War civilian police paradigm limited to observing and reporting (UN DPKO 1997). By 1999, the unit had grown by five “gratis” police experts who were seconded by their governments free of charge to the United Nations (Oakley and Dziedzic 1998, Durch et al. 2003: 53). Up to 100 of these loaned officers literally kept DPKO running through the rapid expansion of peacekeeping demand in the mid-1990s. Because they were overwhelmingly from Western countries, the Non-Aligned Movement became concerned about its representation in and influence on the bureaucracy and, as peacekeeping became unpopular with the Security Council, pressed the Secretary-General to phase out their use by 1999. Some of these posts were replaced with regular positions from the peacekeeping budget (UN Secretary-General 1998a: para. 13, 83, UN ACABQ 1998: para. 14, UN Secretary-General 1998b: para. 72-74).

Preoccupied with operational, administrative and budgetary matters, the bare-bones Civilian Police Unit hardly made any progress on doctrine development between 1997 and 2000. As the role of police in post-conflict situations was increasingly recognized by academic

researchers and policy think-tanks, however, others stepped into the void. The *International Centre for Criminal Law Reform and Criminal Justice Policy* at the University of British Columbia spearheaded a report which synthesized many of the existing reviews and analyses of UN civilian police activities, including an extensive oral history of the Balkans operations up to 1996. Financed by the Canadian Foreign Ministry and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, the study was released internally to the UN in January 1997 and published in 1999 (Chappell and Evans 1999, here: 177).

A much more analytical and prescriptive treatment of the key challenges faced by post-conflict policing has resulted from a series of conferences and author workshops that brought together mostly practitioners and a few academics to produce a seminal volume on UN police operations. Published in 1998, the book is considered a “roadmap” for the work of senior international police professionals to the present day (Oakley, Dziedzic and Goldberg 1998). The project was led by the *Institute for National Strategic Studies*, part of the U.S. National Defense University, with support from the U.S. Institute for Peace, philanthropic foundations and the Canadian government. Among other influential contributions, the book coined the memorable and much-repeated labels of deployment, enforcement and institutional “gaps” as the key challenges for international post-conflict policing (Dziedzic 1998: 8-15).

In the follow-up process, DPKO convened a series of three seminars on improving UN civilian police operations between March 1998 and August 2000. The conferences produced a series of recommendations which were quite similar to those made by the Brahimi report (see below; Serafino 2004: 11). However, with the Security Council’s reengagement with UN peacebuilding since mid-1999, conceptual progress came again to a halt as UN police staff were preoccupied with present operational demands. The number of police personnel deployed grew from a modest 2,411 in July 1999 to 4,613 after six months and eventually to nearly 8,000 a year later (January 2001), mostly because of the two massive transitional administration missions in Kosovo (authorized on June 10, 1999) and East Timor (authorized on October 25, 1999). Following an emergency appropriation of funds in October 1999, the Civilian Police Unit was allocated a few additional posts, bringing its total number of budgetary positions to eleven (UN Secretary-General 1999b: para. 50-51; 2000b: 40, UN ACABQ 1999: para. 10). Even so, at that time it took DPKO 362 days on average to fill a new post (Durch et al. 2003: 83). In addition, when they actually arrived, most of the new incumbents were fully occupied supporting ongoing peace operations or recruiting additional field personnel (United Nations 2000: 31-32).

The changing of the guard and the Brahimi report

In 2000, DPKO saw a number of important changes which had implications for its capacity for doctrine development. With Halvor Hartz of Norway, a new Police Adviser came on board. On 21 August, the Secretary-General issued the report of the Brahimi panel to the

General Assembly and the Security Council. On 1 October, Jean-Marie Guéhenno of France became the new Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations.

The Brahimi panel was an ad-hoc response by the UN Secretariat to the danger that the recent and unforeseen increase in the demand for peace operations since mid-1999 might lead to similar disasters as the last one. Half a decade earlier, the hasty deployment of peacekeepers into war zones with no peace to keep combined with managerial overstretch at headquarters had, in the view of UN senior management, played a role in leading to the crises of Rwanda and Srebrenica. The report was hastily drafted within less than six months and was discussed with various stakeholders by a small group of four officials under the leadership of Brahimi himself (Durch 2004). Doctrinally, the panel's final report strengthened political support for "robust mandates" and advocated a broad range of peacebuilding tasks. At the same time, it rallied the UN membership behind a substantial increase in resources for the secretariat and DPKO in particular (Ahmed, Keating and Solinas 2007: 17-18, Durch et al. 2003: 3-5).

For the first time in the succession of high-level white papers on UN peace and security policy since the end of the Cold War, the Brahimi panel devoted substantial attention to the rule of law in post-conflict situations. As part of a "team approach to upholding the rule of law and respect for human rights" it called for a "doctrinal shift in how the Organization conceives of and utilizes civilian police in peace operations" (United Nations 2000: para. 40). This doctrinal shift recognized not only what had in effect been practiced in Bosnia since 1997 but went even further: "Today, missions may require civilian police to be tasked to reform, train and restructure local police forces according to international standards for democratic policing and human rights, as well as having the capacity to respond effectively to civil disorder and for self-defence" (United Nations 2000: para. 39).

In the following paragraph, the report called for the role of UN police to be "better understood and developed" (United Nations 2000: para. 40). This formulation was the closest the drafting team came to calling for better operational doctrine in the face of clear warnings from member states that it had already been "pushing the edge of the envelope with the few doctrinal points it had made" (Ahmed, Keating and Solinas 2007: 18). However, as member states had just tasked the organization with setting up large-scale transitional administrations in Kosovo and East Timor, they were more willing to make additional resources available.

In a series of supplementary appropriations between 2000 and 2002, Secretary-General Kofi Annan was able to secure some of those resources to establish a police planning and policy development capacity. As part of an enlarged Civilian Police Division within the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), the new Policy and Planning Unit was assigned ten posts and tasked with the "development of policy guidelines for the Division and ... field missions" (UN Secretary-General 2000a: 38-41; 2001: para. 40, UN ACABQ 2001: para. 73, Durch et al. 2003: 52ff.). However, the reality hardly matched the formal situation as

presented on paper. The Policy and Planning Unit was left without a dedicated manager, with each person reporting directly to the Police Adviser – a post that was vacant since mid-2001 because the UN had problems finding qualified and politically acceptable applicants. This lack of leadership, in turn, held up the hiring of staff for newly funded positions (Durch et al. 2003: 82). When a post was indeed filled, the candidate was required to go through the cumbersome personnel processing system of the UN secretariat, which in most cases took between 264 days and more than a year (Durch et al. 2003: 83).

In addition, since a huge backlog of mission support and field recruitment tasks awaited new arrivals regardless of their formal job descriptions, the increase of resources did not effectively translate into greater capacity for conceptual tasks until several years after the fact. Therefore, despite being explicitly responsible for the “development of policy guidelines”, the Policy and Planning Unit turned out to be far more preoccupied with planning than with formulating policy even as it became the focal point for police mission planning as a whole. Under these circumstances, hardly any time and resources were left for doctrinal development (Durch et al. 2003: 52, Ahmed, Keating and Solinas 2007: 20, UN Secretary-General 2004b: para. 26).²

Institutionalization of doctrine development

With as few as 4,435 officers deployed in September, the year 2003 marked the quantitative low point for UN police operations since the turn of the millennium. At the same time, a new Police Adviser was appointed: India’s first female Police Commissioner, Kiran Bedi. As a result, the division now had some institutional capacity to consolidate the recent changes and to catch up with tasks that were neglected during the hectic preceding years, including the adaptation and development of police doctrine (UN Secretary-General 2004a: para. 72).³ With only a single new peace operation to be planned and recruited for between mid-2002 and early 2004 (the UN Mission in Liberia), the Division was able to update planning documents and directives for nearly all existing missions without an increase in personnel.⁴

This comparatively tranquil situation changed rapidly in early 2004 when the Security Council requested three new large and multidimensional peace operations for Côte d’Ivoire, Haiti and Burundi within less than three months, all of which included sizable police components and were assigned sweeping mandates. Despite severe recruiting difficulties and high vacancy rates as well as the simultaneous drawdown of UNMISSET in Timor-Leste, the number of police deployed rose by almost 2,000 throughout the year.

² This point consistently came up in interviews with senior DPKO staff within and outside the Police Division.

³ As evidenced, for example, by the objectives proposed for the Civilian Police Division in DPKO’s results-based budgeting documents for 2003/04 (UN Secretary-General 2003a: 23).

⁴ DPKO budgets for 2003/04 and 2004/05 showed no change in the composition of the Division (UN Secretary-General 2003a: 66; 2004a: 36, 97; documents on file with the authors). Some of these missions had been deployed for several years when formal planning documents were finalized in 2003/04.

In February 2005, Kiran Bedi turned the Division over to Mark Kroeker, a U.S. veteran of many UN police deployments and the 1992 Rodney King riots in Los Angeles. In the 2005/06 budget process, the new Police Adviser clarified the respective roles of the Mission Management Support Section and the renamed Strategic Policy and Development Section (responding to an internal audit), finally secured leadership posts for the two sections and slightly strengthened the overall Division by adding three posts. The new policy section was tasked with “the essential formulation of strategic policy and integrated concepts of operations, ... [integrating] assessment, research, planning, training, liaison and certification activities, among others” (UN Secretary-General 2005a: paras. 158-165, here 162; 2006: 85). The hiring of the head of section, however, took about 16 months from the time the budgetary post was established in July 2005.

Until 2005, Under-Secretary-General Guéhenno’s (2002) determination to “professionalize” DPKO beyond the “continuous emergency” approach to operations and to make “change management” a priority had hardly produced visible results in terms of doctrine development. That year, however, the Peacekeeping Best Practices Section, DPKO’s internal think tank, finally made plans for the wholesale reform of DPKO. Championed by Guéhenno, the *Peace Operations 2010* reform program was driven by David Harland as the successive head of Best Practices and the larger Change Management division in 2003-2006. At the heart of this *Peace Operations 2010* reform initiative was doctrine development. In particular, Guéhenno and Harland started the *Guidance Project*, a full review and (re-)development of peace operations doctrine that was envisaged to take five years and culminate in the drafting of a so-called “capstone doctrine” which “aims to define the nature and scope of contemporary UN peacekeeping operations, and describe their limitations as an instrument for conflict management” (UN DPKO 2006a: Preface, Benner and Rotmann 2008: 54).

In July 2005, the departmental working group on the reform process specified a doctrine development process that has since been applied to the bulk of more detailed doctrinal publications such as those regarding UN police. It formalized a bureaucratic decision-making process in four stages: *proposal*, *drafting and consultation*, *approval*, and *promulgation and review* (UN DPKO 2005c).

The following case example analyzes how the UN peacebuilding bureaucracy’s infrastructure for doctrine development gradually came to terms with one of the most far-reaching innovations in the use of UN police: UN constabulary police or formed police units (FPUs).

Case example: A Doctrine for UN Constabulary Police

The introduction of constabulary police forces as a new instrument in the UN peace operations toolkit was not a straightforward process. As detailed in the following sections, the

UN resisted its introduction for years until the unprecedented executive mandates for Kosovo and East Timor in 1999 no longer allowed the Secretariat to avoid the force requirements required by the executive law enforcement role. It took until 2003, however, until DPKO gradually began to send constabulary forces to other (non-executive) peace operations as well. It is only at this point that DPKO began to develop relevant doctrine on a department-wide level, despite earlier initiatives from the field, particularly Kosovo. Aside from piecemeal improvements, however, these first steps only began to bear fruit when DPKO had established its formal over-arching doctrine development process in 2005.

The emergence of constabulary police in peace operations: the context

Between August 1996 and September 1997, the Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) at the U.S. National Defense University hosted a broad-based study exercise that assembled an international team of military and civilian peacebuilding specialists, including officials of the UN's Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) to appraise the new challenges for the restoration of public order following internal war instead of inter-state conflict. Their analysis and recommendations, published by Robert Oakley, Michael Dziedzic and Eliot Goldberg (1998) as *Policing the New World Disorder: Peace Operations and Public Security*, emerged as an enduring blueprint for the work of international police experts in peace operations for years to come.⁵

Based on extensive case studies of foreign police involvement in war-torn countries from Panama to Bosnia, one of the conveners' conclusions was that the public security environment after civil war produced a specific set of challenges for which neither military forces nor civilian police officers were adequately trained or equipped: in short, an "enforcement gap" existed between the capabilities of military forces and those of civilian police "when serious lawlessness breaks out or one of the disputants acts to thwart the peace process" by means of orchestrated civil unrest, for example (Dziedzic 1998: 11). Such challenges, according to the study group, required special training in "the measured use of force, control of riots, negotiating techniques, or de-escalation of conflict" which military forces do not have. At the same time, unarmed or very lightly equipped civilian police officers are often not up to the task as well (ibid.: 12).

As a consequence, and also to reduce the usual delay in the deployment of individually recruited civilian police officers, the editors proposed to include constabulary police forces in peace operations (Oakley and Dziedzic 1998: 518-520). Constabulary forces, according to Robert Perito (2004: 46), are "armed forces of the state that have both military capabilities and police powers." Like the military, constabulary police operate jointly as units and use a wider range of weapons than civilian police officers. Like the police, they are trained in non-

⁵ Interview, DPKO official, May 2007.

lethal combat techniques and hold a fundamentally civilian or rule-of-law-based approach to the use of force (Hansen 2002: 70). At the time, however, the prevailing opinion within the UN Secretariat was that the traditional monitoring and advisory role of unarmed “CIVPOL” had proven a success story over many years, including in Bosnia, and that there was little reason to change this practice (Broer and Emery 1998: 380-383).

In parallel, the idea of an international armed constabulary force to support the police in Bosnia gathered increasing support within the U.S. government and NATO headquarters. In early summer 1997, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Robert Gelbard attempted to convince UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali and Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Kofi Annan in a personal meeting to support an expansion of UNMIBH’s mandate to include a constabulary police force tasked with assisting the maintenance of public order. Boutros-Ghali and Annan declined. The U.S. administration continued to pursue the proposal in NATO with considerably more success. Finally, a so-called Multinational Specialized Unit (MSU) under Italian leadership was included in NATO’s IFOR presence (Perito 2004: 128).

For the United Nations, it was only the deployment to Kosovo that sparked the eventual acceptance of constabulary police as a new instrument of peace operations. In 1999, when the Security Council mandated the UN-led transitional administration with executive authority and responsibility for public order and law enforcement for Kosovo, the Secretariat had no other choice than to plan with the use of constabulary police units from the outset. As DPKO had no institutional experience with fielding constabulary forces, the planning task was given to a French gendarme working in the Civilian Police Division who came up with a design that was unsurprisingly reminiscent of the French gendarmerie (Perito 2004: 195). Alongside UNMIK’s special police units (SPU), as they were called by the UN because the individual units were not multinational, the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR) also employed constabulary police within its military chain of command. Later that year, when the UN was asked to deploy to East Timor, it basically replicated the institutional set-up and force structure of its civilian police component from Kosovo (UN Secretary-General 1999a: 11).

Even before attitudes among the wider UN membership retreated from the ambitious agenda of state-building through transitional administrations such as in Kosovo and East Timor, senior UN officials realized how inadequately equipped their organization was to the task. The same level of ambition (and resources) could hardly be replicated across the spectrum of ongoing peace operations, especially those in Africa. Along with many other new tools in the peace operations toolkit, the instrument of constabulary police remained closely linked to the extraordinary context of transitional administration and effectively shelved. There were no plans to include such units in either of the other two new peace operations set up in 1999, an observer mission (later to become a more robust peace operation) to the Democratic Republic of the Congo and a large peacekeeping mission to Sierra Leone. Despite repeated violent

crises and dysfunctional local police services, not even discussions about including formed police units are on the public record from the years before 2004/2005.

When these topics finally came on the agenda, it was as a result of a breakthrough that occurred in 2003. Following a period of relative calm for DPKO, including the downsizing of the mission in East Timor in late 2002, the Security Council requested a new robust peace operation for Liberia, with a comprehensive mandate including law enforcement powers but no sweeping executive authority. Formed police units were part of the force structure from the outset, and in contrast to the cases of Kosovo and East Timor four years earlier, the utility of constabulary police was recognized beyond the immediate case at hand.

The establishment of UNMIL marks the final turning point in DPKO's routine response to a particular kind of public security challenge in peace operations. Subsequently, the deployment of constabulary police alongside military forces and "civilian" (armed or unarmed) police monitors, advisers and trainers became standard practice for large peace operations charged with interim public security provision. The number of FPU's deployed more than doubled, and the number of missions which deployed constabulary police tripled in the 18 months between September 2003 and April 2005.

2000-2002: No doctrine development despite innovation in the field

Back in 2000-2002, DPKO suffered from overstretch and the ripple effects of sudden growth as the budgetary reinforcements sparked by the Brahimi report began to materialize. During this time, the operational management and administration of ongoing operations consumed most of the department's capacity. In practice, the initial experience with constabulary units in Bosnia, Kosovo and East Timor was sobering for both NATO and the UN. It took a long time to obtain the necessary forces as hardly any European country with standing constabulary forces had many of them to spare. The few countries that were ready to provide *gendarmerie* or *carabinieri* preferred to do so under NATO rather than UN command. After the units arrived, their capabilities were often misunderstood and underutilized by both military and civilian police leaders, most of which came from the United States or northern European countries with no conscious constabulary tradition. In effect, MSUs and SPUs were kept in their barracks, often not allowed to go on patrols or gather intelligence and in various cases not even to make their own situation assessments before implementing the missions assigned to them by higher authorities. The lack of clear command and control arrangements for mutual support with the military led to a number of operational failures. Each local mission appears to have learned from these failures, but none of their local innovations spread beyond its point of origin, at least not within the UN (Perito 2004: 326-327, Hansen 2002: 72-73).⁶

⁶ NATO appears to have a better track record of doctrine development in this respect. Its "Blue Box doctrine" was developed in Bosnia in response to local challenges and later taken over not only by KFOR but also (years later) by the

The division of authority between constabulary police and international military forces is a crucial case in point. In response to an incident of civil unrest on 1 October 1998 on a major overland road near Capljina in Bosnia, the senior military officer on site ordered an Italian carabinieri unit against the objections of its commander to forcibly remove a group of protesters. While the military officer acted in accordance with the chain of command, the resulting escalation of violence caused a number of casualties among civilians and police officers alike and damaged both the effectiveness and legitimacy of SFOR (Perito 2004: 162-164). Subsequently, SFOR command developed the so-called *Blue Box doctrine* that specified command and control arrangements in joint military and police operations. In case of civil unrest, an Area of Responsibility (AoR) would be established in a particular area and for a defined period of time. Within the “blue box”, the senior constabulary police officer would have authority not only over his own units but also over all military forces present, allowing the police to employ their non-violent tactics to greater effectiveness. On the outside, the military would retain command and control. For NATO forces in Bosnia, the new doctrine worked well in a series of further incidents.

For the UN in Kosovo, the parallel setup of constabulary units within UNMIK Police and as part of NATO’s KFOR military forces with different and overlapping mandates led to a series of clashes over respective authority and roles (Perito 2004: 187-197). The lack of a doctrine on joint operations was felt at various points, including the mishandling of the 2000 Mitrovica riots by the French-led Multi-National Brigade North (ibid.: 211-213) and the subsequent reluctance of military commanders to use the largely non-Western UN constabulary units for mistrust of their attention to human rights with regard to the use of force against civilians (ibid.: 220). As a reaction particularly to these experiences with civil unrest in 2000, UNMIK and KFOR quickly developed a local command and control doctrine that included setting up a Joint Operations Center and Regional Operations Centers to coordinate the respective day-to-day activities as well as flexible command arrangements based on the level of tension in each area (Blume 2004: 97, Perito 2004: 234).

Despite these examples of local reflection and change within one of the most high-profile operations of the day, DPKO’s newly compiled *Civilian Police Principles and Guidelines*, officially issued in December 2000, reflected only a token acknowledgment of the radical change in the mission profile that the Kosovo and East Timor mandates had brought about. Out of 78 pages of step-by-step guidance on training, reform and monitoring of local police services, it devoted a total of two pages to the headings of “executive power”, “armed civilian police operations” and “formed police units” (UN DPKO 2000: 48-49).

For the following years, despite ample accumulation of knowledge from experience and experimentation in the field, the doctrinal gap of the precise role, requirements, organization

European Union (COESPU 2005).

and tactics of UN constabulary police remained unfilled, even as the lack of guidance in this and other fields of post-conflict policing was repeatedly criticized by outside observers (Hansen 2002: 15, Dahrendorf 2003: 58). As described earlier in this paper, there was hardly an effective policy and planning capacity in the Civilian Police Division at the time. The prevailing organizational culture in DPKO was one of crisis decision-making rather than strategic planning and sustainable problem-solving according to professional standards. Despite Under-Secretary-General Jean-Marie Guéhenno's (2002) ambition to "professionalize" the department, there were no incentives in place to advance this aim. Under these conditions, it is hardly surprising that doctrine development for only two missions that did not represent what DPKO officials saw as their core business was not accorded a high priority, however politically important these missions were for part of their membership.

2003/04: Informal doctrine development begins

The spring of 2003 marked a break for the overstretched police planners at DPKO's Police Division. After more than 18 months without senior leadership at the top, Kiran Bedi of India was finally appointed as the new Police Adviser in February. Subsequently, the division and its Policy and Planning unit were finally able to complete the substantive expansion in staff that had been approved long ago. When the Security Council requested the Secretary-General to begin planning a peace operation for Liberia in June, he managed to quickly recruit Jacques-Paul Klein, the forceful and experienced former Transitional Administrator of Eastern Slavonia and SRSG in Bosnia as his Special Representative. Subsequently, Klein led the political assessment mission to Liberia in August and involved himself closely in the planning process for UNMIL, months before the Police Commissioner was assigned in November (UN DPKO/PBPU 2004: 9).

The resulting Mission Plan for Liberia (UNMIL), dated 11 September 2003, differs markedly from earlier documents of the same kind in that it clearly and concisely lists four tasks for the constabulary police units that are being requested: general "law and order" support to the local, UN-installed interim police force, dealing with civil disturbance in major population centers, capacity building for Liberian constabulary police, and generally supporting the protection of civilians and property (UN Secretary-General 2003b: para. 68). The mission's subsequent concept of operations (CONOPS), dated January 2004, includes a comprehensive plan for the police component. For the first time, this CONOPS devotes several pages to the roles and capabilities of formed police units and their function within the overall strategy of the mission. It was drafted between Kiran Bedi's reinforced Civilian Police Division in New York and the UNMIL police team led by Police Commissioner Mark Kroeker in Monrovia. Only seven months later, an essentially identical section on formed police unit was added to

the concept of operations for the new MINUSTAH operation in Haiti, dated August 2004 (UN Secretary-General 2004c: para. 93).⁷

While these planning documents marked significant conceptual improvements over earlier ones, the substance of guidance for FPU contributors and mission leaders on the ground remained very limited. Beyond the envisaged roles and basic requirements for constabulary police units, almost no details were provided on the internal organization of formed police units, their relationships to UN civilian police and military forces as well as their rules of engagement. Apparently, there have been no attempts to improve or formalize such guidance until early 2005 – with one (incomplete) exception.

Four years after UNMIK and KFOR in Kosovo had established a locally successful solution for the division of authority in joint military/police operations DPKO's Military Planning Service in New York began in December 2004 to draft "Guidelines for Military-Civilian Police Coordination" for the mission in Haiti. At that time, the operation had been deployed for over six months but had yet to reach its full strength. An early draft is dated 29 December,⁸ possibly indicating a link to a first massive deployment of blue helmets to the notorious Cité Soleil slum in Haiti's capital Port-au-Prince just two weeks earlier, on 14 December. Military peacekeepers were not prepared to confront criminal gangs in their strongholds without police assistance, which increased the likelihood of extensive joint operations in the future.

Whether or not the coordination arrangements specified in the draft were actually used on the ground, the next six months saw hardly any progress on finalizing the document. Amid rising levels of violence against UN police, in a number of incidents in March and April 2005 UN military forces failed to support the police, according to senior police officers in Haiti. As a result of a DPKO assessment visit in late April and another assessment trip by the Security Council, according to the Secretary-General's (2005b: para. 45) next report on the Haiti operation, "several practical steps [were] being taken, such as developing a set of standard operating procedures guiding the operational activities of the military component and the police component's formed units." Only weeks later, in May, the mission's police commissioner presented a much more comprehensive draft of "Combined Joint Military-CIVPOL-FPU SOPs" to the force commander. By September, the development of the draft SOP had stagnated and apparently no further changes were made until at least August 2006, despite rotations in the positions of force commander and police commissioner.⁹

Why was at least limited progress made on doctrine development during this period, contrary to the years before, and why was it still so severely constrained and largely limited to informal

⁷ Both Concepts of Operations are on file with authors.

⁸ On file with authors.

⁹ Various MINUSTAH documents on file with authors.

and mission-specific matters? For the first time, the Policy and Planning Unit within the Civilian Police Division had modest staff resources available, which is a likely enabling factor that could be exploited by senior leaders such as SRSG Jacques Paul Klein and DPKO Police Commissioner Kiran Bedi in connection with the political influence of the United States who were specifically interested in one mission (UNMIL) and generally supported formed police units as part of a more robust posture of UN peace operations. While Klein and/or U.S. political pressure likely had a role in adding FPUs to UNMIL, however, their subsequent mainstreaming into further UN missions required support from within the bureaucracy, specifically the strengthened Police Division of DPKO. The precise nature of this support is one of the aspects of this paper that needs further empirical research. This is particularly true because despite these first steps in doctrine development, the position of the Police Division was not strong enough to effectively resolve the conflict about command and control arrangements that erupted in Haiti.

The 2005 Reform Push: Toward formal and comprehensive doctrine

On 7 February 2005, UN Police Adviser Kiran Bedi turned over the Police Division to Mark Kroeker, who had been the first UNMIL Police Commissioner in Liberia and a veteran of the UN's International Police Task Force in Bosnia. Kroeker's tenure left a huge impact within the UN policing community. Some of his short, pointed quotes were still pinned on office walls at the Police Division long after his departure, and he is considered one of the few "wise men" of international police assistance.

Around the time Kroeker took office in New York, the DPKO-wide reform agenda driven by Under-Secretary-General Guéhenno and put together by David Harland as the successive head of the Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit and Director of Change Management began to take shape. As one of the key items on a five-point list of "well-known weaknesses ... that the Secretariat can address with reasonable hope of success" Harland had identified the "lack of clear doctrine and performance standards" (internal document, 2006). Doctrine development became a priority for the department. DPKO's senior management team introduced a formal doctrine development process in May and approved it officially in July (UN DPKO 2005b; 2005c), months before Guéhenno officially presented his full reform plan to the Fourth Committee of the General Assembly in October.

Kroeker's Police Division quickly took up the challenge of developing formal doctrine. In April 2005, as an explicit reaction to the previous years' Kosovo riots, the recently established *Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units* (COESPU) convened a joint UN/NATO/EU conference on constabulary police doctrine in peace operations (COESPU 2005: 3). The center is a joint Italian-US initiative based on the June 2004 G8 action plan to strengthen the capacity for peace operations around the world. The meeting took stock of progress in doctrine development for constabulary police and identified a series of gaping holes that were

essentially the same for each organization. In line with the Center's G8 tasking, COESPU staff were to act as a "focal point for doctrine development" on FPU affairs (COESPU 2005: 17-19).

In the following months, a number of draft doctrines on various aspects of constabulary policing began to surface. Starting already in May 2005, the Police Division developed a first set of administrative and disciplinary *Guidelines for Formed Police Units*. The document was formally approved in November 2005 and revised again in May 2006 (UN DPKO 2005a; 2006c). It makes no reference to substantive policy issues on FPU operations, though. In parallel, the Police Division began to draft a number of substantive policies on the role of constabulary police in UN peace operations, joint command and control arrangements with UN military forces and the use of force. Each of these "tracks" of doctrine development proceeded at a very different speed.

The drafting process for the foundational document on *Functions and Organization of Formed Police Units in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations* was stretched out over nearly two years until it was finally approved in November 2006. Despite this long delay, the substance of the end result is largely identical to the earlier pieces of informal doctrine in the strategy documents for Liberia and Haiti. The doctrine describes a wide-ranging set of preventive and reactive roles of formed police units, from the protection of mission personnel and assets through confidence building by regular joint patrols with local police, support for crowd control, intelligence gathering and situation assessments to training and advisory tasks for the benefit of local constabulary police (UN DPKO 2006b: paras. 4.9-4.11).

It appears likely that the comparatively long time spent formulating and advocating a basic policy document that only formalized existing practice was caused by a succession of delaying factors outside of DPKO's control. At first, COESPU (2005: 19) had assumed a lead role in drafting a common doctrine for UN, NATO and EU police. After some time without progress on the part of COESPU, DPKO restarted its own efforts that had been put on hold before, according to a senior DPKO police official (Interview May 2007). If substantial time was indeed lost waiting for COESPU's input, another increase in operational workload through the start-up of the large mission to Sudan and planning for a potential mission to Darfur would have hit home in the second half of 2005, which might have stalled the Division's own efforts. At the beginning of 2006, the General Assembly's Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (2006: para. 102), having previously not shown any official interest in constabulary police, used its 2005/06 report to stress "the urgent need" for FPU doctrine to be "propose[d] for its consideration". Such a formulation often indicates attempts by at least some member state delegations to influence the drafting process of Secretariat policy. As the policy was eventually approved without significant changes from the Police Division's earlier strategy documents, diplomatic pressure from member states is unlikely to have aimed at limiting the tasks of FPUs. A united front of member states could have easily

achieved this. However, there might have been disagreements among the Committee's membership or delegates might have pressed DPKO not to depart from established practice.

In parallel, DPKO initiated a drafting process for an "operational directive" on "Authority, Command and Control in Peacekeeping Operations", to be led by the Military Division and completed by the end of 2005. Given its timing, the initiative for this doctrine likely resulted either from the Haiti experience, as witnessed by the assessment visitors in April 2005, or from member state pressure through the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (2005: para. 84) that urged DPKO in its session in January/February 2005 "to develop better coordination and cooperation" for joint military and police operations. An early and incomplete version of the directive, dated 1 October 2005, fails to mention anything but the traditional division of operational control between the force commander for the military and the police commissioner for the police. In a slightly later draft, dated 1 November 2005, the key issue of the transfer of authority between military and police chains of command in situations of mutual support is flagged as contentious between different units of DPKO.¹⁰

Since December 2005, this piece of doctrine has made no further progress – despite at least one direct complaint by a senior police officer in charge of UN police in Haiti. According to DPKO's *Policy and Guidance System Gazette*, the directive had not been finalized until mid-2006, and no further documents on the matter were found. Therefore, despite the UN's experience in Kosovo and its exposure to NATO developments through COESPU, it remains accurate to the present day that "a policy delineating what role military forces should play in UN policing operations, and what role paramilitaries and gendarmerie should play, has not been established" (Mobekk 2005: 3). Given the complaints from the field, it is also unlikely that anything has changed in practice.

Meanwhile, 2005 saw a further process of doctrine development that did not take the formal route of the official guidance development process. Rules of engagement for formed police units started to appear only in 2004, and the early directives issued individually by the Police Adviser at DPKO to various field missions simply codified the widest possible latitude for commanders on the ground. These documents seem hardly in line with the standards of deescalating and non-lethal appearance and conduct of constabulary police. The last of these semi-standardized directives, for example, was issued on 4 February 2005 via code cable from DPKO to UNMIL in Liberia, having been drafted by the Civilian Police Division and cleared with the secretariat's Office of Legal Affairs. It provides for a wide-ranging set of powers of arrest and detention for UN FPU. It also sanctions the general bearing and use of weaponry up to and including light vehicle-mounted machine guns.¹¹

¹⁰ Documents on file with authors.

¹¹ Documents on file with authors.

In the months following the change at the helm of the Police Division from Kiran Bedi to Mark Kroeker, the tone and substance of these directives changed visibly towards limiting the use of force by UN police. With no evidence of internal investigations, lessons learned reports, media or diplomatic pressure, it is most likely that the change goes back to Kroeker's initiative. Beginning on 15 July 2005, Under-Secretary-General Guéhenno signed a series of substantively identical "Directives on Detention, Searches and the Use of Force for Members of Formed Police Units" with MONUC (15 July), UNOCI (25 August) and UNMIL (11 November). Within these documents, the prescribed search and detention procedures as well as the lists of authorized weapons for constabulary officers reflect a significantly more restrictive posture. At various points throughout the 14-page document, officers are urged to avoid any embarrassment or threatening appearance toward civilians who do not pose a direct threat. Automatic weapons such as machine guns were not listed as authorized any longer. Similar if not identical directives were probably issued to all UN peace operations with FPU as there is no apparent reason for DPKO to put constraints on the use of force in these three missions alone.

The period since 2005 shows the enabling effect of a much stronger infrastructure for doctrine development that for the first time not only comprised a modest policy and planning staff but also a set of department-wide processes for the formulation and approval of doctrine as well as a changing organizational culture as a result of a constant and forceful emphasis on professionalism and standardization of procedures on the part of senior leadership. At the same time, the excessive time lags between the first drafts and the eventual approval of most documents illustrate that the new doctrine development infrastructure remains extremely vulnerable to intra-departmental disagreements (a likely roadblock for the passage of the command and control doctrine), political feuds among the membership, or to a sudden increase in the operational workload (as planning for a few large missions such as the one in Darfur could easily overwhelm the capacity of the Police Division's Strategic Policy and Development Unit).

Conclusions and Outlook

The introduction of constabulary police forces was not only one of the most far-reaching innovations for UN peace operations in recent years, but also one of the most advanced examples of doctrine development by DPKO. The preceding analysis of this process revealed a tentative list of enabling and constraining factors for doctrine development. Further empirical investigation is required to better understand the process and its critical junctures. Such research might take into account some or all of the following factors:

- The evidence from this and other cases strongly suggests that an effective *organizational infrastructure* might be necessary for doctrine development, but not sufficient. Such an

organizational infrastructure comprises “functional units and institutional mechanisms” (Benner and Rotmann 2008: 44) dedicated to the task of doctrine development which may include a certain level of qualified staff specifically dedicated to the task as well as effective procedures in place to bring proposals to the attention of senior officials and get decisions made. This understanding of organizational infrastructure captures some of the dimensions that military learning scholars consider part of “organizational culture” (Nagl 2005: 10). We consider it analytically useful to separate these material and formal institutional dimensions from less formal cultural factors that impact doctrine development in a bureaucratic organization – if only for the fact that very different policy prescriptions follow depending on the relative importance of each. With regard to constabulary police doctrine, it was only the full establishment of the Police Division’s Strategic Policy and Development Section and the institutionalization of guidance development at the very top of DPKO in 2005 that enabled formal doctrine development in principle. In contrast to DPKO’s larger Policy, Evaluation and Training Division which is effectively insulated against operational demands, the unit remains responsible for planning new missions. As a result, it is periodically being overwhelmed by its operational workload, effectively inhibiting progress on doctrine development.

- Many DPKO officials and outside experts with long experience in the bureaucracy describe the prevailing *organizational culture* of the department as one of “decision-making in a constant state of crisis.” Faced with a drive for a more professional knowledge management and codification of doctrine, some senior officials are concerned that the department may lose the very “constructive ambiguity” that allows UN peacekeeping to survive and sometimes succeed in the face of extremely complex situations on the ground and contradictory political pressures from member states. Guéhenno’s *Peace Operations 2010* agenda and his high-level support for professionalization has established a competing set of cultural norms within DPKO that may have contributed to the success, after 2005, of some doctrine development efforts. Based on anecdotal evidence on recent discussions about the “capstone doctrine”, however, this debate is far from won for the reformers.
- The role of *leadership* by a committed and skilful senior official in shepherding a proposal for doctrine through the bureaucratic and political minefield of the UN Secretariat was the single factor mentioned most often by interview partners as important for a doctrine development process to be completed with the core of its content intact. In future research, it might be fruitful to employ a more fine-grained set of categories such as Rid’s (2007) three distinct levels of leadership, mentioned above. Empirically, leadership is impossible to observe in document analysis and therefore hard to track with the instruments of this study. However, both in the basic informal shift toward constabulary police in 2003/04 and in the later initiation of guidance development, the record suggests a strong role of

individual or combined leadership by senior managers at the Police Division and in particular field operations. On a more general level, the leadership change at the top of the Police Division in early 2005 apparently brought with it a new focus beyond semi-identical individual mission strategies toward the development of formal doctrine.

- For an organization with tenuous formal and informal ties between the headquarters in New York and individual field operations, *HQ-field relations* are another likely factor influencing doctrine development processes. Again borrowing from Nagl (2005: 10), an incentive structure that promotes suggestions from the field, establishes routine contact between officials at headquarters and in the field and enables the informal creation of standard operating procedures from the bottom up to be validated and mainstreamed by the center may encourage effective doctrine development. At least until 2005, formal institutional links between DPKO and its field missions worked effectively only as far as the immediate operational needs of missions were concerned. The few anecdotal examples of doctrinal collaboration rested on personal continuity or contacts, i.e. a senior field manager changing into a senior position at headquarters, or being friends with someone in such a position. It will be interesting to see what effect the new knowledge sharing efforts of the Peacekeeping Best Practices Section will have on headquarters-field dynamics. Operational managers are already complaining about a “one way street” of additional reporting requirements *to* headquarters rather than substantive guidance *from* it (Interviews, May 2007).
- *Political pressure from member states* can cut both ways. Positively, it may promote a particular doctrine development process by forcing the secretariat to make it a priority through the budget process or the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, such as in the case of FPU-military cooperation – although, interestingly, even member state pressure did not guarantee speedy completion of guidance. Negatively, while much harder to detect, member states can also stifle doctrine development through micro-management or infighting among themselves, which may exacerbate preexisting bureaucratic divisions if particular coalitions of member states lobby different parts of the bureaucracy.
- Knowledge from outside (especially from the expert community) can help to inform the development of doctrine. This presupposes the ability of experts to communicate effectively with decision-makers in the UN system as well as the willingness on the part of the UN system to take into account findings by experts. Experts can also play an important role in terms of comparing the approaches of different players involved in peace operations (NATO, EU, African Union, US, UK).

This article only scratched the surface of what is a promising field for further research. Further in-depth examination is needed to determine patterns of relative influence of these factors for doctrine development. Beyond the example of constabulary police (that in itself

needs further exploration), the analysis of a larger variety of doctrine development processes at DPKO and within its field operations will be required to draw comparisons. Further research also needs to analyze the application of doctrine in the field and the presence or lack of training and evaluation – and in particular the challenge to develop doctrine that still allows the flexibility to address the fundamentally different challenges of each country on its own terms while at the same time providing for system-wide guidance and coherence.

Bibliography

- Ahmed, Salman, Paul Keating and Ugo Solinas (2007) 'Shaping the future of UN peace operations: is there a doctrine in the house?' *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 20:1, 11-28.
- Bellamy, Alex J. and Paul D. Williams (2007) *Contemporary Peace Operations: Four Challenges for the Brahimi Paradigm*. In Harvey Langholtz, Boris Kondoch and Alan Wells (eds.), *International Peacekeeping: The Yearbook of International Peace Operations*. Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1-28.
- Benner, Thorsten and Philipp Rotmann (2008) 'Learning to Learn? UN Peacebuilding and the Challenges of Building a Learning Organization' *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding* 2:1, 43-62.
- Blume, Till (2004) *Analyzing Organizational Change and Adaptation of Civilian Police Components in UN Peace Operations*. M.A. thesis submitted to the Fachbereich Politik- und Verwaltungswissenschaft. Konstanz: Universität Konstanz (retrieved 2006-08-01 from <http://www.ub.uni-konstanz.de/kops/volltexte/2006/1772/>).
- Broer, Harry and Michael Emery (1998) *Civilian Police in U.N. Peacekeeping Operations*. In Robert Oakley, Michael J. Dziedzic and Eliot M. Goldberg (eds.), *Policing the New World Disorder: Peace Operations and Public Security*. Washington, DC: National Defense University, 365-398.
- Chappell, Duncan and John Evans (1999) 'The Role, Preparation and Performance of Civilian Police in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations' *Criminal Law Forum* 10, 171-271.
- COESPU (2005) *Future Roles for Stability Police Units*. Washington, DC: Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units, Vicenza.
- Dahrendorf, Nicola (2003) *A Review of Peace Operations: A Case for Change. Synthesis Report*. London: Conflict, Security and Development Group, King's College London (retrieved 2006-06-07 from <http://ipi.sspp.kcl.ac.uk/rep002/index.html>).
- Downie, Richard D. (1998) *Learning from Conflict: The U.S. Military in Vietnam, El Salvador, and the Drug War*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing Group
- Durch, William J. (2004) *Building a Better Peace Operation: Lessons from the Brahimi Report Process*. Expert Policy Brief to the Secretary-General's High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change. New York: United Nations Foundation (retrieved 2007-07-07 from http://www.un-globalsecurity.org/pdf/Durch_paper_UN_reform_lessons_Brahimi.pdf).
- (2006) *Are We Learning Yet? The Long Road to Applying Best Practices*. In William J. Durch (ed.), *Twenty-First-Century Peace Operations*. Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 573-607.
- Durch, William J., Victoria K. Holt, Caroline R. Earle and Moira K. Shanahan (2003) *The Brahimi Report and the Future of U.N. Peace Operations*. Washington, DC: The Henry L. Stimson Center.
- Dziedzic, Michael J. (1998) *Introduction*. In Robert Oakley, Michael J. Dziedzic and Eliot M. Goldberg (eds.), *Policing the New World Disorder: Peace Operations and Public Security*. Washington, DC: National Defense University, 3-18.
- Guéhenno, Jean-Marie (2002) *On the Challenges and Achievements of Reforming UN Peace Operations*. In Edward Newman and Albrecht Schnabel (eds.), *Recovering from Civil Conflict: Reconciliation, Peace and Development*. London: Frank Cass, 69-80.

- (2005) *Interoffice Memorandum by Mr Jean-Marie Guéhenno, Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, to all DPKO headquarters and mission staff, dated 30 November 2005*. New York: UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (retrieved 2007-07-07 from <http://www.un.org/depts/dpko/dpko/selectedPSDG/guehennoDPKO2010.pdf>).
- Hansen, Annika S. (2002) *From Congo to Kosovo: Civilian Police in Peace Operations*. Adelphi Paper 343. London: Oxford University Press.
- Malone, David M. and Heiko Nitzschke (2004) 'Friends and Critics. Think Tanks and the United Nations' *D+C Development and Cooperation* 2004:1.
- Mobekk, Eirin (2005) *Identifying Lessons in United Nations International Policing Missions*. Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF).
- Nagl, John A. (2005) *Learning to Eat Soup With a Knife. Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya to Vietnam*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Nitzschke, Heiko and Peter Wittig (2007) 'UN-Friedenssicherung: Herausforderungen an die deutsche Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik' *Vereinte Nationen* 55:3, 89-95.
- Oakley, Robert B. and Michael J. Dziedzic (1998) *Conclusions*. In Robert Oakley, Michael J. Dziedzic and Eliot M. Goldberg (eds.), *Policing the New World Disorder: Peace Operations and Public Security*. Washington, DC: National Defense University, 509-536.
- Oakley, Robert, Michael J. Dziedzic and Eliot M. Goldberg (eds.) (1998) *Policing the New World Disorder: Peace Operations and Public Security*. Washington, DC: National Defense University.
- Perito, Robert M. (2004) *Where Is the Lone Ranger When We Need Him? America's Search for a Post-Conflict Stability Force*. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace.
- Rid, Thomas (2007) *War and Media Operations: The US Military and the Press from Vietnam to Iraq*. Cass Military Studies. London: Routledge.
- Serafino, Nina H. (2004) *Policing in Peacekeeping and Related Stability Operations: Problems and Proposed Solutions*. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service.
- Smith, Joshua G., Victoria K. Holt and William J. Durch (2006) *Enhancing United Nations Capacity for Post-Conflict Police Operations*. Report from the Project on Rule of Law in Post-Conflict Settings, Future of Peace Operations Program. Washington, DC: The Henry L. Stimson Center.
- UK NPJA (2007) *Doctrine Development*. UK National Policing Improvement Agency (retrieved 2007-06-25 from <http://npia.police.uk/en/5214.htm>).
- UN ACABQ (1998) *Support account for peacekeeping operations. Report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions*. UN Document A/52/892.
- (1999) *Support account for peacekeeping operations. Report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions*. UN Document A/54/661.
- (2001) *Implementation of the report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations: Report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions*. UN Document A/56/478.
- UN DPKO (1995) *United Nations Civilian Police Handbook*. New York: United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations.
- (1997) *Selection Standards and Training Guidelines for UNCIVPOL (Draft)*. New York: United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations.
- (2000) *United Nations Civilian Police Principles and Guidelines*. General Guidelines for Peacekeeping Operations. New York: United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations.
- (2001) *Note by the Military Advisor, Major General Tim Ford (Australian Army), to Andrew Grene, Policy Analysis Unit, 2001-07-02*. United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations.
- (2005a) *Guidelines for Formed Police Units on Assignment With Peacekeeping Operations*. UN Document DPKO/CPD/2005/00983.
- (2005b) *Policy Directive: DPKO Guidance Manuals*. UN Document 6400/ADM/POL/05/01.
- (2005c) *Standard Operating Procedure: Development of DPKO Guidance Materials*. UN Document SOP/6400/ADM/05/01.

- (2006a) *Capstone Doctrine for United Nations Peacekeeping Operations – Draft 2, 2006-07-08*. United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations.
- (2006b) *Functions and Organization of Formed Police Units in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations*. UN Document DPKO/PD/2006/00060.
- (2006c) *Guidelines for Formed Police Units on Assignment With Peacekeeping Operations*. UN Document DPKO/PD/2006/00015.
- (2007) *UN Police Activities*. Presentation by Andrew Carpenter, Chief, Strategic Policy & Development Section, Police Division. New York: UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations.
- UN DPKO/DFS (2008) *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines*. UN Document
- UN DPKO/PBPU (2004) *Lessons Learned Study on the Start-Up Phase of the United Nations Mission in Liberia*. New York, NY: UN DPKO, Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit.
- UN Secretary-General (1998a) *Support account for peacekeeping operations. Report of the Secretary-General*. UN Document A/52/837.
- (1998b) *Support account for peacekeeping operations. Report of the Secretary-General. Addendum*. UN Document A/53/854/Add.1.
- (1999a) *Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in East Timor*. UN Document S/1999/1024.
- (1999b) *Support account for peacekeeping operations. Report of the Secretary-General*. UN Document A/54/648.
- (2000a) *Support account for peacekeeping operations. Report of the Secretary-General*. UN Document A/54/800.
- (2000b) *Support account for peacekeeping operations. Report of the Secretary-General*. UN Document A/54/800.
- (2001) *Budget for the support account for peacekeeping operations for the period from 1 July 2001 to 30 June 2002*. UN Document A/55/862.
- (2003a) *Budget for the support account for peacekeeping operations for the period from 1 July 2003 to 30 June 2004*. UN Document A/57/732.
- (2003b) *Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council on Liberia*. UN Document S/2003/875.
- (2004a) *Budget for the support account for peacekeeping operations for the period from 1 July 2004 to 30 June 2005*. UN Document A/58/715.
- (2004b) *Report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services on the evaluation of the impact of the recent restructuring of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations*. UN Document A/58/746.
- (2004c) *Report of the Secretary-General on Haiti*. UN Document S/2004/300.
- (2005a) *Budget for the support account for peacekeeping operations for the period from 1 July 2005 to 30 June 2006*. UN Document A/59/730.
- (2005b) *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti*. UN Document S/2005/313.
- (2006) *Budget for the support account for peacekeeping operations for the period from 1 July 2006 to 30 June 2007*. UN Document A/60/727.
- UN Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (2005) *Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations and its Working Group at the 2005 Substantive Session*. UN Document A/59/19.
- (2006) *Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations and its Working Group at the 2006 Substantive Session*. UN Document A/60/19.
- United Nations (2000) *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations*. UN Document A/55/305-S/2000/809.